Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Claimant’s Appeal for Refugee Status

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 802880 [NAME_1], [NAME_14]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: H Cochrane (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Hearing: 19 March 2026

Date of Decision: 24 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a [NAME_3] and protection officer declining to grant [NAME_3] status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm, following threats made to him in 2021 by militants who had forced themselves into his truck at gunpoint and required him to drive them for several minutes. [3] The principal issue to be determined is whether the risk of him suffering such harm reaches the required threshold. [4] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal accepts the appellant’s account, but the evidence does not establish that he has a well-founded risk of suffering serious harm.

2 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [5] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [6] The appellant was born in a village in Jammu and Kashmir state in the 1980s. He was one of five children. He studied up to year eight and left school at the age of 15, as his family did not have the resources to send him away to continue his education. He found work as a taxi driver. [7] In 2003, the appellant, his parents, and younger brother, [NAME_5], moved to Z town, a town near Jammu city located close to the border with Pakistan. His other siblings remained in his home village. [8] In 2007, the appellant married and in the following years, the couple had a son and a daughter. His wife and children continue to live in Z town. [9] The appellant’s ability to earn money was severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and he struggled to support his family. He sold his taxi and found other part-time employment. Employment as a milk truck driver [10] In mid-2020, the appellant found employment as a milkman. Each morning, he would leave his home at 4am and travel to the factory in Jammu city, where he would collect the orders and complete his deliveries in Z town by late morning. [11] The milk truck was branded with the milk company’s logo and displayed the appellant’s and his employer’s contact information on each side so they could be contacted by potential customers. The appellant was the only one in Z town delivering for this milk company. Encounter with militants [12] One morning in April 2021, the appellant was on his way to pick up the milk orders at the factory. He had just left Z town when three men came out on to the road and forced the appellant to stop his vehicle. The men had their faces covered and one of the men (“[NAME_6]”) came over to the truck. He was holding a gun and tried to get into the appellant’s truck. He threatened the

3 appellant that he needed to drive the three men through the police checkpoint which was located a couple of kilometres ahead. [13] [NAME_6] got into the cab of the truck and kept his gun pointed at the appellant. The other two men, who were also armed, got in and did not speak to the appellant. The three men spoke to each other in a language that the appellant did not recognise but guessed that it might be Urdu. After several minutes of driving, a police vehicle sped by the truck with the lights on. [NAME_6] ordered the appellant to pull off to the side of the road and all three men got out of the truck. [NAME_6] warned the appellant that they knew who he was and if he told anyone about their existence, especially the police at the checkpoint, they would kill him and his family. They then left the appellant and the truck. [14] The appellant remained on the side of the road for another five to ten minutes, contemplating what had just happened and what he should do next. He then passed through the police checkpoint without mentioning the incident to the police and proceeded to the factory to collect the day’s milk order. [15] Following this incident, the appellant began to leave the truck parked at the milk factory each evening and would ride his motor bike to and from the factory. He would only use the truck to make the deliveries. Each morning, he would also [NAME_2] different routes out of Z town to avoid taking the main road where he had been stopped by the militants. [16] The appellant continued working as a milkman for several more months, but he struggled, the number of orders he received declined, and he eventually resigned in June or July 2021. He did not disclose the April 2021 incident to his employer, with whom he continued to keep in touch. The employer no longer holds the contract with the milk company as he found it no longer profitable to do so. [17] The appellant sought part-time work with his former employer and additionally provided driving services to individuals and companies who had their own vehicles. He would pick up work as it was available, but he did not return to driving full-time. In 2023, he had an accident while driving a bus. A passerby was injured, and the appellant was fined. He attributed the accident to the continuing stress that he felt from the threat of the militants.

4 [18] The appellant continued to be depressed and worried. Each time there was an outbreak in conflict, an arrest of militants or a jail break, the appellant worried that the militants would reappear to harm him. [19] He had told his wife and brother what had happened to him and his brother advised him that he should consider going overseas. A friend of the brother’s assisted the appellant in making a visa application to New Zealand. In February 2023, the appellant was granted a New Zealand visitor visa. [20] In July 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. He was detained and interviewed at the border and was subsequently granted a visa under section 45 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act) and entry permission under section 107 of the Act for the purposes of lodging his [NAME_3] and protection claim. [21] Since the appellant has been in New Zealand, his wife’s mental health has continued to deteriorate due to her fear and stress over the possibility of the militants attacking the appellant, if he were to return home. [22] The appellant acknowledges that a move to another part of Jammu city area or elsewhere in India would reduce the distress the appellant’s wife currently fears for the appellant. However, the appellant would struggle with the cost of moving his family and he does not wish to remove his children from their schools where they are well-settled. Evidence of [NAME_5] [23] In April 2021, the appellant’s brother, [NAME_5], had noticed the appellant acting differently and asked him what was wrong. The appellant told him about being detained by the militants. He has not disclosed what happened to his brother to anyone else. [24] [NAME_5] also works as a private driver. While nothing similar has ever happened to him, he has been cautious and worried following the incident with the appellant. Other Evidence and Submissions Received [25] The Tribunal and the appellant have been provided with the [NAME_7] file concerning the appellant’s claim. The appellant relied on his previous statements to the [NAME_7].

