Successful Refugee Status Appeal Against Persecution Threats

OUTCOME: Allowed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 802713 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 2 and 3 September, and 20 and 21 October 2025

Date of Decision: 22 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm because of his relationship with a woman whose family disapproves of the relationship due to ethnicity and caste differences. [3] The principal issue to be determined is whether the risk of the appellant suffering such harm reaches the required threshold and whether he can obtain meaningful domestic protection elsewhere in [APPELLANT].

2 [4] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal finds that the appellant faces a real chance of suffering serious harm arising from breaches of his human rights in [APPELLANT]. The appeal is allowed. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [5] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [6] The appellant is a citizen of [APPELLANT], aged in his mid-20s. He is a follower of the Hindu religion and is of the [NAME]. His parents and elder sister reside in [APPELLANT]. [7] After completing his schooling in Z city in 2019, the appellant initially worked as a kitchen hand in a hotel. In 2022, he began working as a sales assistant for a trading company, [COMPANY]. He continued to live at home with his parents and sister. [8] While working at [COMPANY], the appellant began a romantic relationship with a fellow employee, [NAME]. She is of [NAME] ethnicity. After an initial period of friendship, the couple began going on dates and spending time together on their days off work. [9] Around the beginning of March 2023, [NAME] family discovered the relationship after looking at her phone where they saw photos and messages. Her parents became outraged when they learnt that the appellant was not a [NAME] man and became violent towards her. They confiscated her phone and locked her in her room for several days. During this time, the appellant tried to contact her but her phone went straight to voicemail and she did not respond to his calls or messages. [10] A few days later, on a Friday night, the appellant went to socialise after work with some friends at a [NAME] located close to his home. While there, he heard someone saying his name inside the [NAME]. He saw that it was a group of people asking about him at the entrance to the [NAME]. He followed the group outside and asked them why they were looking for him. They said they were [NAME] brother, cousin and their friends. Her brother accused the appellant of

3 “manipulating [[NAME]’s] brain”, of potentially “polluting our bloodline” and said that he would not leave the appellant or his family alone. The appellant responded that he loved [NAME], and that different ethnicities or castes should not matter any more. Her brother said that her family would never accept the appellant and warned him to stop talking to her. He then pushed and punched the appellant. The appellant blocked his face with hands, and he grappled with the brother as they both fell to the ground. The appellant’s friends came out of the [NAME] and a brawl developed between the two groups. [NAME] called the police and the brawl lasted for about two to three minutes before the appellant was able to escape. [11] Before the police arrived, the appellant returned to his home which was a short distance away. Although he suffered a number of bruises to his body, he had no other injuries and did not seek medical help other than taking some painkilling medicine. He was concerned about the police because as a local he could be identified, while his attackers were from outside Z city and would not have been identifiable by any of the witnesses to the fight. He had also heard of the police mistreating young men while in their custody. [NAME] took him to stay at a local hotel for the next few days and he turned off his phone. [12] The appellant later learnt that the police had come to his home looking for him on the evening of the fight and on the following day (a Saturday). On Sunday, the police summoned the appellant’s parents to come into the police station. Once there, the police told his parents that they were aware that the appellant was in a relationship with a woman from a different ethnicity and that it was up to his parents to “solve this problem”. The police said they could not protect the appellant if the relationship continued. [13] After his parents returned from the police station, his father called the appellant and told him what had occurred at the police station. He said that some persons he did not know had been watching the family home. His father then arranged for him to stay a hostel, owned by [NAME], just outside Z city for about three weeks. Staying at the hostel, the appellant did not go to work and took leave from his job. [14] Towards the end of March 2023, the owner of the hostel told the appellant’s parents that [NAME]’s relatives had come to the hostel looking for the appellant. Because his location had been discovered, the appellant then moved to stay in a range of different hotels in Y city for the next four or five months. He managed to

