Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Status Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] [NAME] [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 30 March and 1 April 2026

Date of Decision: 24 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm at the hands of an [NAME] [NAME], [NAME], who has repeatedly threatened and attacked the appellant after he helped a [NAME] ([NAME]) party [NAME] escape an attack ordered by [NAME]. [3] The principal issue to be determined is whether the evidence is accepted. [4] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal does not accept as credible the appellant’s account and finds that based on the evidence accepted, it does not establish that the appellant has a well-founded risk of serious harm.

2 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [5] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [6] The appellant was born in West Bengal, [APPELLANT]. He has a younger brother and three younger sisters. His early life is unremarkable for the purposes of this appeal. [7] The appellant is married and has two children born in 2012 and 2017. His wife and children remain in [APPELLANT], living with his in-laws. [8] The appellant spent seven years employed in a cabinet construction role in Saudi Arabia, returning to [APPELLANT] in 2019. [NAME] [9] In 2016, while on a contract break from his employment in Saudi Arabia, the appellant undertook a government-funded training programme which taught the basics of chicken farming. [10] Upon his return to [APPELLANT] in 2019, the appellant secured a lease for a [NAME] just outside his village. He farmed approximately 3,000 chickens which he would sell to shops in the nearby metropolitan area. [11] The chickens needed tending to three times a day and he had one employee, [NAME] who assisted him. Affiliation with [NAME] [12] The appellant first voted for the [NAME] party in 2011, when they won an absolute victory in the [NAME]. The party has since remained in power. [13] In June 2022, ahead of the panchayat (village council) elections, the appellant began attending weekly [NAME] meetings and was paid to hang posters or banners four or five times. The appellant did not encounter any problems while undertaking these political activities. If members of the [NAME] ([NAME]) approached him while he was hanging posters, he would just leave the area and report back that he had not been able to hang the posters in that area.

3 [NAME] [14] One evening the appellant received a call from a childhood friend, [APPELLANT] who was in trouble and needed the appellant’s help. [NAME] was the [NAME] for [NAME] in the area. [NAME] workers had tried to hang their posters in the area and [NAME] had stopped them because he did not want them to ruin the wall where they wanted to put up [NAME] posters. The workers called to have more [NAME] arrive and a fight broke out. [15] [NAME] escaped and hid a couple houses away. He asked the appellant to come and rescue him. When the appellant got close to the scene, he told [APPELLANT] to go to the nearby mosque and the appellant would collect him from there. [APPELLANT] then remained at the appellant’s home resting for the next two days. The appellant was worried that he would face political retribution from the local [NAME], [NAME], so he asked [NAME] to leave his home and find another place to stay, which he did. [16] A [NAME] supporter living close by must have seen [APPELLANT] leave the appellant’s home because a week later, [NAME] called the appellant and asked him why he rescued [APPELLANT]. The appellant tried to deny it, but [NAME] stated that he knew everything because all information came to him. He then threatened if they did not find [APPELLANT], they would [NAME] the appellant’s life instead. He then went on trying to encourage the appellant to leave the [NAME] and join the [NAME]. [17] Following the call, the appellant informed the local [NAME], [APPELLANT], what had happened. She reassured him that it was just the tension of the upcoming elections and there was no need to stress. After the election, she would fix everything. Therefore, the appellant went back to his normal routine. The threats [18] Two days later, [NAME] showed up with three or four individuals at the appellant’s home. The appellant was not there. Instead, [NAME] threatened [NAME], telling him that the appellant needed to improve and if he could not, the appellant would be killed. [19] When the appellant came home from the [NAME], his father told him what had happened. He had not warned him sooner because the appellant did not have his mobile phone with him at the [NAME].

4 [20] The appellant went to seek [NAME]’s help. He had to wait for a couple hours before she was able to see him but when she did see him, she again advised him to wait until after the election and then they could go to the police together. [21] The next day, the appellant received a further call from [NAME] where he warned the appellant that he and [NAME] needed to help the [NAME], otherwise they both would be killed. The appellant tried to see [APPELLANT] again, but she was not available to see him because the election was less than a week away. [22] The election was held on 26 June 2022 and [NAME] won her seat and retained her position as the village council president. [23] The next week the appellant received a further threat from [NAME] saying that this was the appellant’s last warning, and then both he and [NAME] would be finished off. [24] The appellant sought the support of the [NAME] to facilitate a reconciliation with the [NAME]. However, [NAME] refused to come to any sort of agreement. Attack on the appellant [25] Six days later, the appellant was working at the [NAME] in the afternoon with [NAME]. [NAME] called out to him to come out of the chicken enclosure, saying that there were people who wanted to see him. [26] When the appellant came out, he saw four men. One of the men grabbed his hands and another started hitting him with a hockey stick. The appellant could hear that [APPELLANT] was on a call with one of the other men, who was informing [APPELLANT] that they had the appellant and asked what to do with him. He replied that the [NAME] should finish him off, saying “this is his last day”. The appellant bit one of the men on the hand which allowed him to escape and run towards the village. While running away, one of the men threw the hockey stick which hit and injured the appellant’s foot. [27] The appellant ran to and hid at his paternal uncle’s home, whose home was close to the [NAME]. About forty minutes later, [APPELLANT] showed up at the appellant’s home asking for the appellant. His father told him that the appellant was at the [NAME]. [NAME] left, the father rang the appellant’s uncle and asked him to warn the appellant to stay safe as some men had come looking for him. [28] The next day, the appellant sought medical attention. He was given seven days of medication and told that if his foot did not heal, he would need an x-ray. The following day, he rang [NAME] and warned him to stay safe. That was the

5 last time he spoke to [APPELLANT]. The appellant had no further contact with [APPELLANT] as it appeared his phone was turned off and he had left the area. Visit to the police station [29] The following week, the appellant, his father and [APPELLANT] went to the local police station. [NAME] brought a letter he had drafted, detailing the appellant’s attack; [NAME] came to serve as an eyewitness; and the appellant had his mobile phone which had the calls from [NAME]. Initially the police refused the appellant’s attempts to provide evidence saying that [NAME] was just a lay person and in contrast [NAME] was the [NAME]. Further the telephone numbers from which [NAME] had rung the appellant were not his telephone numbers. Despite these objections, the police officer took the letter the father had drafted and said, “we’ll see what we can do”. No First Information Report (FIR) was provided to the appellant or his father. [30] That night [NAME] rang the appellant, letting him know that he was aware of the appellant’s trip to the police station. The appellant feared for his life and no longer slept at his own home. He would rotate staying at his four paternal uncles’ homes in the village. Men visit the family home [31] Later that month, four men came to the appellant’s family home, calling through the gate for him. [NAME] telephoned the appellant’s paternal uncles who lived nearby and asked them to gather some men and come confront the men at the gate. Once they did, the men fled but not before damaging the gate while trying to get it open. [32] Following this incident, [NAME] went to the police station to make a report. The police came to inspect the damage done to the gate but dismissed it saying it was only minimal and took no further action. Vandalisation of the [NAME] [33] One morning several days later, the appellant arrived at the [NAME] and found that it had been vandalised. The wire fence had been cut and more than half of his 3,000 chickens were missing, another 1,000 had been attacked by dogs and the final 500 seemed to be unharmed and healthy but he was later unable to sell them because people feared that they had been injured by the street dogs. The appellant lost his profit on all 3,000 chickens.

6 [34] The appellant called [APPELLANT], [NAME]’s local [NAME], and [NAME], [NAME]’s community manager, and they both came to the [NAME] to see the damage. Once they saw the damage, they telephoned [NAME] who denied any involvement in the destruction. They then telephoned the police, but the police asked what evidence was available since the incident happened at night. [35] Later that evening, [NAME] called the appellant and bragged saying “you can see what I have already done”. Following the call, the appellant took the SIM card out of his phone and destroyed it. [NAME] stressed that if the appellant remained in the area, he would not remain alive. Going into hiding [36] The appellant went into hiding at his sister’s home in another district in West Bengal. While there, the appellant was stressed and depressed. He stayed at the sister’s home for three months until the sister was approached the local [NAME], [NAME], who inquired about whether the appellant was staying with her. When she denied that the appellant was staying with her family, he warned that if he learned she was lying it would not be good and she would face difficulties. She advised the appellant that he should go stay elsewhere so she and her family would not experience any problems. [37] The appellant explained to his maternal aunt and [NAME] the problems he was having with the [NAME] and [NAME]. They offered the appellant a place to stay with them. He travelled to their home and stayed with them for the next two months. However, the local [NAME], [NAME], came to the house and warned that if the appellant was there, the family would face difficulties. Not wanting to cause problems for his family, the appellant agreed to go to somewhere else. [38] The appellant moved to his maternal uncle’s home and [NAME] helped him find opportunities outside of [APPELLANT]. They tried to find opportunities in Saudi Arabia but there were not options so the [NAME] told him to find another country where he could go. The appellant found that New Zealand was offering visas, so the appellant arranged for his brother to return home and collect his necessary documentation for his visitor visa application. He was granted a visa in March 2023. Continued problems for the family [39] At the hearing, the appellant explained that his family continues to experience threats from [NAME].

