Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803260 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: S Joe (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Decision: 30 April 2026 __________________________________________________________________

DECISION ________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm because of his participation in farmers’ protests and by reason of his Sikh faith. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be

2 recognised as a refugee or a protected person under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming refugee or protected person status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_1] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_1]. [6] On 8 April 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of his claim and gave him the opportunity to respond by 15 April 2026: Normally, the Tribunal offers refugee and protected person appellants an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if an appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_1], the Tribunal may determine his or her appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. You were interviewed by the [NAME_1]. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing you an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is your responsibility to establish your claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which you wish to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009. You had the same responsibility in respect of your claim before the [NAME_1], including the obligation to put forward all information, evidence, and submissions that you wished to have considered in support of the claim or would wish to have considered in support of any other potential claim – see section 135 of the Act.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of your claim, as recorded in the interview record and decision of the [NAME_1], is: (a) You are a Punjabi Sikh who was born in a predominantly Sikh locality, ([X village], [Y district], Uttarakhand) in 1998. You speak both Hindi and Punjabi, and read and write Hindi. (b) [NAME_2] is a rice and sugar cane farmer and your mother, a housewife. Your elder brother lives with his parents and works on the family farm. [NAME_2] is married.

3 (c) From April 2018, having completed your high school education, you worked at a factory that produced photographic paper. (d) Between 2018 and 2020, [NAME_3] protested laws which had been passed to reform the farming industry. (e) In January 2020, you took leave from work to join the "sit-in" protest against the reforms at the [Z] border. (f) You attended the protests with your brother, staying around seven or eight months, along with approximately 5,000 other protesters. Your participation was confined to chanting political slogans. From the [Z] border you also travelled to [a different location near the border in Uttar Pradesh] to attend another protest against the new farming laws. (g) On 26 January 2020 the protests at [Z] became violent after protesters attempted to raise a flag at the Red Fort. They were attacked by police and members of the [NAME_4] ([NAME_4]). During this violence, you and your brother sustained minor injuries. (h) Around March 2020, along with several other protestors, you were detained in a police van and driven to a nearby camp, but released on arrival. You believe this was done to provoke and intimidate you. (i) In June 2020, you decided to return to [Y district], and began working on the family farm. (j) Between July and November 2020, the police visited your family’s home and threatened you against participating in any further protests. In the first few weeks following your return, they came four or five times. These police visits continued monthly until the end of the year. (k) You feared that the police would lay false charges against you due to your participation in the farmers’ protests. (l) On 20 May 2023, you applied for a New Zealand visitor visa. On [1 June 2023], your visitor visa was approved. (m) On 28 June 2023, you arrived in New Zealand. (n) On 24 December 2023, you applied for a second visitor visa, which was approved on 27 February 2024. (o) On 26 March 2024, the [NAME_1] received your Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status form. (p) In April 2025, your brother was harassed and beaten by police during a visit to the family home and warned not to engage in any further protests. You believe that this police interest was prompted by ‘the war hysteria’ created by India-Pakistan military crisis at the time. (q) On 5 May 2025, you were interviewed by a refugee and protection officer. On 23 June 2025, you were sent an interview report and given 20 working days to respond to the matters raised. However, no response was received from you by this deadline. (r) The refugee and protection officer emailed you on 16 September 2025, advising that if nothing was received within the next three days, a decision would be made on your case. (s) The [NAME_1] declined your claim on 15 October 2025.

4 No sufficient risk of qualifying harm Not all harm entitles you to protection under the Act. For refugee status, you must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in India, which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act. This means that if you return to India you are either: a) facing a well-founded fear of being persecuted (a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights); b) in danger of being tortured; c) in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or d) in danger of arbitrary deprivation of life. Also, the thresholds of both “a real chance of being persecuted” and being “in danger of” one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility. See Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57], HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189, at [55]–[60], and AI (South Africa) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83]. In your case, the risk of any serious harm occurring to you is no higher than mere speculation, or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: a) In 2020, you and your brother joined the farmers’ protests staying several months at the [Z] border and also joining a farmers’ protest at [a different location near the border in Uttar Pradesh]. b) On 26 January 2020, the farmers’ protest became violent, but you suffered only minor injuries. c) Aside from this, you were picked up and detained along with other protesters in March 2020, only to be released upon arrival at the police camp. d) From June 2020 through to the remainder of that year you suffered some police harassment, in the form of police visits and threats not to take part in any further protests. e) In April 2025, your brother in India was beaten and harassed by police, and warned not to become involved in any further protests. Because of your prior participation in the farmers’ protests in 2020 and because you are a Sikh, you fear that if you now returned to India, false charges would be laid against you. Even taken cumulatively, the above incidents fell well short of amounting to serious harm. The risk of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in the future is no more than a remote and speculative risk of harm. You have never belonged to any political party in India, nor engaged in any activities of a political nature, other than the farmers’ protests. Nor have you experienced any difficulties by reason of your Sikh faith. Your participation at the farmers protests was relatively low-level and confined to chanting slogans, along with some 5,000 others in attendance. You did not suffer serious harm because of that participation. Although you were subject to some police visits the remainder of that year, this was for a finite period only. Nothing further happened to you prior to leaving India.

5 The risk to you appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. It is now almost six years since you were involved in the protests. The police harassment of your brother in April 2025, while regrettable, appears to be an isolated event. At best, if you returned to India there is a remote, as distinct from a real, chance that you would be of any interest to the police now. It appears that you do not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason, nor have grounds for being recognised as a protected person under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. Internal protection alternative There is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. In respect of both the refugee claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to [assess] whether the risk of serious harm in your usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by you relocating elsewhere in the country [of] origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130 (2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217-218 and see also Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see Refugee and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [21]. Here, even if there was a real chance of you suffering serious harm in your home village (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above), there appears to be no reason why you could not move to live in either a different village in Uttarakhand, or beyond, such as, in Jalandhar, Ludhiana, or Amritsar. Uttarakhand is a state of some 10,086,292 million people (2011 census). There appears to be no reason why you could not move to the Punjab where there is also a significant Sikh population. According to the 2011 census, there are over 465,000 Sikhs living in Ludhiana, 185,000 in Jalandhar, and 550,000 in Amritsar. The police interest in you was also very localised in nature, and there is no evidence that the police would be interested in you elsewhere. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to you. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, you cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement.

6 (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [NAME_5] itself. It appears to the Tribunal that you could access, and reside safely in Jalandhar, Ludhiana, or Amritsar. All of these locations in the Punjab have large populations well over 800,000 and where there is a strong Sikh presence. You share a common language and would be likely to find farming work or similar there. The evidence does not point to any risk there of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [NAME_5] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, you are not outside India, your country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. You do not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to Respond It appears that you have neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason nor grounds for being recognised as a protected person under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. The claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer you an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 15 April 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence you wish to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer you an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice. [7] No response by way of submissions or evidence has been received. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [8] The Tribunal finds, for the reasons explained in its letter, that, even accepting the claim as asserted, the appellant does not meet the requirements for recognition as a refugee or protected person. The appeal is manifestly unfounded. [9] For that reason, the Tribunal determines not to offer the appellant an oral hearing. [10] It is now necessary to turn to the facts of the appellant’s case, bearing in mind that credibility is accepted.

