Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal Due to Lack of Evidence

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803182 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: B L Burson (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Decision: 15 April 2026 __________________________________________________________________

DECISION ________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, or to be in danger of being subjected to another form of harm entitling him to protection in New Zealand arising from his activities supporting a friend’s failed candidacy in [NAME_2] ("panchayat") elections held in November 2015, and because of his debt to a local money lender. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as a refugee or a protected person under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming refugee or protected person status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_3] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_3]. [6] On 24 October 2025, the appellant filed (undated) statements from his wife and mother, corroborating the appellant’s account of the problems he had faced in India. [7] On 9 February 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim as it related to: (a) the harassment he suffered and interference with his business by local “goons” from the [NAME_4] ("[NAME_5]") in retaliation for his assisting a friend, [NAME_6], who had unsuccessfully run against the [NAME_5] for the [NAME_7] ("INC") in the 2015 election and (b) with an unlicensed money lender. It continued: No sufficient risk of qualifying harm Not all harm entitles the appellant to protection under the Act. For refugee status, the appellant must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in India, which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act. This means, the appellant is: a) in danger of being tortured; b) in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or c) in danger of arbitrary deprivation of life. Additionally, the thresholds of both “a real chance of being persecuted” and being “in danger of” one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility; see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; [NAME_8] (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]; and AI (South Africa) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83].

3 The evidence does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: a) The harm the appellant has experienced to date is not serious. While the [problems] he has encountered with the [NAME_9] can be regarded as an interference with his right [to] work, he has been able find other work to support himself and his family. The assault he suffered at the end of March 2022 was minor. b) [[NAME_10]] [the moneylender] would appear to have no motivation in seeking to harm the appellant. It is not in his interest to do so. The appellant has been taking active steps since being in New Zealand to repay the loan which will further reduce the likelihood that [[NAME_10]] would want to inflict any harm on him in the future, let alone harm of a serious nature. c) The appellant can avoid any risk by repaying the loan from [[NAME_10]] by working in India, if he has not already done so in view of his remittances in the two-and-a-half-years he has been in New Zealand. d) The appellant’s support of the INC was at a low-level and historical, being principally supporting the failed candidacy of his friend [[NAME_6]] in 2015. The chance that this activity, or any activity he would do in the future in support of [[NAME_6]] would give risk to serious harm is remote and speculative Accordingly, the risk of serious harm for the appellant in the future is no more than speculative. Further, the gravity of harm involved, even taking the events cumulatively, falls well short of being serious, in the context of requiring the surrogate protection of another state. Lack of nexus to Convention ground fatal to refugee claim In every claim for refugee status, the appellant must establish that the predicament has a sufficient nexus to one of the five Convention grounds. In order to be recognised as a refugee, a claimant must establish not only a well-founded fear of being persecuted, but also that this predicament is linked to one of the five Convention grounds. This requires that the Convention ground be a contributing cause to the risk of being persecuted; see Refugee Appeal No 72635 (6 September 2002), at [173]. In this appeal, it does not appear that the appellant has... indicated anything in the background circumstances which would support a finding that any one of the five Convention grounds has or will in any way contribute to his predicament. ... He simply owes money to a money lender. For this reason alone, his refugee claim must fail; see discussion in ZB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802975 at [50]-[54]. Internal protection alternative There is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. In respect of both the refugee claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assesses whether the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151.

4 It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217-218 and see also Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] et seq. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see Refugee and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706. The events which have happened were highly localised in nature. There appears to be no reason why the appellant could not live safely elsewhere [in] Kerala, or if necessary, in Tamil Nadu. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [NAME_11] itself. It appears to the Tribunal that the appellant could access, and reside safely in a different place in Kerala, away from the [NAME_12], where he would not be at any risk from them. Kerala is a huge state of some 33 million people, of which more than six million are Christian. There are 78 taluks with a total of 1,670 villages in Kerala. In the coastal districts of Thrissur and Ernakulam, for example, there are sizeable Christian populations of many millions. The evidence does not establish that, if the appellant moved to another village or town, say Thrissur city or Ernakulam city, he would have any further difficulty from the small number [NAME_13] in [Z] with whom he has had past problems. He could also move to live in Tamil Nadu, for example, in Chennai or Coimbatore. The evidence does not point to any risk there of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [NAME_11] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, the appellant is not outside India his country of nationality owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to respond It appears that appellant has neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason nor grounds for being recognised as a protected person under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. His claim appears to be, prima facie,