7 [40] His wife and children relocated to her family’s home approximately seven months after the appellant went into hiding. She would experience threats and questions about the appellant’s whereabouts when she was at her in-laws’ home. [41] In October 2024, [APPELLANT] came to the appellant’s home and threatened the appellant’s parents. The stress caused the father to have a stroke and he died two days later. [42] In January 2026, [NAME] approached the family home and damaged the locked gate. Evidence of the Appellant’s Brother — [NAME] [43] The appellant’s brother, [APPELLANT], provided two written statements, one undated and the second dated 11 March 2026. He also appeared at the hearing by audiovisual link on 1 April 2026. During the hearing, he confirmed he drafted the statements with the assistance of a translator. [44] The appellant had told his brother about the problems he was having and how it started with the saving of his friend [NAME]. Since then, [NAME] stated [NAME] has repeatedly come to the family home to ask about the appellant’s whereabouts and the family’s home’s gate has been damaged two or three times. He stated that he had not been the victim of any harm because he was barely ever home. [45] [APPELLANT] also stated that he was telephoned by the appellant several times to arrange paperwork for the appellant’s visa application. Each time the appellant would call, it would be from a different telephone number. However, he was unsure if he had arranged documents for the appellant once the appellant was in New Zealand. [APPELLANT] was asked if he could produce the appellant’s [NAME] membership card that he retrieved from the family home and sent a photo of to the appellant via [NAME]. He stated that the appellant had the card, he did not have it. Other Evidence and Submissions Received [46] Counsel provided written submissions (20 March 2026) and oral submissions at the close of the hearing. She submitted that, as the Tribunal’s hearing was a de novo hearing, the evidence before it demonstrated the appellant’s support for [NAME], the threats and destruction caused by [NAME], the appellant’s need to relocate and ongoing threats to the family, were well founded and there was an ongoing

8 continuing risk to the appellant. The appellant’s core narrative has remained consistent, and any differences may be resolved by the passage of time, stress and the nature of memory to recall things differently. The country information establishes that there is police corruption and political leaders influence the local police to the degree it can be considered systemic and as a result individuals are reluctant to report to the police. [47] The appellant provided an updated written statement which gave a summary of his claim as well as his concerns with the [RESPONDENT[NAME]’s decision. Written statements from the appellant’s mother and brother were provided. [48] At the hearing the appellant provided larger reproductions of the evidence he provided at the [RESPONDENT[NAME]: his [NAME] membership card and the [NAME] post where he is pictured in the background of a group of men with matching t-shirts and visible [NAME] symbols which the appellant’s brother had sent through to him through [NAME]. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [49] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning [RESPONDENT] or protection status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [50] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter.

9 [51] In determining whether the appellant is [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME], it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [52] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in [NAME] (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. [NAME] (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [53] Counsel’s opening submissions address the appellant’s overall credibility, noting that the appellant has attempted to resolve the credibility concerns identified at the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and at the Tribunal, and has provided further evidence. The Tribunal has considered these submissions, as well as counsel’s oral closing submissions where the nature of the Tribunal’s de novo hearing was addressed. [54] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant has voted for [NAME] in the past, and during the panchayat elections in 2022, he attended regular meetings at the party office and did work for them four to five times in the lead up to the June election. The Tribunal also accepts that the appellant leased and ran a [NAME] for a number of years. [55] The Tribunal also reminds itself of the difficulties [NAME] face in trying to establish their claims and recall past traumatic events with specificity, as well as the nature of memory and its ability to mend and change memories over time through the retelling of events. However, for the reasons which follow, the Tribunal is satisfied that the core elements of the appellant’s claim to be at risk of harm on return to [APPELLANT] is not credible. It is not satisfied that the appellant has established his claim that he has been a victim of violence and harassment orchestrated by [NAME].

