Refugee Appeal Dismissed: No Real Risk Found in Home Country

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803216 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: M Avia (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Decision: 14 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, or to be in danger of being subjected to serious harm entitling him to protection in New Zealand from the [NAME_2] ([NAME_2]). He was threatened with violence by a group of men from the [NAME_2], following an election in which the appellant, a [NAME_3]) party member, campaigned for a successful [NAME_4] candidate. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of the appellant being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as a refugee or a protected person under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming refugee or protected person status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_5] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] On 5 August 2024, the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_5]. By decision dated 1 October 2025, it declined the appellant’s claim. The appellant then lodged the present appeal. [6] On 17 March 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim and gave him the opportunity to respond: The Tribunal has received the above appeal, lodged on 9 October 2025. I am instructed by the Tribunal to write to you as follows. Whether to offer an oral hearing Normally, the Tribunal offers refugee and protected person appellants an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if an appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_5], the Tribunal may determine the appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_5]. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal may be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing the appellant an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of your claim, as recorded in the decision of the [NAME_5], is:

3 (a) The appellant was born in [Y village], [X district], Tamil Nadu state, India, in the early 1980s and is a citizen of India. He is of the Hindu faith. His parents are deceased. (b) The appellant married his wife in 2004, and they have two daughters, in their late teens and early 20s, respectively. (c) The appellant was a longtime supporter of the [NAME_3]) party and in 2001, he became a member of the party. As a party member, he helped to organise party events, canvassed for potential voters and supported local [NAME_4] candidates. He experienced some harassment during this time, which he ignored. (d) In 2010, the appellant was elected to the position of president of the youth wing of the [NAME_6] and in 2019, he was elected as the [NAME_4] secretary for the ninth ward [Y village] (although he remained a constituent (and a voter) in the fifth ward). (e) In February 2022, the appellant took part in a street campaign for the [NAME_4] in the upcoming local body elections. A group of 20 to 25 men approached him and other [NAME_4] campaigners and, armed with clubs, threatened the appellant with violence unless he stopped campaigning. The men were led by a [NAME_2] ([NAME_2]) candidate, [[NAME_7]]. Although the appellant tried to report the threats to the police, they refused to file a First Information Report (FIR) because of [[NAME_7]’s] connections in central government. (f) Later that month, the appellant attended a party celebrating the election victory of the fifth ward [NAME_4] candidate, [[NAME_8]], in his local council election. During the party, a group of 20 [NAME_9] arrived, armed with clubs and machetes. The appellant identified two of the supporters as [[NAME_7]] and [[NAME_10]], the [NAME_2] candidate for the lok sabha (lower house of the [NAME_11]) in [X district]. (g) The [NAME_9] intended to kill the appellant, as he was heavily involved in [[NAME_8]’s] successful campaign. The appellant left the party with help from friends and [NAME_12]. When the [NAME_9] realised that the appellant was not at the party, they attempted to locate him by visiting his family home. According to a friend of the appellant’s, in an attempt to discover his whereabouts, the [NAME_9] made death threats to the appellant’s wife and daughters. (h) That same night, the appellant travelled to Kerala state via bus and also arranged for his family to relocate away from [Y village]. As an additional precaution, he decided to end his [NAME_4] involvement. (i) Approximately 10 days later, the appellant’s wife and children left [Y village] and moved to [W village], [V district], Tamil Nadu. The appellant was located in [[NAME_13]], [T district], Kerala, near the [S border]. (j) Following the threats made on his life, the appellant lived and worked in Kerala. He received work from a friend, [[NAME_14]], who he met on the bus to Kerala in February 2022. [[NAME_14]] was a subcontractor who supplied labourers to various industries. The appellant moved around regularly to avoid detection by the [NAME_2]. (k) In March 2023, the appellant left Kerala and moved to [R city], Tamil Nadu, where he found restaurant work.