7 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [11] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status (“Confirmation of Claim”) form, the decision of the [NAME_1] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview), other material contained in the appeal file. [12] The appellant is in his late twenties. He was born a Punjabi Sikh in a predominantly Sikh locality (X town, Y district, Uttarakhand). He speaks both Hindi and Punjabi, and reads and writes in Hindi. [13] The appellant’s father is a rice and sugar cane farmer and his mother is a housewife. His elder brother lives with his parents and works on the family farm. His other sibling, a sister, is married. [14] From April 2018, having completed his high school education, the appellant worked at a factory that produced photographic paper. [15] Between 2018 and 2020, [NAME_3] protested laws which had been passed by the government to reform the agricultural industry. [16] In January 2020, the appellant took leave from work to join the farmers’ “sit-in” protest at the Z border. [17] The appellant attended the protests with his brother, staying around seven or eight months, along with approximately 5,000 other protesters. His participation was confined to chanting political slogans. From the Z border he also travelled to a different location near the border in Uttar Pradesh to attend another farmers’ protest. [18] On 26 January 2020 the protests at Z became violent after protesters attempted to raise a flag at the Red Fort. They were attacked by police and members of the [NAME_4] (“[NAME_4]”). During this violence, the appellant and his brother sustained minor injuries. [19] Throughout the farmers’ protests the police often would pick up four to five protesters, drive them away in a vehicle, and then leave them at police camps that had been established in the vicinity. On one such occasion, around March 2020, the appellant was picked up together with several other protestors

8 and detained in a police van. The police questioned why they were protesting, telling them to stay home and “forget about the bills”. After being driven approximately 200 metres away to a nearby police camp, the appellant was released and left to make his own way back on foot. The appellant believes these actions were done to provoke and intimidate him and other protesters. [20] In June 2020, the appellant decided to return home in Y district, where he began working on the family farm. [21] Between July and November 2020, the police visited the family home and threatened the appellant against participating in any further protests. In the first few weeks following his return, they came around four or five times. Over time, these visits became less frequent, continuing around once a month, until the end of the year. [22] The appellant feared that the police would lay false charges against him due to his participation in the farmers’ protests. [23] On 20 May 2023, he applied for a New Zealand visitor visa which was approved on 1 June 2023 (and not on 21 August 2023, as incorrectly referred by Immigration New Zealand in its decline decision). On 28 June 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. [24] On 24 December 2023, the appellant applied for a second visitor visa, which was approved on 27 February 2024. On 26 March 2024, the [NAME_1] received his Confirmation of Claim form. [25] In April 2025, the police visited the appellant’s family home in India. They harassed and beat his brother, warning him not to engage in any further protests. The appellant believes that this police interest was prompted by “the war hysteria” created by India-Pakistan military crisis at the time. [26] The appellant’s claim was declined on 15 October 2025. ASSESSMENT [27] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as:

9 (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [NAME_5]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_6] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [28] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a protected person, section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [NAME_5]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [29] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the Convention or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment; see YT (India) [2025] NZIPT 802899 at [9](d). As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. THE [NAME_5] [30] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of the [NAME_5]. [31] Article 1A(2) of the [NAME_5] provides that a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

10 [32] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_7] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [33] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [34] In terms of Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellants being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [35] It is necessary to address the relevant country information. None has been provided by the appellant, but the Tribunal’s own research establishes the following. Country information [36] India is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in India in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions

11 on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [37] As to the farmers’ protests, a helpful background can be found in the Tribunal’s previous decision in AY (India) [2026] NZIPT 803052 at [41]: [41] As the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT Country Information Report: India (29 September 2023) (“DFAT report”) reports: ‘2.6 India is a mature and robust democracy in which politics is hotly contested, and news and analysis is often sensationalised. Social media is used widely and sometimes includes disinformation. According to media reports, Hindu nationalism and populism have risen since [NAME_8]’s 2014 election. During this period the largest national opposition party, the [Indian National Congress], has weakened significantly at the national level, and no other political party has shown itself capable of forming a nationally cohesive challenge to the ruling [[NAME_4]]. Generalisations about India’s state of democracy are often unhelpful; India is characterised by significant ethno-linguistic and political diversity and the political landscape in one state can differ significantly from its neighbours. Diversity also exists within states. Some states (notably Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Bihar) have populations exceeding 100 million people: more people than most nations.’ [42] As to the farmers’ protests, the DFAT report states: ‘3.99 A recent prominent example of political activity, mainly in Punjab and Haryana (other states also to a less extent), was a year-long farmers’ protest against agricultural reform seeking to liberalise aspects of India’s agricultural sector in 2021. The protests were generally peaceful with some high-profile exceptions. For example, a vehicle ran into protesters causing fatal injuries in Uttar Pradesh. The son of a Union minister of state was charged with murder in relation to the incident. The protests were called off after the government acceded to the demands of protesters.’ [43] The DFAT report does not include any report of punitive action being taken against anyone involved in the farmers’ protests, except to note that there was interference with social media at the time, presumably in the interests of national security or public safety: ‘3.109 According to an article in the East Asia Forum by an academic at the National University of Singapore, [NAME_9], the government used section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000 to request the removal of hundreds of tweets and Twitter accounts in relation to the 2021 farmers’ protests. That Act allows the government to block public access to an ‘intermediary’ for reasons such as national security, defence and public order.’ Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [38] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [39] The appellant has had multiple occasions on which to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [NAME_1], in his interview with a refugee and protection officer, in his response to the interview report and in his opportunity to respond to the Tribunal’s letter of 15 April 2026. The Tribunal is satisfied that he has had ample

12 opportunity, over an extended period to present his claim. See here the discussion in ZB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [10]−[27]. [40] As to what constitutes serious harm, not all harm arising from breaches of human rights will qualify. The threshold is that the harm must be serious. In that regard, the purpose of the [NAME_5] is to provide the surrogate protection of another state when the claimant’s own state is unable or unwilling to protect the person. That surrogate protection is not intended to be available where the harm at issue is not serious. [41] In summary, the harm which has occurred to the appellant in the past is that: (a) In 2020, he joined the farmers’ protests staying several months at the Z border and also joining a farmers’ protest at a different location near the border in Uttar Pradesh. (b) On one occasion in January 2020 he suffered minor injuries when the farmers’ protest became violent. (c) The appellant was later picked up and detained along with other protesters in March 2020, only to be released upon arrival at a police camp. (d) From June 2020 through to the remainder of that year the appellant suffered some police harassment in the form of police visits and was threatened not to take part in any further protests. [42] In his absence from India, the appellant learned that in April 2025, his brother in India, with whom he had participated in the farmers’ protests, was beaten and harassed by police. He was also warned not to become involved in any further protests. [43] However, even accepting the above, the future risk of any serious harm occurring to the appellant is no higher than mere speculation, or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: (a) The appellant’s participation at the farmers protests was relatively low-level and confined to chanting slogans. He was one of some 5,000 protesters in attendance who suffered only minor injuries on one occasion during the protests. Even assuming the assault

13 amounted to a breach of his right to security of the person, it has not resulted in serious harm to him. As for his being picked up by the police, the evidence indicates that the police was focused on deterring him from any future related protest activity. He was immediately released upon his arrival at the police camp, and did not encounter any further difficulties even after he resumed his participation in the protests. Following his return home, and for the remainder of that year the appellant was subject to some police scrutiny and visits to his home, but this was for a finite period only. (b) The appellant did not suffer serious harm because of his participation in the protests. Even taken cumulatively, the above incidents fell well short of amounting to serious harm. (c) By the end of 2020, any police interest in the appellant had come to an end. Nothing further happened to him prior to his leaving India in June 2023. He continued to live in India without incident and the authorities demonstrated no further interest in him. (d) It is acknowledged that the appellant’s brother, who had also participated with him in farmers’ protests, was beaten and harassed by the police in April 2025. While regrettable, this appears to be an isolated event and, on the appellant’s own evidence, that police visit was more likely due to the increased India-Pakistan tensions prevailing at the time. (e) There is no evidence to suggest that the appellant would be of any further interest now to the police, either by reason of his prior involvement in protests or due to his Sikh faith. He has never belonged to any political party in India, nor engaged in any activities of a political nature, let alone of a pro-Khalistan nature, other than the farmers’ protests which are now remote in time having occurred almost six years ago. Nor has the appellant experienced any difficulties in India by reason of his Sikh faith. The Tribunal has considered the general country information regarding India and accepts that India is a large and diverse country in which human rights violations occur. It is characterised by