10 The attack on the appellant [56] The evidence of the attack on the appellant has been inconsistent between his evidence at the hearing and his previously statements and oral accounts. [57] At the hearing, the appellant recounted the personal attack he allegedly experienced, orchestrated by [NAME]. However, during this retelling of the evidence [NAME] was not present at the attack. Rather the appellant stated that [NAME] was in the [NAME] and only present at the attack through an ongoing call with one of the attackers where he was providing directions as to their attack on the appellant. [58] However, the appellant’s previous evidence was that [NAME] came to the [NAME] and attacked him personally. At his interview at [RESPONDENT[NAME], the appellant unequivocally stated that [NAME] came to his farm, was present at his attack and chased him after the appellant had escaped his attackers. Similarly in his August 2024 written statement, the appellant stated “[[NAME]] arrived at the farm that afternoon, accompanied by four others … When I went to meet the individuals, I realised it was [[NAME]] and his associates … He threatened to kill me”. In response to the [RESPONDENT[NAME]’s interview report, the appellant corrected that three, not four, men had accompanied [NAME] at the attack on the [NAME]. [59] The Tribunal asked the appellant to explain why the appellant’s previous evidence, including the written evidence set out above, was that [NAME] was present at his attack. The appellant explained that a [NAME] would not turn up at an attack and get his hands dirty and that the previous evidence must have been a result of a misunderstanding of what he had previously said. The vandalisation of the [NAME] and last threatening telephone call [60] The appellant’s previous accounts have varied as to the help he sought after his [NAME] was vandalised. [61] At the hearing, the appellant stated that he called [APPELLANT] and had both [APPELLANT] and [NAME], [NAME]’s Community Manager, come to the farm to see the destruction. The [NAME] leaders then rang [NAME] while at the farm to confront him. He denied his involvement and then they then rang the police to seek their action, and they refused to intervene. After they left, [NAME] rang the appellant one last time and threatened him. The appellant’s 2024 written statement that he went to the “[NAME]” rather than having them come to inspect his farm and there is no mention of them seeking police assistance.

11 [62] By contrast, at the [RESPONDENT[NAME], the appellant stated that he went to see [APPELLANT], and her husband, who he identified as [NAME] came and inspected the farm and then went to speak with [NAME] who denied his involvement. In this version, the appellant did not report the destruction to the police because he believed he did not have sufficient evidence. Finally, the appellant failed to mention that [NAME] called him later that day, delivering his last threat by telephone. [63] When the concern as to the appellant’s differing account from what was given at the [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview was put to the appellant, he stated he gave the answers to the questions asked and he does not know if he was asked those questions at his interview. Police assistance sought [64] The appellant’s evidence was inconsistent and mobile as to whether he sought assistance with the police. At the hearing, the appellant gave evidence that he repeatedly sought help from the police, including when: (a) The appellant, his father and his employee went to the police a week after the attack on him to seek help. (b) [NAME] went to the police after the incident where his house’s gate was damaged. (c) [NAME] and [NAME] called the police following the vandalisation at the [NAME]. [65] However, at his [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview, the appellant stated that he and the village council went to the police a week after the attack on him and that his father went without him to the police after the vandalisation of the appellant’s farm. When asked about why the new evidence was now coming to light which was different than what was previously stated, the appellant responded that it was hard to remember everything when he was depressed and stressed. [NAME]’s position in [NAME] [66] At the hearing, the appellant gave evidence that [NAME] was a [NAME], and his party position was just below the [NAME] who served as a Member of Parliament. The appellant was unable to remember the [NAME]’s name.