4 contact [NAME] through social media and they discussed ending their relationship but their affection for each other was too strong. [15] While in Y city, the appellant moved between different hotels to avoid being discovered. His father told him that he had been verbally abused by [NAME]’s relatives in Z city who had come to the house and that they threatened to use contacts within the [NAME] to have the appellant falsely arrested and imprisoned. Despite the risk that it entailed, [NAME] came to stay for a couple of days with the appellant at a hotel in Y city. [16] After learning that [NAME]’s relatives had visited the appellant’s workplace asking questions about his whereabouts, and that they seemed to have found out that he was hiding in Y city, his family arranged for an agent to obtain a visitor visa for New Zealand. [NAME] had left her employment with [COMPANY] in or about late April or early May 2023. [17] On 14 August 2023, the appellant travelled by bus from Y city to Z city. The following day, he left [APPELLANT] from Z city airport. [18] The appellant arrived in New Zealand on 16 August 2023. He held a visitor visa valid to 29 July 2024. [19] On 8 January 2024, the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] (“RSU”) received the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form. [20] On 31 October 2024, the RSU declined the appellant’s claim, leading to the present appeal. [21] The appellant, since arriving in New Zealand, has maintained a long-distance relationship with [NAME] using social media (such as Instagram and Facebook Messenger) to communicate with each other. They have discussed marriage but not in any formal or definite way. [NAME] has not disclosed to her family that she is in contact with the appellant and she deletes messages from her phone. She is presently living with her sister in Z city. Her family have pressured her to get married to someone that they know, preferably someone in the [NAME], as she has cousins serving in the [NAME]. From time to time, [NAME]’s relatives have gone to the appellant’s family home and threatened to kill the appellant if he continues to contact her. The appellant believes that her family suspect that they remain in contact with each other, although they have not been able to obtain any proof of this.

5 [22] The appellant considers that, motivated by keeping the family’s ‘name’ (or honour), [NAME] will kill him if he returns to [APPELLANT]. He believes that he will not be able to get protection from the police because they have told his parents that they will not get involved in a matter of an inter-caste, inter-ethnic relationship and that the [NAME] need to sort it out themselves. Even his own [NAME] will not support him when it comes to the relationship. He had a good job in [APPELLANT], earning a high salary for someone of his age, and he left [APPELLANT] only because of the attack on him and ongoing threats from [NAME]. Evidence of [NAME] [23] [NAME], a manager employed by the appellant’s former employer, [COMPANY], gave evidence by video-link. He confirmed that the appellant formerly worked as a sales assistant for the company. He stated that, on 23 June 2023, [NAME] members came to the company’s premises, demanding to know the appellant’s whereabouts and who he was with. Aware of the problems caused by the appellant’s relationship with [NAME], [NAME] refused to provide any information other than saying that the appellant no longer worked for the company. [24] On being told this, [NAME]’s relatives adopted an aggressive attitude and initially refused to leave the premises. After being told by [NAME] that he would call the police if they did not leave, they eventually left. Although they behaved in a threatening and intimidating manner, [NAME] members have not returned to the company’s premises since this incident. [25] [NAME] confirmed that, due the problems that the appellant encountered with his girlfriend’s family, the appellant took a period of leave from his job before later resigning from his employment with the company. Evidence of [APPELLANT] [26] [NAME] of the appellant, [APPELLANT], gave evidence during the hearing by video-link. He stated that he was with the appellant when the fight started outside the [NAME] in March 2023. He confirmed that the appellant was confronted by one of his girlfriend’s family members who was with three other men. They questioned the appellant in an angry and hostile manner before they physically attacked the appellant. [NAME] himself was not involved in the fight.

6 Other Evidence and Submissions Received [27] The appellant’s counsel and the Tribunal were each provided with a copy of the file of the RSU. Counsel filed written opening submissions and made oral closing submissions after the conclusion of the appellant’s evidence. Also provided were: (a) Written statements from: (i) the appellant; (ii) [NAME]; (iii) [NAME]; (iv) [NAME] (a family friend); and (v) [NAME] (the appellant’s landlord in New Zealand); and (b) copies of messages and social media communications between the appellant and [NAME], sent and received while the appellant has been in New Zealand. [28] After the hearing, the appellant sent to the Tribunal a short video clip of his father speaking in the Nepalese language (without translation) and medical records relating to his grandmother. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [29] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning [RESPONDENT] or [NAME] status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131).