5 manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 16 February 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence your client wishes to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer your client an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice. [8] On 16 February 2026, counsel for the appellant provided written submissions in response to the Tribunal’s letter. In support, the appellant has provided undated statements: (a) From the appellant’s wife, who confirms the appellant’s account of his problems with the [NAME_9] and [NAME_10]. She claims that his friend intervened with the [NAME_9] and brokered a deal that the goons would stop harassing the appellant and his family on the condition the appellant destroyed all the evidence he had stored on his phone as to their harassment and that he leave India. (b) From the appellant’s mother, who confirms that the appellant had problems with the [NAME_5] and [NAME_10]. She also states that, due to the harassment, the appellant had tried to commit suicide, after which his friends made an agreement with the appellant’s tormentors that he would leave the country. [9] These statements effectively repeat the contents of their statements that were submitted on 24 October 2025. [10] While the submissions are, to some extent repetitive, in summary, counsel contends that the appellant’s claim is not manifestly unfounded because: (a) Even if the appellant has not suffered serious harm in the past there is still a significant risk that he will be even more seriously harmed. The repeated targeting and harm by [NAME_9] increases the risk of serious harm in the future. (b) The Tribunal’s assessment does not consider the wider context and the targeting that perceived activists face in India. In this regard, counsel refers to the United States Department of State (“USDOS”), 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025), Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – India at G3,

6 and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, [NAME_14] India (29 September 2023). Counsel submits that, while the appellant’s support for his friend’s candidacy occurred in 2015, the appellant’s problems should be considered in the context of the high level of political violence, corruption, religious intolerance and arbitrary killings that this country information indicates. Counsel submits that, if the appellant continues to support the INC, it is statistically likely that he will be targeted in some way. (c) The appellant’s predicament is analogous to that of the appellant in SK (India) [2024] NZIPT 802322 and RE (India) [2024] NZIPT 802321. (d) While the appellant is repaying the moneylender, given the prevalence of violence in the country, it is not out of the question that the appellant could be targeted. (e) It is not safe for the appellant to reside in Kerala. The [NAME_5] has previously won many elections in the state and has significant influence. It has the broad network of political influence that exists across India. [11] For these reasons, counsel submits that the appeal is not manifestly unfounded and requires an oral hearing. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [12] The Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to the appellant, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. The statements from the appellant’s wife and mother are noted but it is not necessary to convene an oral hearing to take their evidence. As noted in YT (India) [2025] NZIPT 802899 at [9](d), where the Tribunal finds an appeal to be manifestly unfounded, it is premised upon an acceptance of the claim, as asserted. [13] As to counsel’s submissions in regard to the need for an oral hearing: (a) The submissions do not address the question of a lack of nexus to a Convention ground as it relates to his money lender-related problem. The lack of such a nexus is, on its own, fatal to this aspect of the refugee claim, rendering it manifestly unfounded.

7 (b) Counsel’s submissions regarding an ongoing risk despite the passage of time since the appellant’s friend’s failed candidacy in 2015 are noted but they do not meaningfully address why this particular appellant would be at risk in the future, at the real chance level, because of events which happened over a decade ago now and in respect of which he has not suffered serious harm at any time. Insofar as counsel relies on general country information establishing extensive political violence, corruption, religious intolerance and arbitrary killings, this does not persuade the Tribunal that the appeal cannot properly be regarded as manifestly unfounded. The country information cited is of a general nature, aggregating reports from across India into broad statements at the national scale. As noted in AN (India) [2026] NZIPT 803146, it is how general conditions have and will be experienced locally by the appellant (as with all appellants) which shapes the risk to him. In a country as vast as India, and with a federal structure which gives rise to some differentiation between states in terms of the local conditions, it cannot be presumed that risk vectors are homogenous across the entirety of the country. Nothing in counsel’s submissions meaningfully addresses the lack of a localised risk to the appellant, the general country conditions notwithstanding. (c) The appellant’s predicament is far-removed from the appellants in SK (India) and RE (India). Both cases concerned risks to [NAME_28] who actively engaged with pro-Khalistan activities online and one – the appellant in SK (India) – had a prominent pro-Khalistan tattoo. The contextual backdrop to those appeals, namely, the decades long and ongoing campaign for an independent Sikh homeland means that little, if anything can be taken from those appeals in the evaluation of the future risk faced by this appellant because of his historical support for a failed [NAME_15] in local elections not in the Punjab, but in another part of India, over a decade ago. (d) As regards the issue of an internal protection alternative, counsel’s submission relating to the [NAME_5]’s “broad network of political influence” does not address why local [NAME_5] “goons” would have any interest in using such a network, even presuming it exists, to locate the appellant elsewhere.

