Tribunal Rejects Refugee Status Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803288 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 21 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION ___________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm from his [NAME] and other relatives who are targeting him due to his blocking his wife from contacting them after the [NAME] became involved in an extramarital affair with an unsavoury character. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME] under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] The Tribunal must ordinarily provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming [RESPONDENT] or [NAME] status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] On 15 August 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] interviewed the appellant in respect of his claim. By decision dated 11 November 2025, it declined the appellant’s claim. The appellant then lodged the present appeal. [6] On 7 April 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim and gave him the opportunity to respond by 14 April 2026: The Tribunal has received the above appeal. I am instructed by the Tribunal to write to you as follows. Whether to offer an oral hearing Normally, the Tribunal offers [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] [NAME] an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if an appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME], the Tribunal may determine his or her appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 15 August 2025. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal may be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing the [NAME] an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of the claim, as recorded in the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME], is:

3 a) The appellant, of the [NAME], was born in [A town], Uttarakhand, [APPELLANT] in the late 1990s. He has two siblings. b) In 2018, the appellant had an arranged marriage. Their daughters were born in [DATE]. c) In 2019, the appellant worked as an accountant in Uttarakhand. d) In October 2022, the appellant received several calls from a man named [[APPELLANT]], a person with whom his [NAME] was having an extra marital affair. This person sent several nude photographs and an indecent video of himself and the [NAME] to the appellant on Whatsapp. He showed his wife the material. He told her that she could not see her family anymore as he was offended and shamed. The wife agreed to stop seeing her family. e) In January and February 2023, the [NAME] and wife’s brothers started calling the appellant every few days trying to contact the wife. f) Sometime in 2023, the appellant had an altercation with two of the brothers, [[NAME]] and [[NAME]]. He received minor injuries. He contacted the local police, but the men had connections with the [NAME] ([NAME]) and the police officer refused to register the complaint. g) The appellant arranged to leave [APPELLANT] and arrived in New Zealand on 3 November 2023. h) Since his departure, the [NAME], [[NAME]] and [[NAME]] have been calling the wife to reestablish their connection with her. The [NAME] threatened the appellant’s parents, and [[NAME]] and [[APPELLANT]] visited their home once or twice a month saying that now the appellant was no longer in [APPELLANT] there was no one stopping them seeing the wife. i) In February or March 2024, that the appellant’s parents told him not to return to [APPELLANT] because of the conflict between him and his wife’s family. j) The appellant lodged his claim for [RESPONDENT] and protection status on 13 March 2025. k) On 15 August 2025, the appellant interviewed by [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer. On 22 August 2025, an interview report was sent to the [NAME] and their representative. On 19 September 2025, the [[RESPONDENT[NAME]] received the [NAME]’ response to the interview report. On 11 November 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] declined the [NAME]’ claim. Even if it is assumed that the foregoing claims are true they do not appear, on their face, to establish that, if the appellant returns to [APPELLANT], he is either: a) facing a well-founded fear of being persecuted (serious harm arising from breaches of human rights); b) in danger of being tortured; c) in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or d) in danger of arbitrary deprivation of life.

4 The thresholds of both ‘a real chance of being persecuted’ and being ‘in danger of’ one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility. The claims appear not to establish a risk any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: a) The circumstances that gave rise to family interest in the appellant took place three and a half years ago and gave rise to some harassment and a minor assault. Such did not constitute serious harm. b) Further, the precursor to this interest (the [NAME]’s affair) is now remote in time. At the time of the [[RESPONDENT[NAME]] decision of November 2025 there had been no further reported adverse interest in appellant and any enmity demonstrated towards the appellant has lessened over time. c) The evidence does not establish that there is a real chance of the appellant experiencing serious harm in the future. Visits by the [NAME], [[NAME]] and [[NAME]] to the family in 2023 and early 2024, conveying interest in the appellant, are now remote in time and even at the time did not rise to the serious threshold of being persecuted. The risk of serious harm to the appellant in the future appears no more than speculative.

For these reasons, it does not appear that there is any more than a remote or speculative chance of the appellant suffering serious harm if he returns to [APPELLANT]. The risk to him appears to fall short of the thresholds of ‘a real chance’ and being ‘in danger of’ by a significant margin. Furthermore, in respect of both the [RESPONDENT] claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to [assess] whether the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see the discussion in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151 and sections 130(2) and 131(2) of the Act. Where an ‘[NAME]’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection does not arise. Here, even if there were a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm in Uttarakhand state, there appears to be no reason why the appellant could not move to a different state in [APPELLANT], such as, the Punjab, and to a city such as Jalandhar, Ludhiana or Amritsar where there is also a significant Sikh population. According to the 2011 census, there are over 465,000 Sikhs living in Ludhiana, 185,000 in Jalandhar, and 550,000 in Amritsar. An [NAME] requires that: a. The [NAME] must be accessible to you. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. b. In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, you cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. c. In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement.

5 d. In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] itself. It appears to the Tribunal that you could access, and reside safely in Jalandhar, Ludhiana, or Amritsar. The evidence does not point to any risk there of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an [NAME]. If correct, you are not outside [APPELLANT], your country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of ‘a real chance’ and being ‘in danger of’ by a significant margin. You do not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to respond It appears that the appellant has neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason nor grounds for being recognised as [NAME] persons under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. His claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 14 April 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence the appellant wishes to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer the appellant an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice. [7] Counsel has not provided any written response to the Tribunal’s letter. Whether the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded [8] As will be explained in the assessment which follows, the Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to the appellant, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. It therefore determines, pursuant to section 233 of the Act, not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [9] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form, the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant wished to make to the record of his interview), other material contained in the appeal file and in counsel’s submissions and the attachments.