5 [26] The appellant’s wife provided a written statement, that mirrored the brother’s statement almost word for word, including sentences which made it appear as if the letter writer had experienced the appellant’s predicament. She did not appear before the Tribunal due to her poor mental health. A number of prescriptions were provided to support the claim that she was in poor health. [27] In written opening submissions (12 March 2026), counsel submits that the appellant’s account of the events on the road and in the truck should be accepted. It is submitted that the country information provided demonstrates that individuals in the appellant’s profession are routinely subjected to interception, threats and harassment. Nor is protection from the Indian state available to the appellant and internal relocation is not a viable option due to the family’s limited resources. Therefore, the appellant has a well-founded fear of the armed groups which maintain local networks while pursuing cross-border attacks. [28] A bundle of country information on the prevalence of attacks on truck drivers by armed groups and militants was also provided and will be referred to below, as relevant. [29] Counsel provided oral closing submissions and further written closing submissions (8 April 2026) where it was submitted that the consistency of evidence from the appellant and his witness demonstrates the appellant’s credibility and the well-foundedness of his fear. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [30] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning [NAME_3] or protection status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) a [NAME_3] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [NAME_3]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_8] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131).

6 [31] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [32] In determining whether the appellant is a [NAME_3] or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [33] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. See AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [34] The evidence is accepted for the purposes of this appeal. It was mostly consistent with the appellant’s evidence given to the [NAME_7]. The matters which raised some concern as to inconsistency in evidence were put to the appellant and he has provided explanations which assuaged the Tribunal’s concern. [35] In later communication related to the appellant’s linked humanitarian appeal, counsel inferred that the appellant had been impacted by the psychological trauma of the event. The Tribunal accepts that the event which is the crux of the appellant’s claim has caused him worry and anxiety. [36] As the evidence is accepted for the purposes of this appeal, it is these facts on which the appeal is to be determined.

7 THE [NAME_3] [37] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a [NAME_3] in accordance with this Act if he or she is a [NAME_3] within the meaning of the [NAME_3]. [38] Article 1A(2) of the [NAME_3] provides that a [NAME_3] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [39] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_9] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see [NAME_3] Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [40] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [41] The principal issues are, as explained in [NAME_3] Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [42] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case.

8 Relevant country information [43] Country information indicates that, while India is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations do occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in India in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [44] As a federal republic, India is made up of a number of states and the Tribunal has considered the security situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir a number of times recently. ZF (India) [2025] NZIPT 802983 set out the origin of the conflict: [15] … The conflict in Jammu-Kashmir is the oldest frozen conflict before the United Nations. It derives from the arbitrary, rushed and secret map drawing which accompanied the decolonisation and partition of India in 1947, which led to India’s controversial occupation of Kashmir and consequent war with the armed forces of the newly created Muslim majority Pakistan; see, for a brief summation, [NAME_10] “How a British Royal’s Monumental Errors Made India’s Partition More Painful” The Conversation (16 August 2017); and “Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan Fight Over It” BBC (8 May 2025). [45] The news article, “What the India-Pakistan Kashmir Conflict is About: A Timeline” Radio New Zealand (7 May 2025), citing a CNN report, records two recent notable events in the conflict. In 2019, [NAME_12] announced that India would revoke a constitutional provision giving Jammu and Kashmir autonomy to set its own laws and India's parliament approved it by vote. Pakistan declared the change illegal and suspended diplomatic relations and bilateral trade. Then in April 2025, gunmen killed 26 tourists and injured a dozen others in an attack in Pahalgam in Kashmir. All but one of the victims were Indian citizens. The attackers were Muslim. While most of the conflict in the region continues to play out in Kashmir, there are sporadic outbreaks of conflict along the India/Pakistan border in Jammu.