12 [67] The Tribunal put to the appellant that his previous evidence was that [NAME] was the deputy president for the area covered by the Y town police station. In response, the appellant stated that [NAME] continued to cover the Y town. [68] Following the hearing, the Tribunal provided the appellant with the [NAME]’s webpage which listed its state office bearers. The Tribunal also provided the appellant the 2021 version of the webpage, which remained active in 2022 and 2023, and the 2025 version. None of these versions listed [NAME] as a [NAME] who reported to the [NAME] of the state. In response, the appellant stated that [APPELLANT] was the [NAME] for the [NAME]. The Tribunal accepts that [NAME] was the [NAME] official responsible for the [NAME], but not a [NAME] within the party structure for the state of West Bengal. Discrepancy between evidence offered and evidence provided [69] At the hearing, the concern was put the appellant about his inability to provide evidence which went to the core of his claim, despite his repeatedly offering to do so. By the time the Tribunal heard the appellant’s appeal in March 2026, two and half years after the appellant had first lodged his Confirmation of Claim form, the appellant had provided one photograph where he is present in the background of a photograph with individuals wearing a [NAME] shirt and the front of a [NAME] membership card. He also provided evidence of his father’s death by stroke, which the appellant attributes to ongoing harassment by [NAME] and [NAME] members. [70] The Tribunal is mindful of the longstanding guidance of the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for [RESPONDENT] the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“The [NAME]”) which sets out the legal principles at [196]: … [A]n applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents … [71] However, the appellant’s circumstances stand in contrast to the scenario envisioned in the Handbook. Throughout the various stages of the appellant’s [RESPONDENT] and protection procedures, he has offered to provide evidence and indicated that evidence was available to be provided:

13 (a) In his Confirmation of Claim dated 23 August 2023, in response to the question “C4 Do you intend to submit further evidence in support of your claim?”, the appellant ticked yes and recorded he would provide “news, video, FIR, and payee audits”. (b) At the start of his interview at the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 2 September 2024, he stated he would provide a photo of him with [NAME], a membership card and photographs of the destruction at the [NAME]. During the interview he also recorded that he had evidence of his doctor’s visit after the attack where he injured his foot. [72] The appellant has had ongoing legal representation throughout his [RESPONDENT] and protection procedures including the initial preparation of his Confirmation of Claim form where he indicated that he had evidence he intended to submit. Further, his brother procured the necessary documents for his visa application in March 2023 which according to the appellant were kept in the same place as the evidence of the destruction of the [NAME]. He also provided the appellant with the copy of his [NAME] card. [73] Despite the appellant’s assertions, the appellant did not provide news articles, video, an FIR or “pay audits”, nor did he provide evidence of his doctor’s visit or most relevant photographs of the destruction to his [NAME]. When asked why none of this evidence had been produced, the appellant relied on the letter produced by his wife in December 2024. In it, she went to the home to gather the appellant’s voter identity card, [APPELLANT] card, doctor’s prescription and photographs of the [NAME] but these documents had been destroyed by rats. The Tribunal does not accept as credible that the appellant would not have sought and produced the necessary evidence earlier if it had been available. Conclusion [74] The Tribunal does not accept that the appellant was attacked at his farm, that his farm was vandalised or that the police were contacted and refused to help him following these events. It follows that any interest (past or present) by [NAME] or the [NAME] is also rejected. [75] Subject to the foregoing findings, the Tribunal accepts the balance of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case.

14 THE [RESPONDENT] [76] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT]. [77] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [78] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [79] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [80] The principal issues are, as explained in [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [81] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case.

15 Relevant country information [82] The [NAME] is the dominant political party in the national politics of [APPELLANT] as the ruling party of the [NAME] (the [NAME]) through the last three elections in 2014, 2019 and 2024. However, the [NAME] has been the dominant political party in West Bengal. In 2019, the [NAME] won 22 seats, and the [NAME] won 18 seats of the total of 42 seats for the state of West Bengal in the [NAME] — see [APPELLANT] 2019 [NAME] for West Bengal (2019) at www.[NAME] In 2024, the [NAME] maintained its majority, winning 29 seats, and the [NAME] won only 12 seats — see [APPELLANT] 2024 [NAME] for West Bengal (2024) at www.[NAME] [83] In elections for the [NAME], the [NAME] secured an absolute majority of seats in the 2011 election and, for the first time, became the ruling party in the [NAME]; see [APPELLANT] 2011 Vidhan Sabha / Assembly Election Results West Bengal (2011) at www.[NAME] The [NAME] subsequently won the state elections in 2016 and again in 2021, by large margins, see [APPELLANT] 2016 Vidhan Sabha / Assembly Election Results West Bengal (2016) at www.[NAME] [APPELLANT] 2021 Vidhan Sabha / Assembly Election Results West Bengal (2021) at www.[NAME] [84] According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report: [APPELLANT] (29 September 2023), at para 3.88, [APPELLANT] has a vibrant political culture which “also extends to elections in the states”, stating: The culture between states generally differs with different language groups and local issues. Like Indian politics at national level, state politics is hotly contested and media coverage can be sensationalist, however day-to-day politics is usually peaceful, and when violence does occur, it is unlikely to be one-sided. The risk of violence associated with elections varies significantly between states, with notable examples of violence in West Bengal, Tripura and Uttar Pradesh.... The vast majority of residents do not experience day-to-day political violence. [85] Pre-election violence in West Bengal is often blamed by one party on the other party and while there is underreporting to the [NAME], its 2021 report recorded that West Bengal had the highest number of political murders in the country; see [APPELLANT] “At Least 10 killed in Poll-related Violence in [APPELLANT]’s West Bengal” [NAME] (10 July 2023); Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Regional Overview: Asia-Pacific, [APPELLANT]: Violence in West Bengal Spikes during Local Elections (3 August 2023); United Kingdom Home Office [APPELLANT]: Political parties and affiliations (December 2023) at para 14.1.1.

