Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803010 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 17 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm in that he will be targeted by a Member of [NAME] ("[NAME]") affiliated with the [NAME] ("[NAME]"), because of his role and protest activities as an unofficial local leader of the [NAME] ("[NAME]"), a farmers’ union. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME] under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming [RESPONDENT] or [NAME] status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. [6] On 13 February 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. [7] The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim. It noted that the appellant’s claim centred on an incident in November 2021 when the [NAME] came to the appellant’s village in Haryana state to address the inhabitants. The villagers protested against the [NAME] and the [NAME] and, given that the appellant was the unofficial leader of the protest, he was threatened by the [NAME]. The [NAME] ordered the police to attack the protesters, resulting in an injury to the appellant. The police later refused to accept his complaint. Thereafter, the [NAME] sent “[NAME]” to harass him. The appellant was also hit by a plastic bullet when he was part of a crowd at a large demonstration in New Delhi in August 2022. The Tribunal advised in its letter: No sufficient risk of qualifying harm Not all harm entitles the appellant to protection under the Act. For [RESPONDENT] status, the appellant must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in [APPELLANT], which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act. For this, the appellant must be: a) in danger of being tortured; b) in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or c) in danger of arbitrary deprivation of life.

3 Additionally, the thresholds of both ‘real chance of being persecuted’ and being ‘in danger of’ one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility. [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57], HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189, at [55]–[60], and [NAME]) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83]. The evidence does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: The evidence does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: a) The appellant describes [[NAME]]’s animosity towards him as being personal. However, [[NAME]] left the [NAME] on 10 March 2024 and joined the [NAME]. He contested the 2024 Haryana Legislative Assembly election from the Uchana Kalan constituency, but lost. b) In November 2021, the farmers’ protests were underway in New Delhi and there was tension between the farmers and the [NAME] government. But those events are now over four years ago. Further, [[NAME]] is out of [NAME], in an opposition party to the [NAME]. There is no sensible reason why he would have any adverse interest in the appellant as a result of a brief confrontation under different circumstances, a long time ago. It is significant that there have been no further visits to the appellant’s house since [[APPELLANT]] left the [NAME]. c) As to the appellant’s attendance at a protest in New Delhi in August 2022, he was neither arrested nor suffered any serious harm. There is no reason to consider that that isolated event will have any future repercussions for him. The risk of serious harm for the appellant in the future appears to be no more than remote and speculative. Further, the gravity of harm involved, even taking the events cumulatively, falls well short of being serious, in the context of requiring the surrogate protection of another state. Internal protection alternative There is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. For all limbs of the claim, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assesses whether the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin; see sections 130 (2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and [NAME] (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217-218 and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [21].

4 An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT] itself. It appears to the Tribunal that the appellant could access, and reside safely in, any one of a number of cities in Haryana state, including Kaithal, Karnal or Rohtak, all of [which] have populations in the hundreds of thousands, with the majority being Hindu. Or, he could relocate to New Delhi, a metropolitan area of over 28 million people. He has the same opportunities to seek work there as anyone else. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. Indeed, [[NAME]] would have no means of knowing that the appellant was in [APPELLANT] at all, let alone where he was. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT] are available in the proposed locations. All appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, the appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of ‘a real chance’ and being ‘in danger of’ by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. [8] The Tribunal gave the appellant the opportunity to respond by 20 February 2026. [9] On 24 February 2026, counsel for the appellant provided a ‘Google’ translation of the appellant’s written response (in Hindi) to the Tribunal’s letter. The appellant states that, on 13 July 2025 and on 21 November 2025, [NAME] affiliated with the [NAME] went to the family home looking for him and threatening him with harm if [NAME] formed the next government. [10] Counsel also filed submissions in response to the Tribunal’s letter. [COUNSEL] submits that, given that the Tribunal is statutorily empowered to hear matters afresh by way of de novo hearing, the Tribunal is constraining its own powers “by declining to hear the case fresh”.