8 [14] Given the above, counsel’s submissions do not persuade the Tribunal that an oral hearing is necessary. Pursuant to section 233 of the Act, it therefore determines not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [15] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form, the decision of the [NAME_3] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview), other material contained in the appeal file, including counsel’s submissions and the statements from his wife and mother filed in support of the appeal. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [16] The appellant was born in Z village, Y district, Kerala in 1988. He has two siblings: a brother and a sister. The appellant and his family are of Malayali ethnicity, and followers of the Roman Catholic faith. The appellant's father is a farmer, and his mother is a housewife. [17] In approximately 2005, the appellant completed his schooling. In 2006 or 2010, he did a course in graphic design. After completing the course, he began working in different jobs, doing fabricating and painting. [18] In 2012, the appellant joined the [NAME_7] ("INC"). The appellant liked the INC because it was more peaceful than other political parties in Kerala, such as the [NAME_16] ("[NAME_17]"), the Communist Party of India ("CPI"), and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) ("[NAME_18])"). The [NAME_19]) were part of the [NAME_4] ("[NAME_5]") political coalition. [19] The appellant's role in the INC was to collect money from party members for a chit fund, a type of lottery, which was run by the party and overseen by the government. [20] In 2015, the appellant started a business located approximately one kilometre from his home. He worked in the business by himself and did not have any employees. To finance his business, he took a loan of Rs2,000,000 from a local moneylender named [NAME_10], who was connected to [NAME_19]). Interest on the loan was Rs1,500 per month on every Rs100,000 borrowed.

9 [21] In 2015, the appellant began working with other INC members to support the candidacy of his friend, [NAME_6], in the [NAME_2] ("panchayat") elections, which were to be held in November 2015. [NAME_6] was running for the INC in the Z panchayat where the appellant lived. [22] The appellant worked daily to support [NAME_6]. As a consequence, he began to receive threats from [NAME_9], telling him to cease his activities. The other people supporting [NAME_6] also received threats but not to the same degree as the appellant. He did not report the threats to the police out of fear he would be killed by the people threatening him. [23] In November 2015, the elections were held. After voting had finished, the appellant was standing outside a school that had been used as a voting station, when he was attacked by approximately four [NAME_13]. Two of the appellant's attackers were [NAME_9] who had been involved in other attacks on [NAME_19])'s political opponents. The appellant managed to escape his attackers and run home. [24] [NAME_6] was defeated in the Z panchayat elections by a [NAME_18]) [NAME_15] and the [NAME_5] took control of the panchayat. [25] A few days after the election, [NAME_18]) party members ransacked the appellant’s business premises. The appellant was beaten in the attack and some property smashed. Before leaving, the appellant's attackers told him that if he attempted to file a case with the police, they would kill him. [26] The appellant believed that he had continued to be of interest to [NAME_19]) after [NAME_6]’s election defeat because he was involved in the church and was well known, and [NAME_19]) were concerned he might get involved in political activities again. [27] The appellant did not report the attack to the police. He repaired what had been damaged and reopened the shop. However, when he attempted to renew his business licence, his application was rejected because of his political opponents’ influence over the local administration. It was difficult for the appellant to operate his business without a licence, and he began to have problems repaying his debt to [NAME_10]. [28] At the end of 2016, the appellant sold the business but received only a quarter of what he had invested in the business. He remained living in his home in Z and supported himself doing small fabricating and painting jobs. He also