4 (l) In May or June of 2023, the appellant began preparing to leave India. Another friend, [[NAME_15]], who knew about the appellant’s situation, assisted him by applying for a New Zealand visitor visa and paying for his travel to New Zealand. (m) In August 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. Even if it is assumed that the foregoing claims are true, they do not appear on their face, to establish that if the appellant returns to India, he is either: (a) facing a well-founded fear of being persecuted (that is to say, a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights); (b) in danger of being tortured; (c) in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or (d) in danger of arbitrary deprivation of life. This is because it appears that the appellant has a viable internal protection alternative available to him, by relocating elsewhere in India. As such it appears that he does not require the surrogate protection of New Zealand. Internal protection alternative In respect of both the refugee claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assesses whether (assuming such a risk to exist) the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of residence can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]-[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217-218 and see also Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] et seq. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see Refugee and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement.

5 (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by [NAME_16] itself. The place in which the appellant is at risk of harm in confined to [Y village], [X district]. Therefore, the Tribunal considers that there is no reason why the appellant cannot move to a different location in Tamil Nadu, where he will be away from [NAME_18] who wish him harm. Even if it is not feasible for the appellant to remain in the [X district] area, the Tribunal notes that the appellant lived in the city of [R city] for two months before departing for New Zealand and his family have lived in the [W village], [V district], since February 2022. There is no evidence of harm or threats of harm to either the appellant or his family in their respective locations. Further, Tamil Nadu is the 11th largest state in India, and the seventh most populous state, being home to some 81.5 million people. There is no reason why the appellant could not relocate to any other large urban area in Tamil Nadu such as Chennai, Madurai, Salem or Tirunelveli. Further, there is no reason why the appellant cannot relocate outside of Tamil Nadu, as the appellant spent a year in [[NAME_13]], [T district], Kerala with no reported incidents of or threats of harm. There would be no new risks in any of those locations, and the basic human rights recognised by [NAME_16] are available there and it appears to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, there is not a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future (see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]). The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of ‘a real chance’ and being ‘in danger of’ by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to respond For all the above reasons, it appears that appellant has neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason nor grounds for being recognised as a protected person under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. His claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 24 March 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence your client wishes to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer your client an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice. [7] On 24 March 2026, counsel for the appellant provided written submissions in response to the Tribunal’s letter. In summary, counsel contends that the appellant’s claim is not manifestly unfounded because: (a) The appellant is facing a cumulative risk. Repeated threats to kill from the [NAME_2] will increase the risk of future serious harm to the appellant. Such a risk is more than merely speculative, given the risk of violence in India. The Tribunal failed to consider that violence

6 against perceived political opponents of the [NAME_2] and [NAME_19] is widespread, and country information confirms a high level of political violence, corruption and arbitrary killings. The appellant, a [NAME_4] supporter, could be victimised given the prevalence of violence in the country. (b) Given the countrywide influence of [NAME_19] and the extensive network of supporters, it would not matter whether the appellant relocated or remained in his village. Noting the threats made against his wife and daughters in 2022 to reveal his whereabouts, should he relocate elsewhere in India, his family could be pressured into revealing his location. (c) Given the general country conditions of political violence, corruption, religious intolerance and arbitrary killings, the risk to the appellant is not confined to one locality. Amongst others, counsel cites UB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802385 where the Tribunal found that due to the nationwide influence of the [NAME_2], there was no internal protection alternative available to the appellant, and RE (India) [2024] NZIPT 802321, where an increase in corruption in the [NAME_20] and targeting of groups of people were factors in the recognition of refugee status. (d) The Tribunal failed to consider corruption existing within the police and the influence that [NAME_21] like the [NAME_2] have over the police. This was confirmed with the appellant’s dismissive treatment by the police, despite the threats against him. Even if the relevant people were prosecuted, they could receive a community based sentence, which would leave them free to target the appellant again. It is unlikely that any sentence of imprisonment imposed would be for a significant period of time. (e) The risk of serious harm to the appellant is based on his political opinion, one of the five grounds under [NAME_16]. (f) An oral hearing is essential to resolve the adverse credibility findings regarding the appellant’s timeline and travel stamps. [8] For these reasons, counsel submits that the appeal is not manifestly unfounded and requires an oral hearing.

7 Whether the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded [9] As will be explained, the Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to counsel, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. Oral hearing required to resolve issues of credibility [10] Where an appeal raises arguable issues of fact or credibility, an oral hearing will ordinarily be required to ensure a fair determination. However, the premise of any ‘manifestly unfounded’ assessment is that it must proceed on the basis that the claimant’s account is accepted in full. Credibility and findings of fact are not in dispute, see [NAME_22] (India) [2025] NZIPT 802899 at [9](d). [11] For the purposes of determining this appeal, the Tribunal accepts the appellant’s claim in full. It accepts that appellant was a longtime supporter of the [NAME_3]) party and in 2001, he became a member of the party. In February 2022, the appellant was threatened by a large group of [NAME_2]-aligned men holding weapons, first during a street campaign for a [NAME_4] campaign (after which the police refused to file an FIR report) and secondly, at a party for the successful [NAME_4] candidate. The appellant was able to elude the men at the party; however, they went to the appellant’s home and threatened his family. The appellant immediately left Y village and stayed in Kerala for one year, moving around regularly to avoid detection by the [NAME_2], followed by a couple of months in R city, Tamil Nadu, before travelling to New Zealand. The appellant’s family also relocated out of Y village. Having accepted these matters for the purposes of this appeal, there is no need for an oral hearing to determine issues of credibility or fact. [12] The Tribunal notes that there is nothing to suggest that claim involves complex factual circumstances. It is an uncomplicated case of an asserted risk of harm from [NAME_2] in the appellant’s local area due to the appellant’s political activities with the [NAME_6]. As to matters of law, the facts of the present case are straightforward and do not raise novel issues of law. The degree of risk [13] Counsel’s submission as to ‘cumulative risk’ is noted but misses the point. The Tribunal’s letter of 17 March 2026 was clear that the ‘manifestly unfounded’ issue arises because it appears that, even accepting that all of the claims made by the appellant are true, including the threats to kill and harassment of the appellant

8 and his family in Y village and the indifference of the local police to the appellant’s predicament, their cumulative impact in terms of any ongoing risk to him will still, by some considerable margin, fall below the ‘real chance’/‘in danger of’ thresholds by him relocating to any one of the internal protection sites identified by the Tribunal. Further, the submission about risk has not established that there is a need for an oral hearing. Widespread levels of political violence and the Tribunal’s failure to consider the nationwide influence of [NAME_19] and police corruption [14] Counsel submits that the Tribunal overlooked the issues of the nationwide influence of [NAME_19] and police corruption. Instead, these factors mean that the threats and harassment of the appellant would occur with the same frequency and/or intensity regardless of where he was living. However, this does not explain why these submissions need to be tested by way of an oral hearing. In addition, the submission that general country information attests to political violence, corruption, religious intolerance and arbitrary does not establish that there is a need for an oral hearing. These issues will be considered later in the Tribunal’s assessment of whether the appellant has a viable internal protection alternative. Previous Tribunal decisions [15] Counsel, citing UB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802385 and RE (India) [2024] NZIPT 802321, submits that similarities between the present appeal and aspects of those cases indicates that this appeal is not manifestly unfounded. [16] Both cases are distinguishable on the facts. UB (India) concerned risks to a politically active Muslim appellant who had reason to fear the [NAME_2] or its associated organisations. This appellant is not Muslim; he is Hindu. There is no inter-communal element to his claim. In that case, an internal protection alternative was found not to be viable in UB (India) at [86] because, although the appellant had attempted to live in a large urban city hundreds of kilometres from his home, two months after leaving, he was found by the perpetrator of the harm, possibly directed to him by either a family member or his business networks. Similarly RE (India) concerned a Sikh appellant where, at [62], an internal protection alternative was found not to be available because the agent of persecution was the state of India. As such, it had the machinery and the will to

9 access the appellant, a supporter of the [NAME_23], in all parts of the country. [17] Further, the fact that the Tribunal did not find those appeals to be manifestly unfounded does not bind the Tribunal to the same view in other cases, notwithstanding that those other appeals may, to some extent, have arisen against the background of the same general country conditions. The exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion is very much case specific. There were presumably issues in those other cases which the Tribunal decided required an oral hearing. Other matters [18] The Tribunal notes that the appellant has already had a full and fair opportunity on multiple occasions to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [NAME_5], in his interview with a refugee and protection officer and in his response to the interview report. The appellant was also offered a further opportunity to advance and explain his claim in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 17 March 2026, to which counsel responded on 24 March 2026. The Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant has had ample opportunity, over an extended period and with the assistance of counsel, to present his claim; see discussion in ZB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802975 at [11]–[20]. [19] For the above reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to the appellant, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. It therefore determines, pursuant to section 233 of the Act, not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [20] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeals, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form, the decision of the [NAME_5] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant wished to make to the record of his interview) and other material contained in the appeal file. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [21] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later.

10 Evidence of the Appellant [22] The appellant was born in Y village, X district, Tamil Nadu state, India, in the early 1980s and is a citizen of India. He is of the Hindu faith. His parents are deceased. [23] The appellant married his wife in 2004 and they have two daughters, in their late teens and early 20s, respectively. [24] The appellant was a longtime supporter of the [NAME_3]) party and in 2001, he became a member of the party. As a party member, he helped to organise party events, canvassed for potential voters and supported local [NAME_4] candidates. He experienced some harassment during this time, which he ignored. [25] In 2010, the appellant was elected to the position of president of the youth wing of the [NAME_6] and in 2019, he was elected as the [NAME_4] secretary for the ninth ward Y village (although he remained a constituent (and a voter) in the fifth ward). [26] In February 2022, the appellant took part in a street campaign for the [NAME_4] in the upcoming local body elections. A group of 20 to 25 men approached him and other [NAME_4] campaigners and, armed with clubs, threatened the appellant with violence unless he stopped campaigning. The men were led by a [NAME_2] ([NAME_2]) candidate, [NAME_7]. Although the appellant tried to report the threats to the police, they refused to file a First Information Report (FIR) because of [NAME_7]’s connections in central government. [27] Later that month, the appellant attended a party celebrating the election victory of the fifth ward [NAME_4] candidate, [NAME_8], in his local council election. During the party, a group of 20 [NAME_9] arrived, armed with clubs and machetes. The appellant identified two of the supporters as [NAME_7] and [NAME_10], the [NAME_2] candidate for the lok sabha (lower house of the [NAME_11]) in X district. [28] The [NAME_9] intended to kill the appellant, as he was heavily involved in [NAME_8]’s successful campaign. The appellant left the party with help from friends and [NAME_12]. When the [NAME_9] realised that the appellant was not at the party, they attempted to locate him by visiting his family home. According to a friend of the appellant’s, in an attempt to discover his whereabouts, the [NAME_9] made death threats to the appellant’s wife and daughters.

11 [29] That same night, the appellant travelled to Kerala state via bus and also arranged for his family to relocate away from Y village. As an additional precaution, he decided to end his [NAME_4] involvement. [30] Approximately 10 days later, the appellant’s wife and children left Y village and moved to W village, V district, Tamil Nadu. [31] The appellant moved to [NAME_13], T district, Kerala, near the Karnataka border. Following the threats made on his life, he continued to live and work in Kerala. He received work from a friend, [NAME_14], who he met on the bus to Kerala in February 2022. [NAME_14] was a subcontractor who supplied labourers to various industries. The appellant moved around regularly to avoid detection by the [NAME_2]. [32] In March 2023, the appellant left Kerala and moved to R city, Tamil Nadu, where he found restaurant work. [33] In May or June of 2023, the appellant began preparing to leave India. A friend, [NAME_15], who knew about the appellant’s situation, assisted him by applying for a New Zealand visitor visa and paying for his travel to New Zealand. [34] In August 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. [35] On 3 September 2023, the [NAME_5] received the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status form. [36] On 5 August 2024, the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_5]. On 4 June 2025, the appellant was sent the interview report and filed a response on 11 July 2025. The appellant’s claim was declined on 1 October 2025. Other Evidence and Submissions Received [37] No further submissions or evidence was provided in support of the appellant’s appeal. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [38] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal concerning refugee or protected person status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as:

12 (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“[NAME_16]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_24] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [39] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [40] In determining whether the appellant is a refugee or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [41] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in [NAME_25] (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. [NAME_25] (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [42] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the Convention or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant

13 has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. [NAME_16] [43] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of [NAME_16]. [44] Article 1A(2) of [NAME_16] provides that a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [45] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_26] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [46] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [47] The principal issues are, as explained in Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution?

14 Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [48] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case. Relevant country information [49] India is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in India in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [50] Tamil Nadu is the 11th largest state in India, and the seventh most populous state, being home to some 81.5 million people (see https://worldpopulationreview.com/regions/tamil-nadu). In common with most states in India, Tamil Nadu is a majority Hindu state (approximately 88 per cent of the population), see S Kramer Religious Composition of India Pew Research Centre (21 September 2021). As to politics, the [NAME_4]-led alliance has been the dominant party in Tamil Nadu politics, having won three successive elections since 2019. In 2022, it swept the urban local body elections in Tamil Nadu (see [NAME_27] “[NAME_4]’s Winning Spree in Tamil Nadu Continues” Frontline 16 March 2022) and, in Tamil Nadu’s Lok Sabha election in April 2024, it won all 39 seats in the state (see “Tamil Nadu Lok Sabha Election Results 2024 Highlights: [NAME_4] a Clean Sweep of 39/39; [NAME_2]-digit Vote Share” The Hindu (7 June 2024)). [51] However, in respect of the upcoming April 2026 Assembly elections, combined polling points to a much closer race between the [NAME_4] and its opposition, the AIADMK-led alliance, of which the [NAME_2] is a member. Although the election appears to be competitive with no guaranteed outcome, “the [NAME_4] holds a

15 marginal advantage in the overall polling trend”, see [NAME_28] “Opinion Polls For Tamil Nadu Election 2026: Who Is Leading Right Now?” News 18 (30 March 2026). [52] It is unclear as to whether or how much the [NAME_2]’s influence has increased in Tamil Nadu politics. [NAME_29] in “[NAME_2]’s Emergence and Struggles: Navigating Tamil Nadu’s Dravidian Dominance” (2025) 13(2) Studies in Indian Politics 206, notes that the efforts of the [NAME_2] and the Sangh Parivar (the grouping of [NAME_19] associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organisation) to expand their influence has been confined to urban areas and upper castes, with attempts to use communal tensions to fuel organisational growth being largely unsuccessful. Further, efforts to appropriate Tamil culture have not resulted in electoral success. [53] However, the AIADMK-led alliance appears to believe that the [NAME_2]’s influence has grown. Its seat sharing arrangement for the upcoming election has resulted in the [NAME_2] being allocated 27 seats to contest, an increase of six from the previous Assembly election, although, putting the numbers in context, the AIAMDK itself will be contesting 178 seats in the upcoming election (see “[NAME_2]'s Influence Grown in Tamil Nadu? Why the AIADMK Alliance Allocated 27 Seats to Party for Assembly Polls” The Week News (23 March 2026). Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [54] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [55] As to what constitutes serious harm, not all harm arising from breaches of human rights will qualify. The threshold is that the harm must be serious. In that regard, the purpose of [NAME_16] is to provide the surrogate protection of another state when the claimant’s own state is unable or unwilling to protect the person. The surrogate protection of another state is not intended to be available where the harm at issue is not serious. [56] At the core of the appellant’s account is the following: (a) The appellant was a longtime supporter of the [NAME_6] and in 2001, he became a party member.

16 (b) In February 2022, the appellant was threatened by a large group of [NAME_2]-aligned men holding weapons, first during a street campaign for a [NAME_4] campaign (after which the police refused to file an FIR report) and second, at a party for the successful [NAME_4] candidate. The appellant was able to elude the men at the party; however, they went to the appellant’s home and threatened his family. (c) The appellant immediately left Y village and stayed in Kerala for one year, moving around regularly to avoid detection by the [NAME_2], followed by a couple of months in R city, before travelling to New Zealand. Shortly after the appellant’s departure, his family relocated away from Y village. (d) At the time the appellant left Y village, he decided to end his [NAME_4] involvement. (e) The harm arises in breach of his rights under Articles 9 (security of the person) and 26 (equal protection of the law) of the ICCPR. [57] The protection afforded by [NAME_16] is not focussed on harm in the past. Its gaze is fixed firmly on the risk of harm in the future. What has happened in the past can, of course, be an indicator of what might happen in the future. However, where, as here, a past instance of harm becomes remote in time, without further harm arising, it ceases to be a compelling indicator of risk of future harm. [58] In the appellant’s case, it has been four years since the latest events which gave rise to the claim, after which the appellant left New Zealand. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this appeal, the Tribunal assumes that the [NAME_33] in Y village will remain interested in him, given the nature of the threats to him and his family and the fact that the group of men were intent on ending his life following the [NAME_4]’s election victory in the local area. Therefore, when viewing these incidents cumulatively, the Tribunal finds that, in Y village, the appellant faces a real chance of serious harm from those local [NAME_30] and that state protection in that area may be problematic, given the previous treatment of the appellant by the local police. Such a predicament involves in breach of his rights under Article 6 (not to be arbitrarily deprived of life), Article 9 (security of the person) and Article 26 (equal protection of the law) of the ICCPR.

17 [59] However, as explained in the Tribunal’s letter, the issue of whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted were he living in his local area is not the determinative issue. Rather, what is at issue is the availability of a viable internal protection alternative as discussed below. Internal Protection Alternative [60] In respect of both the claim for protection as a refugee under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile (if one exists there) can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country of origin and accessing meaningful domestic protection there, to the extent that it is needed; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well- founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for the surrogate protection of another country simply does not arise. As noted in its letter of 17 March 2026, the Tribunal has adopted a four-stage inquiry: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by [NAME_16] itself.

18 [61] However, this test must be seen in light of the Court of Appeal decision in Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, at pp217–218, where the Court clearly stated that the internal protection alternative is inherent to the refugee definition and does not authorise a free-standing inquiry as to whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances. Nor is it a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. Further, it is for the appellant to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see Refugee and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [18]–[21]. [62] In its letter of 17 March 2026, the Tribunal put the appellant on notice that, given that his past problems were centred on Y village, X district as the result of his involvement with the [NAME_4], they were highly localised in nature. Therefore, any risk he faced because of his political involvement would dissipate to below the ‘real chance’ and ‘in danger of’ thresholds by his moving a large urban area in Tamil Nadu such as Chennai, Madurai, Salem or Tirunelveli, or R city where he has lived without incident previously, or further afield to an area outside of Tamil Nadu, given that he spent a year in Kerala, again, without incident. [63] In reply, counsel cites the 2024 United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025), which notes, as the Tribunal sets out at [48], that human rights violations do occur and include of arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention. However, the general nature of this report does not meaningfully engage with the internal protection alternative issue as it relates to this particular appellant in the identified internal protection sites. The Tribunal stated in AN (India) [2026] NZIPT 803146: [50] … [A] more focussed analysis is required to establish that meaningful domestic protection is not available to this appellant in those places consistent with the caution sounded in Butler (supra) against the evaluation straying away from a protection focus. There cannot be any presumed homogeneity of risk and associated protection need across India which is a vast and populous country. … [52] Like most things, the street-level impact of politics of intolerance expressed at a national level or state level depends on how these are mediated through more local, community level structures … [64] Here, no country information has been provided to demonstrate that the general statements about country conditions are relevant to the specific locations identified as potential sites of internal protection. Further, as the Tribunal observed in AN (India) there was no evidence that:

19 [53] … persons similarly situated to the appellant have been pursued, located and harmed in these places (or elsewhere) by [NAME_31] using their networks. There is also nothing to suggest that such ‘networks’ either exist or, if they do, that they are used to locate persons in whom there is an adverse interest in one small area. [65] The Tribunal does not overlook that the decision in UB (India) provides an example of where, two months after relocating to a large urban area hundreds of kilometres away from the site of the harm, the appellant was tracked down by the [NAME_2]-aligned perpetrator of the harm, possibly directed to him by either a family member or someone in his business networks. That decision is confined to its own facts. Moreover, in contrast, in the present case, despite spending a year away in Kerala and a short time in R city, the appellant was not located by any of the perpetrators. The Tribunal does not overlook the appellant’s evidence that when he lived in Kerala, he moved frequently to avoid detection. However, given that the appellant spent over a year away from the village and was not located, it appears that the [NAME_30] from Y village did not possess the means (even assuming they had the wish) to locate him, even if the appellant genuinely held that subjective fear. Further, the passage of time since the original harm took place is now four years. This further lessens the chance that he will face a risk of serious harm from any such [NAME_30] should he relocate away from Y village. [66] The Tribunal also notes that the appellant immediately ended his involvement with the [NAME_4] when he left Y village, another factor further reducing the chance of attracting adverse attention from any [NAME_30] once he relocates elsewhere in India. [67] Finally, the Tribunal finds that the appellant will not be exposed to other forms of harm in the specific locations identified as potential sites of internal protection and he will be able to enjoy his basic human rights there given that he is male, Hindu, and someone who has held employment out of his home village. That he might encounter harm in any of these places should he choose to resume political activities in support of the [NAME_4] is entirely speculative and remote. Conclusion on the internal protection alternative issue [68] The appellant’s predicament is local in nature. Even assuming he remains at risk of serious harm in his home village, he can avoid this by moving to one of a number of places, including those identified as internal protection alternative sites in the Tribunal’s letter of 17 March 2026. Therefore, the appellant does not require

20 the surrogate protection of another state such as New Zealand as he can find this in India. [69] For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of his human rights in India is no more than speculative and remote. For this reason, he does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [70] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to Refugee Status [71] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a refugee under [NAME_16] and section 129 of the Act. The [NAME_24] [72] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_24] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [73] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME_24], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [74] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [75] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the protected person categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established

21 (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the refugee enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [76] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in India, to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as protected persons in New Zealand under the [NAME_24]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_24] [77] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [78] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. (2) Despite subsection (1), a person must not be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if he or she is able to access meaningful domestic protection in his or her country or countries of nationality or former habitual residence. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [79] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [80] Again, the appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

22 [81] The breaches of human rights inherent in the arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights when considered in relation to the refugee enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, there, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in India. Nor is it the case that the degree of harm required for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is any less serious than the degree of harm (that is to say, serious harm) required for the assessment of refugee status. [82] As with the claim to refugee status, the appellant has available to him an internal protection alternative in India. As the result of that availability, the Tribunal is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in India. He is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [83] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act.

CONCLUSION [84] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of [NAME_16] and therefore is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME_24] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [85] The appeal is dismissed.

23 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

M Avia Member Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [86] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellants and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others. [87] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “M Avia” M Avia Member