5 [11] More substantively, it is submitted that the appellant has provided sufficient evidence to a risk of qualifying harm. Further, the [NAME] is “likely to abuse their powers against the appellant given the country information and [APPELLANT]’s general human rights records”. [12] For these reasons, counsel submits that the appeal is not manifestly unfounded and requires an oral hearing. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [13] The Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to the appellant, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. As to counsel’s submissions in regard to the need for an oral hearing: (a) Counsel’s submission that not providing an oral hearing amounts to an impermissible constraint on the Tribunal’s statutory power to conduct a de novo assessment of the claim is rejected. It is unquestionably the case that section 233 of the Act provides that the Tribunal is, with limited exceptions, to conduct a de novo oral hearing in relation to [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] appeal. But the same section of the Act also empowers the Tribunal to not offer an oral hearing if it determines an appeal to be manifestly unfounded. To the extent that this acts as a constraint, it is only on the Tribunal’s default process, not its powers, and is in any event one expressly authorised by statute. (b) Further, the Tribunal is not declining to hear the matter afresh when it considers an appeal to be manifestly unfounded. As observed in ZB ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [20], the manifestly unfounded jurisdiction does not operate so as to deny an appellant the right to a substantive appeal; that remains. It simply truncates the appeal process by removing that part of the process where an appellant (and any witnesses of fact) gives oral evidence to enable the Tribunal to be satisfied as to their credibility to provide the factual basis upon which it will undertake the downstream assessments of the relevant legal tests. (c) The submissions as to qualifying harm and the internal protection alternative are noted but are unpersuasive. The evidence of the recent visits are noted, but does not address why this would give rise

6 to a risk of serious harm, particularly given the passage of time since the events of 2021. Nor is the question of the internal protection alternative meaningfully addressed. The bare assertion that the [NAME] may be able to abuse his power to locate the appellant is not evidence of the same. Quite why this [NAME], who is no longer associated with the [NAME], would have any interest in pursuing the appellant elsewhere given the farmers’ protests which took place in 2021 and 2022 are no longer a political issue, is not addressed. [14] Given the above, counsel’s submissions do not persuade the Tribunal that an oral hearing is necessary. Pursuant to section 233 of the Act, it therefore determines not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [15] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form, the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview), other material contained in the appeal file and in counsel’s submissions and the attachments. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [16] The appellant was born in Z village (a village of approximately 4,000 inhabitants), Haryana in 1983. He is a Hindu of the [NAME]. [17] The appellant's father died in 2011. The appellant and his brother continued farming the family land, with his brother managing the crops and the appellant looking after the dairy farming. [18] In 2013, the appellant joined the [NAME] as an ordinary member, with no official position. From 2020 until 2023, he acted as the unofficial leader of the [NAME] members from three local villages. Some of the members suggested that he [NAME] on this role, and so he did. It was unpaid and undocumented. [19] In November 2021, a [NAME] Member of [NAME], [NAME], came to Z village to address the inhabitants. About 70 people, including the appellant, held black flags, shouting slogans such as "Go back, go back" at [NAME] and against the [NAME]. The slogans asked the government to [NAME] back the bills which were the subject of

7 the then-existing farmers’ protests and demanding a guarantee of the minimum sales price ("MSP") for their produce. Given that the appellant was the unofficial leader of the protest, [NAME] approached him and said, "I am very powerful and I will see you". [20] [NAME]’s orders, the police charged the protestors with lathis and the appellant was badly beaten. The police took mobile phones from people trying to video the incident. They also warned people that, if they released any coverage of the incident to anyone, they would face dreadful consequences. [21] The appellant suffered injuries, including his left knee ligaments having been torn. He was admitted to hospital for an operation. [22] The appellant reported the incident to the Y Police Station. They did not fill out a First Information Report (“FIR") because he was reporting an [NAME]. [23] From January 2022 onwards, [NAME] sent police or "[NAME]" to the appellant's home and farm approximately every one to two months. They spoke to his brother and made threats against the appellant. They did not threaten or hurt the appellant's extended family, or the appellant himself. [24] The appellant took part in a protest at New Delhi in August 2022. There were around 100,000 persons peacefully protesting when the police set upon them with tear gas and plastic bullets. The appellant was hit with a plastic bullet as he was running away but was not injured. [25] On 23 May 2023, the appellant applied for a New Zealand visitor visa, with the help of an agent. [26] In June 2023, the police or [NAME] came to the appellant's home. He was not there, because he was at the farm. The police went to the farm in the evening. the appellant hid in a bajra (pearl millet) crop and switched off his phone. [27] On 17 August 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand on a visitor visa. [28] On 18 February 2024, the appellant became unlawfully in New Zealand. [29] The police or [NAME] visited the appellant's home in August 2024. His mother and brother told them that there was no point looking for the appellant because he had gone to another country.