10 continued to work for the INC by sharing party information on his Facebook account and encouraging people he met through his role as youth president of his church, to join the INC. He did not have any significant problems with his political opponents, except if he came across them in the street, when he would be verbally abused. [29] In 2018, the appellant married and then lived at his wife’s family home in Y village, which was approximately 35 kilometres from Z. Their first son was born in 2020 and their second son in 2022. [30] In 2019, national elections ("Lok Sabha") were held in India. The appellant's electorate was won by an [COMPANY_20]. [31] In 2020, panchayat elections were held. The appellant’s ward was won by an INC member. [32] In February 2021, [NAME_9] went to the appellant's home in Z and threatened the appellant's parents, telling them that the appellant owed money to [NAME_10]. The appellant’s father was pushed over during the incident and windows in the house were broken. The appellant's father did not report the incident to the police because he was afraid of what the goons would do if he did. [33] In 2021, elections for the [NAME_21] were held. The local seat was won by an [COMPANY_20]. [34] In August 2021, the appellant and his family returned to his parents' home in Z. The appellant had returned to his home because he thought that the situation with his political opponents had settled down and he did not want to stay at his wife’s parents' home for too long. [35] In October 2021, the appellant opened another business also located in Z. He thought that, after such a long time, it would be safe to open a new shop in the same area. He borrowed Rs1,000,000 from friends to open his new business. He had approached [NAME_10] for the finance, but [NAME_10] had refused, as the appellant was still indebted to him for the money he had borrowed to finance his previous business. [36] Shortly after opening his new business, the appellant was visited at his shop by the same two [NAME_9] who were part of the group who attacked him in 2015. These men warned him that they would not allow him to continue operating his business.

11 [37] At the end of March 2022, these same two [NAME_9] arrived at the appellant’s home with three or four other men. They were armed. The appellant was hit on the face, and he and his other family members were all frightened by what was happening. [38] The appellant did not report the attack on his home to the police because he was afraid that doing so would cause him more problems. After the attack, the appellant realised that he could not stay in his home or run his business any longer, and that he would be unable to repay the money he had borrowed. He felt broken mentally and suicidal. [39] Two of the appellant’s INC friends saw how he was, and attempted to resolve the problem. They telephoned [NAME_19]) and spoke to the panchayat president of [NAME_19]). [NAME_19]) responded by demanding that the appellant cease his business and leave the country. [NAME_19]) also demanded that he relinquish his mobile phone so that the evidence he had saved on the phone of the attack on his shop, including photographs of a broken window, and the complaint he had written, could be destroyed. He did so. [40] At the end of 2022, the appellant closed the shop and returned to doing the same small jobs, painting and fabricating, he had done in the past. While he remained in his home, he was still afraid of [NAME_19]). As such, he did not go out much, did not get involved in politics, and did he best to avoid people like the two [NAME_9]. [41] In 2023, the appellant realised that he would not get any justice in India, or have any financial security, and he made the decision to leave the country. [42] On 9 August 2023, the appellant lodged an application for a visitor's visa with Immigration New Zealand which was approved on 21 August 2023. The appellant departed India and arrived in New Zealand the following day on 9 September 2023. [43] After finding work in New Zealand, the appellant began sending money to repay his debt to [NAME_10]. He has repaid at least Rs500,000 to [NAME_10]. [44] On 12 September 2023, the [NAME_3] received the appellant's Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status form. He later filed a statement in support of the claim.

12 [45] In 2024, Lok Sabha elections were held in India. The local seat was won by an [COMPANY_20]. [46] On 11 and 12 December 2024, the appellant was interviewed by a refugee and protection officer. On 23 July 2025, an interview report was sent to the appellant's representative. On 20 August 2025, the [NAME_3] received the appellant's response to the interview report. [47] On 10 September 2025, the [NAME_3] declined the claim. ASSESSMENT [48] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [NAME_11]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_22] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [49] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a protected person, section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [NAME_11]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [50] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the Convention or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal.

13 THE [NAME_11] [51] Section 129(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 provides that: A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of the [NAME_11]. [52] Article 1A(2) of the [NAME_11] provides that a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [53] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_23] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and [NAME_8] (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [54] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [55] In terms of Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellants being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? [56] The protection afforded by the [NAME_11] is not focussed on harm in the past. Its gaze is fixed firmly on the risk of harm in the future. What has happened in the past can, of course, be an indicator of what might happen in the future. However, where, as here, a past instance of harm becomes remote in time, without further harm arising, it ceases to be a compelling indicator of risk of future harm.