9 [46] The Tribunal (differently constituted) also recently reviewed the country information related to the impact of the border conflict on civilians living in and near Jammu; see EG (India) [2026] NZIPT 802988 at [78] to [86]. In summary, the Tribunal’s review of the country information found: “the risk of civilian casualties has been declining for many years and is now very low” (at [85]). [47] The country information provided by counsel, mostly from Indian news sources, reflects incidents of truck hijacking by criminal groups and militants across India, not only in Jammu and Kashmir state. Various motives are given but hijackings are said to be carried out most commonly to acquire the goods being transported or to use the vehicle to move explosives near a chosen target. Further country information was provided to demonstrate the ability of criminals to break out of Indian prisons. Application to the facts [48] The appellant is a driver by trade. Over the years he has driven cars, trucks and buses. Between 2020 and mid-2021, the appellant was employed to drive a branded milk truck (which included his telephone number). One morning, the appellant was stopped by three armed men who forced him, by gunpoint, to transport them a short distance. As they left, they threatened that the appellant and his family would be killed if he told anyone about them. The appellant did not go to the police or mention what had happened as he passed through the police checkpoint minutes after the incident. However, the appellant fears that, because he drove the same route each morning, the militants knew his identity and specifically targeted him but does not know why they would. If he were to go back to India, he fears that these individuals would be able to find him and harm him. Even if they were in prison, he fears they could break out of prison and target him. [49] While the appellant does not have to prove that the crux of his claim will happen with certainty, the harm he fears must be well-founded. A claimant’s subjective fear or perception of future risk is relevant in terms of where to focus the [NAME_3] and protection inquiry but has no bearing on whether there is a real chance of persecution. No matter how genuinely or strongly the appellant holds the belief, the task of the Tribunal is to determine whether the evidence, including available country information, establishes that the risk to the claimant has a real chance of happening. If it does not, it is considered remote or speculative and the claim must fail.

10 [50] The Tribunal finds that the evidence in the appellant’s case does not establish a risk any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility of him experiencing psychological or physical serious harm for the following reasons. [51] Following the incident in April 2021, the appellant remained in Z town until he came to New Zealand in July 2023, with no further interactions with the militants. Apart from no longer driving the milk truck along the main road each morning, he took no further precautions. He and his family remained in their home, his children continued to go to school, and the appellant did not change his telephone number. He continued to work in Z town. [52] As the appellant was the lone driver for the milk company in the area and his contact information was on the truck, the fact that he has had no further encounters with the militants reinforces their lack of interest in him. While acknowledging the fear that the appellant felt during the incident and the continuing anxiety he has felt following that incident, he did not come to any further harm or interest by these individuals for the next two years that he remained in Z town. Nor has his family experienced any adverse interest by the militants or anyone else. [53] To the extent that he may be at risk from other militants in the future due to his freelance driving, the Tribunal finds also that that fear does not reach a real chance threshold. The Tribunal acknowledges that the appellant has provided a number of news reports of trucks having been hijacked across India by militants or escaped criminals. Of the 11 articles provided, three related to Jammu and Kashmir state. One involved a truck that had delayed a military convoy so it could be ambushed on a mountain road and two other articles were about police attempts to retrace the steps of the individuals responsible for the Pahalgam attack in 2025. The appellant told the Tribunal that he heard other drivers discuss similar sorts of incidents while they gathered to wait for their milk orders. The evidence does not establish that drivers are routinely targeted, or their vehicles regularly hijacked. Further, the appellant experienced only one such incident in 20 years as a driver and his brother has experienced none. [54] The Tribunal (differently constituted) also recently considered the risk to civilians from the border conflict in EG (India) [2026] NZIPT 802988. The Tribunal adopts a similar finding that, while the conflict will impact on the appellant’s sense of security and to some degree his life, any anxiety and fear he may have about

11 living near the border is not due to an objectively established localised pattern of conduct of sufficient constancy and intensity by the parties to the conflict. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [55] For these reasons, objectively and on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [56] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [NAME_3] [57] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as a [NAME_3]. THE [NAME_8] [58] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_8] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. Assessment of the Claim under [NAME_8] [59] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME_8], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [60] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [NAME_3] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

12 [61] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, he is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_8]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_8] [62] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. THE ICCPR [63] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [64] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for the claim to [NAME_3] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [65] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the [NAME_3] (to which protected person status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035, at [82] and Taunoa v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [66] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, he is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR.

13 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

H Cochrane Member [67] The appellant does not require protection under the ICCPR. He is not a protected person within the meaning of section 131(1) of the Act. Conclusion on Claim under ICCPR [68] For the above reasons already given, the appellant is not a protected person within the meaning of section 131(1) of the Act.

CONCLUSION [69] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a [NAME_3] within the meaning of the [NAME_3] and, therefore, is not a [NAME_3] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME_8] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [70] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [71] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellants and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others. [72] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “H Cochrane” H Cochrane Member