7 [30] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [31] In determining whether the appellant is [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME], it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [32] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. See AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [33] The evidence of the appellant and his witnesses is accepted for the purposes of this appeal. THE [RESPONDENT] [34] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT]. [35] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to

8 avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [36] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [37] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [38] The principal issues are, as explained in [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [39] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case. Relevant country information [40] The Constitution of [APPELLANT] enshrines fundamental rights that prohibit caste-based discrimination. Article 18 guarantees equality before the law, while Article 38, when read alongside Article 24, ensures an individual’s right to marry according to personal choice, irrespective of caste or ethnicity. [41] Despite this legal protection, the social acceptance of inter-caste and inter-ethnic relationships in [APPELLANT] continues to face challenges. Deeply ingrained caste-based prejudices continue to influence family dynamics, community

9 interactions and societal attitudes. Inter-caste marriages often encounter disapproval from [NAME] and communities. [NAME] are deterred from supporting such unions. Inter-caste couples frequently face harassment, forced separation and displacement and, in some cases, couples suffer violence; see Court Marriage in [APPELLANT] of Inter-Caste Couples in [APPELLANT] (9 May 2023) at https://courtmarriageinnepal.com. [42] While a number of recent reported instances of violence caused by inter-caste relationships in [APPELLANT] have concerned members of the lowest Dalit caste, there were no fewer than 60 reported caste-based deaths between 2012 and 2022; see [APPELLANT] “Caste No Bar” [APPELLANT] (7 June 2022). The same report also notes a resistance to inter-ethnic relationships (the [NAME] being, like the [NAME], a distinct indigenous ethnic community): [A] Brahmin family may accept a Chhetri son-in-law but would resist a [NAME] daughter-in-law. Even educated Nepalis still practice caste-based discrimination, even through its branding and packaging may have changed from the past. [43] An academic article, [NAME] and [NAME] “Crossing the Caste and Ethnic Boundaries: Love and Intermarriage Between Madhesi Men and Pahadi Women in [APPELLANT]” (2019) [NAME] noted, across broader Nepalese society, the openness of the younger generation to inter-caste and inter-ethnic relationship but also noted the ongoing role of [NAME] and community networks: [W]hen the couple crosses caste and ethnic boundaries, however, parents and kin often take it to be transgression of family and community values. … In contemporary [APPELLANT], economic independence is the major means through which members of the younger generation exercise their agency. Education also offers them a moral high ground and critical social resources. Consequently, the younger generation tends to prevail over their parents when it comes to making important life choices such as courtship and marriage. It does not, however, mean that they exercise free agency and choice; their selves are still embedded in the larger family, kin and community networks … [44] In [APPELLANT], when a woman marries, she is expected to adopt her husband’s caste, culture and religious practices; see [NAME] My Parents' Inter-Caste and Cross-Cultural Marriage – the Family History of [NAME] from [NAME] [APPELLANT] (31 July 2025) at www.[NAME].or.jp. [45] There have been recent efforts within the [NAME] to preserve aspects of their distinct culture; see Native Nepali Stage What is Kirat: A Comprehensive Overview (2026) at https://nepalnative.com, where it is noted that:

10 The [NAME] faces various socio-economic challenges, including marginalization and limited access to educational and employment opportunities. [APPELLANT]’s constitution recognizes indigenous peoples and gives them some rights, many Kirat people feel their voices are underrepresented in mainstream politics and society. Land rights issues have become a significant concern, especially in areas traditionally occupied by the [NAME]. In recent years, advocacy groups and organizations including [NAME] and [NAME] have been actively promoting Kirat heritage so that Kirat communities can preserve their language, culture, and traditions. The initiation of Kirat studies in some educational institutions and the recognition of Kirat festivals as public holidays in [APPELLANT] are positive developments that reflect the growing respect for their culture … Application to the facts [46] The Tribunal accepts that the relationship between the appellant and [NAME] was, and is, opposed by her family members and that they physically assaulted the appellant on one occasion. In that assault in early 2023, the appellant was punched and suffered bruising to his body. [NAME] has, after this assault, made numerous threats to harm and kill the appellant and to have him falsely imprisoned. They have made ongoing visits to the appellant’s home, have located him at the hostel in Y city and have visited his former workplace. The fact that the appellant has not suffered further harm was because he went into hiding and continued to move locations before leaving [APPELLANT]. [47] The country information records that, although attitudes among the younger generation are shifting, deeply ingrained prejudices have led to violence, and even death, in connection with inter-caste and inter-ethnic relationships in [APPELLANT]. While it is not possible for the Tribunal to be certain of the specific motivations of [NAME] beyond these societal prejudices, it appears that her brother’s accusation that the appellant could pollute the family’s bloodline was reflective of the recent focus within the [NAME] community of preserving its distinct heritage, as cited above. This suggests that the family’s vendetta against the appellant has its roots in something deeper than the inter-caste and inter-ethnic prejudices referred to in the above country information. [48] The appellant’s relationship with [NAME] continues and has endured the physical separation that they have undergone, first in [APPELLANT] after the March 2023 assault, and since the appellant has been in New Zealand. [49] The Tribunal finds that there is a real chance of serious harm being caused to the appellant in [APPELLANT] by the family of [NAME].

11 [50] The appellant’s claim raises issues under Articles 6 (the right to life), 7 (freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 23 (the right to marry and found a family) of the ICCPR. Viewed cumulatively, these harms amount to serious harm for the purposes of the assessment of being persecuted as explained in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788. [51] As to the issue of state protection, this is a case where the police have made it known to the appellant and his family that they regard the matter as being one for the [NAME] themselves to resolve and the evidence is that they expressly stated that they could not protect the appellant if the relationship continued.

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the appellant would be unable to access adequate state protection from the police to prevent a real chance of serious harm from her family. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [52] For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT] and the state is unable or unwilling to protect him. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [53] In order to be recognised as [RESPONDENT], a claimant must establish not only a well-founded fear of being persecuted, but also that this predicament is linked to one of the five Convention grounds. This requires that the Convention ground be a contributing cause to the risk of being persecuted; see [RESPONDENT] No 72635 (6 September 2002) at [173]. [54] The predicament of the appellant is contributed to issues of caste and ethnicity, which have long been recognised as falling within the rubric of race. His predicament is therefore for reasons of one of the Convention grounds. Internal Protection Alternative [55] The question whether the appellant has a viable internal protection alternative requires consideration as to whether the appellant can access and enjoy meaningful domestic protection elsewhere in the home country: see BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220 at [50]; and [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008).

12 [56] It is not necessary to deal with this in any detail in this case because the geography of the country of origin provides limited alternative locations for the appellant beyond Z city and Y city and the [NAME] was previously able to locate the whereabouts of the appellant when he fled from Z city. The Tribunal is satisfied that the [NAME] will be easily able to locate the appellant regardless of where he resides. For this reason, the appellant has no viable internal protection alternative. [57] The Tribunal is not satisfied that the appellant has a viable internal protection alternative available to him. Exclusion [58] There is nothing in the evidence before the Tribunal which raises any issue under Article 1F of the [RESPONDENT]. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [59] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is recognised as [RESPONDENT]. [NAME] the [NAME] and the ICCPR [60] By virtue of section 164 of the Act (the exceptions to which do not apply), the appellant cannot be deported from New Zealand because they are recognised as [RESPONDENT]. This accords with New Zealand’s non-refoulement obligation under Article 33 of the [RESPONDENT].

Accordingly, there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would be in danger of being subjected to torture, arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand (sections 130(1) and 131(1) and (6) of the Act). [61] The appellant does not require protection under the [NAME] or the ICCPR. They are not a [NAME] within the meaning of sections 130(1) or 131(1) of the Act.

13 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member

CONCLUSION [62] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and, therefore, is [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [63] The appeal is allowed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [64] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellants and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others. [65] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member