14 Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [57] It is necessary to address the relevant country information. Country information [58] India is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in India in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [59] Counsel cites the Department of Foreign Affairs and [NAME_14]: India (10 December 2023) which confirmed that the predatory practices of unlicensed moneylenders operating outside the law continues. It also notes, at para 3.51 to which counsel refers, that Christians are a minority in India. It goes on to note, however, that acceptance and respect of Christianity by non- Christians differs from place to place (para 3.55). [60] The Freedom House report is overly general and adds very little. Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [61] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [62] The appellant has had multiple occasions on which to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [NAME_3], in his interview with a refugee and protection officer, in his response to the interview report and in his opportunity to respond to the

15 Tribunal’s letter. The Tribunal is satisfied that he has had ample opportunity, over an extended period and with the assistance of counsel, to present his claim. See here the discussion in ZB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [10]−[27]. [63] In summary, the harm which has occurred to the appellant in the past is that: (a) In 2015, the appellant began to receive threats from [NAME_9] telling him to cease his activities in support of his friend [NAME_6] in the (then) forthcoming panchayat elections. (b) In the days after the 2015 election (which the [NAME_5] [NAME_15] had won), the appellant was attacked by approximately four [NAME_13] while standing outside a school. Later, he was beaten in his shop and freezers at the business were smashed. (c) Despite repairing the damage and re-opening his shop, the appellant’s application for a business licence was rejected, he believes because of his political opponents’ influence over the local administration. It was difficult for the appellant to operate his business without a licence, and he began to have problems repaying his debt to [NAME_10], an unlicensed local moneylender, from whom he had taken a loan of Rs2,000,000 to establish his business. (d) From 2016, the appellant was verbally abused by [NAME_9] when going about his daily life. (e) In 2021, some three years after the appellant had moved to live with his wife’s parents at their family home in Y village, situated approximately 35 kilometres from the appellant’s family home in Z village, [NAME_9] went to the appellant’s family home and threatened his parents over the money that the appellant owed to [NAME_10]. The appellant’s father was pushed over during the incident and windows in the house were broken. (f) The appellant returned to live in Z village in August 2021. He opened a new business there in October 2021. Shortly after he had established the new business, two of the [NAME_9] who had been harassing him since 2015 came to his new business premises and warned him that they would not allow him to continue operating his business

16 (g) In March 2022, the two goons, who were armed, came to the appellant’s family home and hit the appellant in the face. The appellant told the two men of his intention to make a complaint and that he had evidence to support this. No Real Chance of Serious Harm [64] As noted in DS (Iran), not all harm arising from breaches of human rights will qualify as being persecuted. The threshold is that the harm must be serious. In that regard, the purpose of the [NAME_11] is to provide the surrogate protection of another state when the claimant’s own state is unable or unwilling to protect the person. That surrogate protection is not intended to be available where the harm at issue is not serious. [65] The evidence does not establish a risk of serious harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility. It is accepted that the appellant has experienced interference with his right to security of the person (Article 9 of the ICCPR) but this has been only occasional over a period of years and has not, in any event, resulted in serious harm to him. His support of the INC is at a low-level, being principally supporting the failed candidacy of his friend [NAME_6] in 2015 and posting INC material to his Facebook page. Even assuming that he continues to post such material, the chance that this activity, or any other activity he would do in the future in support of the INC, would give rise to serious harm is remote and speculative. [66] While the problems that the appellant encountered with his business at the hands of the [NAME_9] can be regarded as an interference with his right to work (Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), he has been able to find other work to support himself and his family. It has not resulted in serious ham to him. [67] The Tribunal does not overlook the appellant’s evidence that this interference with his business impeded his ability to repay [NAME_10]. However, there is no evidence that [NAME_10] is motivated to harm the appellant. It is not in his interest to do so. The appellant has been taking active steps since being in New Zealand to repay the loan which will further reduce the likelihood that [NAME_10] would want to inflict any harm on him in the future, let alone harm of a serious nature. Furthermore, the appellant can avoid any risk by repaying the loan from [NAME_10] by working in India, if he has not already done so via his remittances in the two and a half years he has been in New Zealand.