8 [30] On 5 November 2024, the appellant was detained under section 313 of the Act for the purpose of facilitating his deportation. On 13 November 2024, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] received notification of the appellant's intention to claim [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] status. On 12 December 2024, he lodged a Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form. [31] On 20 March 2025, the appellant was interviewed. On 16 April 2025, an interview report was sent to the appellant via his counsel. On 27 May 2025, the appellant responded to the interview report. His claim was declined on 11 June 2025. [32] Subsequent to the decline of his claim, on 13 July 2025 and again on 21 November 2025, [NAME]’s [NAME] enquired in the village and also came to the appellant’s house, asking when the appellant will return. The [NAME] warned his parents “if [NAME] forms the government in the coming elections, then what can we do”. ASSESSMENT [33] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [34] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a [NAME], section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [RESPONDENT]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise.

9 Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [35] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the Convention or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. THE [RESPONDENT] [36] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT]. [37] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [38] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [39] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [40] In terms of [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellants being persecuted in the country of nationality?

10 (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [41] It is necessary to address the relevant country information. None has been provided by the appellant or counsel, but the Tribunal’s own research establishes the following. Country information [42] [APPELLANT] is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in [APPELLANT] in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [43] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [44] The appellant has had multiple occasions on which to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [RESPONDENT[NAME], in his interview with [RESPONDENT] and protection officer, in his response to the interview report and in his opportunity to respond to the Tribunal’s letter. The Tribunal is satisfied that he has had ample opportunity, over an extended period and with the assistance of counsel, to present his claim. See here the discussion in ZB ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [10]–[27].

11 [45] For reasons which are not easily fathomable given: (a) the length of time that the appellant has been away from his village and its environs and (b) the fact that the events of 2021, which brought the appellant to the adverse attention of [NAME], have long since receded into political irrelevance, it seems that there have nonetheless been visits to the family home in August 2024, July 2025 and November 2025 by the local police and/or [NAME] associated with [NAME], asking about the appellant’s return. [46] Even accepting this surprising longevity of interest to be credible (as the Tribunal is required to do with ‘manifestly unfounded’ cases), this is far from compelling evidence that the appellant faces a risk of serious harm in breach of his rights at the real chance level. These recent events need to be seen in context. The last time that the appellant suffered any physical injury due to [NAME]’s animosity towards him was in 2021. The appellant says that, in the aftermath of the November 2021 protest in the village for which he was blamed by [NAME], both the police and [NAME] came to the family home thereafter looking for him. However, it seems that they did so whenever the appellant was not at home or at times when he was able to hide from them in the fields. It stands to reason that if a powerful [NAME] such as [NAME] was truly intent on causing the appellant serious harm, he would have arranged for the police, or [NAME], to visit the family home at a time when the appellant would be present or to accost him when going about his daily affairs at some point in the almost two years which elapsed before the appellant’s eventual departure for New Zealand. [47] The recent visit to which the appellant refers must be seen in this light. All the more so given the passage of time and political irrelevance of the events of 2021. While harassment; the recent visits are no more than this. There is no compelling basis upon which to conclude that they signal an intent to cause him serious harm amounting to his being persecuted. Internal protection alternative [48] Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in breach of his human rights in his village, he could avoid this by moving elsewhere. [49] In respect of both the claim for protection as [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful

12 domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in [NAME] (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [50] As set out in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and [NAME] (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT] itself. [51] The Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant could access, and reside safely in, any one of a number of cities in Haryana state, including Kaithal, Karnal or Rohtak, all of which have populations in the hundreds of thousands, with the majority being Hindu. Or, he could relocate to New Delhi, a metropolitan area of over 28 million people. He has the same opportunities to seek work there as anyone else. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. Indeed, [NAME] would have no means of knowing that the appellant was in [APPELLANT] at all, let alone where he was. Counsel’s submission regarding the possibility of [NAME] abusing his power is noted, but this begs the questions as to how he could be aware of the appellant’s date and place of return and where he was living. No country information has been

13 filed to establish that this would occur, let alone in relation to such low-level and isolated village-level incidents. It is the appellant’s statutory responsibility to establish this aspect of his claim, as with any other. [52] The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT] are available in the proposed locations. All appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, the appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. [53] The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in [APPELLANT] is no more than speculative and remote. For this reason, he does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT]. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [54] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [55] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a [RESPONDENT] under the [RESPONDENT] and section 129 of the Act. The [NAME] [56] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [57] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a [NAME] information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a [NAME] has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a [NAME], or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a [NAME] or other person acting in an official capacity. It

14 does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [58] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [59] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the [NAME] categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [60] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in [APPELLANT], to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a [NAME].

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [61] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [62] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [63] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [64] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the

15 [RESPONDENT] context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in [APPELLANT]. [65] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in [APPELLANT]. He is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [66] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act.

CONCLUSION [67] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and therefore is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [68] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [69] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant.

16 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member [70] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member