16 [86] Research from a national think tank, [NAME]: [NAME] and [NAME] the Unique Nature of Political Violence in Bengal, ORF Occasional Paper No. 351 (March 2022) at pp24–25, [NAME] examined the political violence in West Bengal finding its unique nature was driven by the following factors: ● Violent incidents in Bengal are largely driven by partisan interests aimed at capturing political power and establishing complete political hegemony over opponents. The length for which this trend has persisted has no parallel elsewhere in [APPELLANT]. It began in the pre-independence period and has continued over more than seven decades. ● There is a marked departure from other states in the ideological orientation of the violence. In [West Bengal] ... there seems to be ideological fluidity, as seen from the move of a significant proportion of [NAME]) cadres to the [NAME], and certain sections among them eventually to the [NAME]. The exodus even of state leaders of the [NAME] to the [NAME], and lately of [NAME] leaders to the [NAME], reveals the ideological fluidity of Bengal’s politics. ● … In West Bengal, socio-cultural, ideological and economic factors have largely been subservient to the overriding cause of political domination in the exercise of violence. Political violence is driven by the party loyalty-enmity discourse. This form of violence clearly distinguishes Bengal from other states. ● The phenomenon of political violence has taken deep roots in the state’s political culture. It is no longer confined to the pulls and pressures of elections. While other states witness episodic or sporadic violence; in West Bengal the violence is of an ‘everyday’ nature. The party-society matrix creates enabling conditions for such violence; the sheer number of incidents in the state is testimony to it. Everyday violence or threat of violence is often perpetrated systematically, with the tacit complicity of state institutions, and the active involvement of party organisations. The daily threats of violence and systemic exclusion of people opposed to the party in power makes West Bengal a fitting example of the ‘structural violence’ discussed by [APPELLANT]. Application to the facts [87] The appellant is a married, [NAME] from West Bengal. He has been a supporter of [NAME] since the party came to power in the [NAME] in 2011. However, it was only in 2022 that he began to actively participate in the party’s pre-election activities, which included hanging fliers and banners and regularly attending meetings in the lead up to the panchayat election. In the days before the election, the appellant assisted, [NAME], a local [NAME], escape a politically motivated attack orchestrated by the opposition [NAME]. The appellant is no longer in contact with [NAME] who is no longer a [NAME] in the area as he has left. Further although the appellant presented evidence of a [NAME] membership card, he was not an official member but rather only a supporter of the party.

17 [88] While political violence in West Bengal does not mirror the patterns of political violence in other states, where political violence escalates in the lead up to elections and then dissipates after, the country information does not suggest that all individuals who hold political opinions, particularly ones such as the appellant who hold no political power, are at risk in West Bengal. Any risk to the appellant on the basis of his low-level support to the [NAME] is remote or speculative. [89] The Tribunal finds that the appellant has not established that there is a real chance of suffering serious harm in West Bengal or anywhere else in [APPELLANT]. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [90] For these reasons, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [91] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act. THE [NAME] [92] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. Assessment of the Claim under [NAME] [93] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

18 [94] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [95] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act. THE ICCPR [96] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [97] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for the claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [98] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the [RESPONDENT] (to which [NAME] status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035, at [82] and [NAME] v [NAME] [NAME] [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [99] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR.

19 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Conclusion on Claim under ICCPR [100] For the above reasons already given, the appellant is not a [NAME] within the meaning of section 131(1) of the Act.

CONCLUSION [101] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and, therefore, is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [102] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [103] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellant and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others. [104] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member