17 [68] There is no sufficient evidential basis upon which the Tribunal could reasonably conclude, even assessing what he suffered in the past cumulatively, that the risk of the appellant suffering serious harm in the future in breach of his human rights is at the real chance threshold. The risk of serious harm for the appellant in the future is no more than speculative. Further, the gravity of harm involved, even taking the events cumulatively, falls well short of being serious, in the context of requiring the surrogate protection of another state. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [69] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, it is not necessary to address this issue. Nevertheless, as noted in ZB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [52]: It is sometimes argued that a debtor’s religion, ethnicity or political affiliation is a contributing cause of the risk from a moneylender (and their associates) perhaps belonging to a different — often majority — social group. Such submissions are typically misplaced because, at best, they involve the identification of two evidentially established ‘dots’ — a risk and a Convention protected characteristic — but dots which nonetheless remain unconnected by way of any evidence of the required nexus. Moneylenders simply want to be repaid and there tends to be an absence of any compelling evidence establishing that any risk of persecutory harm the debtor claimant may face is somehow different to those faced by a debtor who does not possess the Convention-relevant characteristic so as to provide a sufficient evidential base to support a finding of nexus, even to the low ‘contributing cause’ standard. [70] The appellant is Christian. He supports the INC. However, there is nothing to support a finding that his religion or politics will in any way contribute to his predicament as it relates to [NAME_10]. While the two [NAME_9] threatened his family over his unpaid loan to [NAME_10] in 2021, there is nothing to link their involvement to any political support the appellant had for the INC, nor his faith. Internal Protection Alternative [71] Further, in respect of both the claim for protection as a refugee under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as

18 the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [72] It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205 at 217-218 and see also Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] et seq. [73] Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see Refugee and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706. [74] An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [NAME_11] itself. [75] The Tribunal is satisfied that, in any event, the appellant could access, and reside safely in, a different place in Kerala or, if necessary, in Tamil Nadu, away from the [NAME_12], where he would not be at any risk from them. [76] Kerala is a huge state of some 33 million people, of which more than six million are Christian. There are 78 taluks with a total of 1,670 villages in Kerala. In the coastal districts of Thrissur and Ernakulam, for example, there are

19 sizeable Christian populations of many millions. The evidence does not establish that, if the appellant moved to another village or town in Thrissur city or Ernakulam city, he would have any further difficulty from the small number [NAME_13] in Z village with whom he has had past problems. He could also move to live in Tamil Nadu, for example in Chennai or Coimbatore. In each place the appellant could work without interference and repay [NAME_10] as required. [77] The evidence does not point to any risk in any of these places of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [NAME_11] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative.

Accordingly, the appellant is not outside India his country of nationality owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk falls short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not require the surrogate protection of another state. Conclusion on Claim to Refugee Status [78] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a refugee under the [NAME_11] and section 129 of the Act. The [NAME_22] [79] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_22] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [80] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME_22], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

20 [81] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [82] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the protected person categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the refugee enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [83] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in India, to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as protected persons in New Zealand under the [NAME_22]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_22] [84] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [85] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [86] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [87] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the refugee enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the refugee context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in India.

21 [88] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in India. [89] It is not overlooked that the evidence before the Tribunal refers to the appellant having contemplated suicide. As regards Article 6 of the ICCPR (which section 131 of the Act partially domesticates) as it relates to suicide, this was signalled in CA (Fiji) [2013] 800328. The appeal there concerned a claim, supported by psychological evidence, that the appellant might commit suicide if returned to Fiji. While a matter of humanitarian concern, of itself, it does not amount to a breach of Article 6 in all the circumstances. As to this, the Tribunal observed, at [58]: Finally, the Tribunal notes [the psychologist’s] concern that there is a high risk of suicide if the appellant is removed from New Zealand. This, in itself, does not constitute being persecuted. International human rights law recognises that the right to life under Article 6 ICCPR includes a duty to protect life which, in certain circumstances (such as detention), imposes obligations on states to take reasonable steps to prevent suicide…. The reality, however, is that the state is simply unable to prevent a citizen outside its control, who is determined to take their own life, from doing so. The obligation on a state to take steps to prevent suicide can never be that broad such that there is a failure of state protection whenever it occurs. In any event, there is no evidence before the Tribunal to establish that if the relevant [NAME_24] were informed of this concern, they would not take any steps, let alone any steps on account of the appellant’s ethnicity. [90] So too for this appellant. Kerala outlawed unlicensed moneylending activity nearly 70 years ago; see the [NAME_25] Act 1958. While the practice endures, there is no evidence that the Kerala police would not investigate any complaint that the appellant made to them of any harassment he encountered. Should the appellant contemplate taking his own life at some point in the future because of his circumstances, this would not be an ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ for the purposes of section 131. [91] Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [92] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act.

22 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

B L Burson Member

CONCLUSION [93] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of the [NAME_11] and, therefore, is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME_22] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [94] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [95] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [96] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “B L Burson” B L Burson Member