14 significant ethno-linguistic and political diversity and the political landscape in one state can differ significantly from its neighbours. It is also accepted that there has been a rise in Hindu nationalism since the [NAME_8] government came to power in 2014. However, there is no reason to think that the rise in Hindu nationalism means that the appellant will suffer serious harm on account of his Sikh faith. [44] The Tribunal finds that the appellant has not experienced any serious harm arising from a breach of his international human rights in the past nor is there any real chance that he will do so in the future. The chance of the appellant suffering serious harm is no more than a speculative or remote possibility, given the length of time over which nothing serious has happened to him. The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights is no more than speculative and remote. [45] For these reasons, the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India. Internal protection alternative [46] There is a further reason why the appellant’s claim is manifestly unfounded. This is that, even assumed that the appellant is at risk of serious harm from the police in his family’s home village, he can mitigate this risk by moving elsewhere. [47] In respect of both the claim for protection as a refugee under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. Any risk of harm that the appellant may face in his village can be negated by his simply relocating to another place.

15 [48] Aside from being remote in time, the police interest in the appellant was also highly localised in nature, and there is no evidence that they would be interested in him elsewhere. As observed in BR (India) [2026] NZIPT 803157 at [57], just because the police are involved, does not mean an internal protection alternative cannot exist as a matter of law. The Tribunal has put to the appellant the question of an internal protection alternative. Having done so, it is the appellant’s statutory responsibility to establish this element of his claim. He has not, however, provided a response to the Tribunal’s letter. [49] The Tribunal sees no reason why the appellant could not move to a different place in Uttarakhand state or beyond, where he would not be at risk of harm from the police. Uttarakhand is a state of some 10,086,292 million people (Population Census 2011 census at https://www.census2011.co.in). [50] Further, there is no reason why the appellant could not move to the Punjab, where there is also a significant Sikh population. According to the 2011 census, there are over 465,000 Sikhs living in Ludhiana, 185,000 in Jalandhar, and 550,000 in Amritsar. All such locations have populations over 800,000 (see https://www.census2011.co.in). The appellant shares a common language in these locations and would be likely to find agricultural work or similar there. [51] The Tribunal finds that the appellant could access and reside safely in any one of those locations. Any risk of his suffering harm there is speculative, and well below the level of a real chance. There is no reason, on the evidence, why the appellant could not live safely in any of these populous areas. All the internal protection alternatives proposed are accessible and safe. The appellant would be free in any of them from the risk of persecution or other forms of harm there and would enjoy the basic rights recognised by the [NAME_5]. Those alternative places of relocation all meet the required criteria for an internal protection alternative. [52] The appellant is not, therefore, outside his country of nationality (India) owing to a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]−[130] and [177]–[183]. The risk falls short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not require the surrogate protection of another state. [53] For the above reasons the Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in India is no more than

16 speculative and remote. He does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [54] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to Refugee Status [55] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a refugee under the [NAME_5] and section 129 of the Act. The [NAME_6] [56] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_6] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [57] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME_6], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [58] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [59] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the protected person categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the refugee enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [60] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in India, to severe mental or physical pain or suffering

17 for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as protected persons in New Zealand under the [NAME_6]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_6] [61] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [62] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [63] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [64] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [65] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the refugee enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the refugee context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in India. [66] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or

18 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

S Joe Member subjected to cruel treatment in India. He is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [67] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act.

CONCLUSION [68] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of the [NAME_5] and therefore is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME_6] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [69] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [70] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [71] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “S Joe” S Joe Member