6 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [10] The appellant, of the [NAME], was born in A town, Uttarakhand, [APPELLANT] in the late 1990s. He has two siblings. [11] In 2018, the appellant had an arranged marriage. Their daughters were born in [DATE]. [12] In 2019, the appellant worked as an accountant in Uttarakhand. [13] In October 2022, the appellant received several calls from a man named [APPELLANT], a person with whom his [NAME] was having an extramarital affair. This person sent several nude photographs and an indecent video of himself and the [NAME] to the appellant on WhatsApp. He showed his wife the material. He told her that she could not see her family anymore as he was offended and shamed. The wife agreed to stop seeing her family. [14] In January and February 2023, the [NAME] and wife’s brothers started calling the appellant every few days trying to contact the wife. [15] Sometime in 2023, the appellant had an altercation with two of the brothers [NAME]. He received minor injuries. He contacted the local police, but the men had connections with the [NAME] ([NAME]) and the police officer refused to register the complaint. [16] The appellant arranged to leave [APPELLANT] and arrived in New Zealand on 3 November 2023. [17] Since his departure, the [NAME], [NAME] have been calling the wife to reestablish their connection with her. The [NAME] threatened the appellant’s parents, and [NAME] visited their home once or twice a month saying that now the appellant was no longer in [APPELLANT] there was no one stopping them seeing the wife. [18] In February or March 2024, the appellant’s parents told him not to return to [APPELLANT] because of the conflict between him and his wife’s family. [19] The appellant lodged his claim for [RESPONDENT] and protection status on 13 March 2025.

7 [20] On 15 August 2025, the appellant interviewed by [RESPONDENT] and protection officer. On 22 August 2025, an interview report was sent to the appellant and their representative. On 19 September 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] received the appellant’ response to the interview report. On 11 November 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] declined the appellant’s claim. ASSESSMENT [21] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT[NAME]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [22] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a [NAME], section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [23] As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. The issue of whether his claim is objectively established, in that his predicament amounts to being persecuted, or another form of harm qualifying him to [NAME] status, is addressed below. THE [RESPONDENT[NAME] [24] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT[NAME].

8 [25] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [26] In terms of [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in [NAME] (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the [NAME] being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? [27] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see [NAME] (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [28] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [29] It is helpful to begin with a backdrop of country information. No country sources have been provided by the appellant or his counsel. Country information [30] [APPELLANT] is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur; United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT]

9 (12 August 2025) (“DOS report”). The DOS report records, in its executive summary, numerous human rights concerns in [APPELLANT], including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [31] The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights is no more than speculative and remote. [32] The circumstances that gave rise to family interest in the appellant took place three and a half years ago and gave rise to low-level harassment and a minor assault in 2023. Such actions did not constitute serious harm. The fact that the police declined to intervene on one occasion does not demonstrate that state protection should not be forthcoming should the appellant require it. One attempt to register a complaint does not demonstrate that there would not be adequate state protection for the appellant should he require it in the future. [33] Moreover, the evidence does not point to his having any need for it. It does not establish that there is a real chance of the appellant experiencing serious harm in the future. Visits by the [NAME], [NAME] to the appellant’s family in 2023 and early 2024, conveying interest in the appellant, are now remote in time and even at the time did not rise to any risk that they were harbingers of the appellant suffering serious harm amounting to his of being persecuted. [34] Further, the precursor to this interest (the [NAME]’s affair with an unsavoury character, which led the appellant to banning his wife from having contact with her and the family) is now remote in time. At the time of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] decision of November 2025 and up to this current time, there has been no further reported adverse interest in appellant and any enmity demonstrated towards the appellant has lessened over time. It appears that there has been some level of contact between the wife and her family in the absence of the appellant. It may be possible that the appellant’s position in respect of his wife’s relationship with her family may be softened and relationships restored,

10 particularly, if it is the case that the [NAME]’s relationship with [NAME] has come to an end. However, even if it were not, there is no real chance of the appellant facing serious harm within the meaning of being persecuted on return to [APPELLANT]. [35] For these reasons, the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT]. [NAME] [36] Although not necessary to address in any detail given the finding that there is no real chance of the appellant being persecuted in his town, for the sake of completeness the Tribunal turns to the question of an [NAME]. [37] In cases where there has been found to be a real chance of serious harm in an appellant’s home area (which is not the case here), the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country of origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [38] An [NAME] requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement.

11 (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] itself. [39] The Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant could access and reside safely in any one of the major cities in the Punjab, such as in Jalandhar, Ludhiana or Amritsar where there is also a significant Sikh population. According to the 2011 census, there are over 465,000 Sikhs living in Ludhiana, 185,000 in Jalandhar, and 550,000 in Amritsar. The appellant speaks Punjabi, which is spoken there. [40] The events which have happened were highly localised in nature. The evidence does not point to any risk there of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. The appellant has experience working as an accountant which will help him source new employment and will be able to maintain an adequate standard of living and support his wife and children. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an [NAME]. If correct, the appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [41] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [42] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a [RESPONDENT] under the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and section 129 of the Act.

12 The [NAME] [43] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [44] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a [NAME] information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a [NAME] has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a [NAME], or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a [NAME] or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [45] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [46] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the [NAME] categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [47] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in [APPELLANT], to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a [NAME].

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as [NAME] persons in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [48] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [49] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds

13 for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [50] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [51] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [52] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the [RESPONDENT] context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in [APPELLANT]. [53] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in [APPELLANT]. He is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR.

CONCLUSION [54] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and therefore is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act;

14 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [55] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [56] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [57] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME]