Refugee Status Appeal Dismissed by Immigration & Protection Tribunal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803191 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 20 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION ___________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm because he owes money to a number of [NAME] who are seeking the repayment of the funds. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME] under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming [RESPONDENT] or [NAME] status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. [6] On 26 March 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim and gave him the opportunity to respond by 2 April 2026: Normally, the Tribunal offers [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] appellants an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if an appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME], the Tribunal may determine his or her appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 28 April 2025. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing the appellant an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009. The appellant had the same responsibility in respect of his claim before the [RESPONDENT[NAME], including the obligation to put forward all information, evidence, and submissions that he wished to have considered in support of the claim or would wish to have considered in support of any other potential claim – see section 135 of the Act.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of the claim, as recorded in the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and its file, is: (a) The appellant was born in [DATE]. He is a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The appellant has three surviving siblings.

3 One brother and his parents are deceased. The appellant is married [and] they have two daughters. (b) The appellant is of Marwari Indian ethnicity and follows the Hindu religion. (c) The appellant attended one year of schooling, at approximately five years old. This was the only formal education that he received and as such, he can neither read nor write in any language. (d) When the appellant was approximately ten years old, his father died. The appellant then moved from the family home in Rajasthan to Mumbai to live with his elder brother and his brother's wife and children. He was not in school or employment at this time. (e) In approximately 2001, when the appellant was approximately 15 years old, he entered the workforce, working for [NAME], selling shoes for commission. (f) In 2004, the appellant married his wife. In 2009, their first child was born. In 2010, their second child was born. (g) In 2010, the appellant and his wife started a [NAME] in Mumbai. While the business was developing, the appellant and his family were financially supported by the appellant’s [NAME]. (h) By 2015, the business's average annual income was approximately Indian Rupees ("INR") 2.5 lakh. (i) In 2020, [APPELLANT] went into lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic and as a result, the appellant’s business suffered and incurred no revenue for six months. (j) To cover staff salaries and personal living expenses, the appellant started taking loans from relatives and acquaintances who had [NAME] of being [NAME] in the [NAME]. The business's stock spoiled during the lockdown, so the appellant loaned more money to replace it. He would take a loan from one moneylender, then take another loan from another moneylender to pay the interest of the loan prior. This cycle continued until the appellant left [APPELLANT]. He borrowed money from 10-12 different individuals, totalling approximately INR 25-90 lakh. The appellant stated that the details of each loan were recorded on a piece of paper, but that the paper stayed with the moneylender. (k) The appellant started to default on his repayments. [NAME] prevented him from acquiring more loans and started demanding repayment by insulting the appellant in public and sitting in front of his house and not letting anyone from the house leave. The appellant tried going to the police, but they did not take any action. (l) On 17 February 2022, the appellant was issued an Indian passport. (m) In 2023, the appellant’s business collapsed, and he decided to go overseas to earn money to pay back the loans. He engaged the services of a travel agent in Mumbai who helped him apply for visas for Australia and Japan, however, these were declined.

4 (n) The agent helped the appellant apply for a New Zealand visitor visa. The agent advised the appellant he needed to demonstrate having sufficient monies to cover his trip, so he had friends temporarily deposit monies into his account, and he presented these bank statements with his visa application. (o) On 10 June 2023, the appellant’s six-month New Zealand visitor visa was approved. (p) On 25 October 2023, the appellant left [APPELLANT] with a group of others and went to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea. He had intended to work in South Korea but was denied entry and was sent back to [APPELLANT] on 6 November 2023. (q) In March 2024, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. He was accompanied by the agent and his wife who returned to [APPELLANT] ten days later. (r) On 26 March 2024, the [NAME] received the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form ("Confirmation of Claim"), dated 25 March 2024. (s) After the appellant’s arrival in New Zealand, [NAME] phoned his wife 40 to 50 times a day to ask when the loans would be repaid. [NAME] also visited the family home and sat outside, stopping the family from working. They also threatened the family and told them they would die there if the debt was not repaid. (t) On 28 April 2025, the appellant was interviewed by [RESPONDENT] and protection officer at [NAME]. His representative was present at the interview. The appellant confirmed that he was fit and well and agreed to be interviewed. The appellant speaks Hindi, does not read nor write in any language, and was interviewed in Hindi. He confirmed that he understood, and agreed to use, the interpreter provided. (u) On 23 May 2025 an interview report was sent to the appellant and his representative. (v) On 7 July 2025 the [NAME] received the appellant’s response to the interview report. (w) On 8 July 2025 the [NAME] received further submissions in support of the appellant’s claim. (x) On 12 September 2025, the [NAME] declined the appellant’s application. No sufficient risk of qualifying harm The appellant’s relevant past experiences can be summarised thus: (a) The appellant had a business, for which he borrowed money from 10-12 different individuals, totalling approximately 25-90 lakh. (b) The appellant defaulted on his repayments after his business experienced financial difficulties. (c) [NAME] insulted the appellant in public and sat in front of his house, not letting anyone leave.

5 (d) The police were approached but did not take any action. (e) After the appellant’s arrival in New Zealand, [NAME] phoned his wife 40 to 50 times per day regarding repayment. They also visited the family home and sat outside, stopping the family from working. They threatened the family and told them they would die there if the debt was not repaid. Not all harm entitles an appellant to protection under the Act. For [RESPONDENT] status, an appellant must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in [APPELLANT], which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act, namely that he or she is in danger of: (a) being tortured; (b) cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or (c) arbitrary deprivation of life. Additionally, the thresholds of both “a real chance of being persecuted” and being “in danger of” one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility – see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57], HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189, at [55]–[60], and [NAME]) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83]. The evidence here does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: (a) The appellant has not sustained any harm which could amount in law to serious harm sufficient to qualify as being persecuted as that term is explained in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. The risk that he would be subjected to serious harm amount to his being persecuted in the future in [APPELLANT] falls well short of this level of harm. (b) [NAME] have verbally abused the appellant and come to his house seeking repayment. While this may have been upsetting to the appellant, it does not amount to serious harm. The appellant also owes this money which [NAME] are entitled to have repaid. (c) [NAME] have threatened the appellant’s family, saying that they would die if the debt was not repaid, there is no evidence that [NAME] have tried to act on these threats, at any time. The likelihood that they would do so in the future is entirely remote. [NAME] have not sought to contact the appellant directly. Further they have legal remedies available to them such as civil proceedings to seek repayment of the loans. (d) Further, the appellant could resolve the matter with [NAME] by honouring his obligations. The appellant has been living in New Zealand and able to earn money for over two years. He could also explore other possibilities, such as repayment plans, or bankruptcy. (e) Insofar as [NAME] have or may in the future threaten him because of unpaid loans, there is no nexus to one of the five [RESPONDENT[NAME] grounds.

6 It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim. He appears not to have established that he meets the requirements of Article1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. Nor does he appear to have demonstrated that there are substantial grounds for believing that he is at risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm in sections 130 and 131 of the Act. He appears not to be not entitled to the surrogate protection of another state. Internal protection alternative There is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. In respect of both the [RESPONDENT] claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assesses whether the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217–218 and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer v [NAME] (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [21]. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] itself. Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in Mumbai (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) it appears that he could access, and reside safely in, Rajasthan where he was born and is family home is. He could also reside in any number of other large cities in [APPELLANT], such as Delhi (with a population of approximately 35 million), or in a different part of Mumbai (with a population of over 20 million). The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, the appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of

7 nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to Respond It appears that appellant has neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason nor grounds for being recognised as a [NAME] under section 130 or section 131 of the Immigration Act 2009. The claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 2 April 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence [NAME] wishes to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer [NAME] an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice. [7] On 1 April 2026, the Tribunal received written submissions (1 April 2026) from the appellant’s counsel and a written statement (undated) from the appellant. [8] Counsel submits that the risk from the informal and unregulated [NAME] is ongoing and not speculative. Commonly, situations such as the appellant’s escalate into harm when repayment cannot be made. Since the appellant’s departure the pressure has continued, with his wife receiving up to 40-50 calls per day and continued visits from [NAME]. [9] Counsel submits that effective state protection is not available to the appellant as the police regarded the matter as a private issue and [NAME] are outside effective regulatory control. The future risk of harm, without state protection, is reasonably foreseeable due to the multiple [NAME], death threats, control and intimidation at the family home and ongoing harassment of family members. Internal relocation is not a viable option due to a lack of financial means, support, employment or education. The appellant’s evidence is credible, and any inconsistencies are adequately explained. [10] The appellant states in his statement (received 1 April 2026) that he is at risk as the money he owes is to [NAME] who do not operate like formal financial institutions. These [NAME] use pressure, threats and intimidation. Such situations often escalate, and people are harmed. The fact he owes money to several [NAME] makes the situation more serious. Since the appellant has come to New Zealand, the risk has shifted to his family. His wife has been contacted repeatedly and the [NAME] have come to her house asking for repayment. The appellant sought help from the police, but none was forthcoming.

8 The matter was treated as a private matter. Further, the appellant has no financial means, support or education to relocate and start again. The pressure would continue on his family. He wishes to remain in New Zealand to repay his debts safely and faster. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [11] The Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to the appellant, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. [12] The Tribunal acknowledges the death threats and visits to the family home. However, it is not satisfied that these will be acted upon. The Tribunal acknowledges that unregulated [NAME] may be capable of escalating threats and harming individuals. However, in this case there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the Tribunal the appellant faces a real chance of being persecuted. The threats have not escalated into any serious harm previously to the appellant or family members. While attempts to seek the return of the money have been made, on a repeated and intense manner, no serious harm has been inflicted on anyone. [13] The appellant is able to relocate to another part of [APPELLANT]. He has successfully relocated to New Zealand, another country, and obtained work here. He has been working in New Zealand and as such, been able to repay loans, to a certain extent in any event. He has not provided any objective evidence of the amount of any outstanding remaining loans. [14] Finally, counsel’s submissions in relation to credibility are misguided. In the context of the Tribunal’s manifestly unfounded jurisdiction, all evidence is accepted as credible. [15] Pursuant to section 233 of the Act, the Tribunal therefore determines not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [16] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form, the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview), other material contained in the appeal file and in counsel’s submissions.

9 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [17] In March 1986, the appellant was born in Z, Rajasthan. He has three surviving siblings. One brother and his parents are deceased. The appellant’s wife and daughters remain living in [APPELLANT]. The appellant is of Marwari Indian ethnicity and follows the Hindu religion. [18] The appellant is unable to read or write. At the age of ten years old, after his father died, the appellant relocated from the family home in Rajasthan to Mumbai to live with his elder brother and his brother's wife and children. He was not in school or employment at this time. [19] In approximately 2001, when the appellant was approximately 15 years old, he entered the workforce, working for [NAME], selling shoes for commission. [20] In 2004, the appellant married his wife. In 2009, their first child was born. In 2010, their second child was born. [21] In 2010, the appellant and his wife started a [NAME] in Mumbai. While the business was developing, the appellant and his family were financially supported by the appellant’s [NAME]. [22] By 2015, the business's average annual income was approximately Indian rupees ("INR") 2.5 lakh. [23] In 2020, [APPELLANT] went into lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic and as a result, the appellant’s business suffered and incurred no revenue for six months. [24] To cover staff salaries and personal living expenses, the appellant started taking loans from relatives and acquaintances who had [NAME] of being [NAME] in the [NAME]. The business's stock spoiled during the lockdown, so the appellant loaned more money to replace it. He would take a loan from one moneylender, then take another loan from another moneylender to pay the interest of the loan prior. This cycle continued until the appellant left [APPELLANT]. He borrowed money from 10-12 different individuals, totalling approximately INR 25-90 lakh. The appellant stated that the details of each loan were recorded on a piece of paper, but that the paper stayed with the moneylender. [25] The appellant began to default on his repayments. [NAME] prevented him from acquiring more loans and started demanding repayment by

10 insulting the appellant in public and sitting in front of his house and not letting anyone from the house leave. The appellant tried going to the police, but they did not take any action. [26] In 2023, the appellant’s business collapsed, and he decided to go overseas to earn money to pay back the loans. He engaged the services of a travel agent in Mumbai who helped him apply for visas for Australia and Japan, however, these were declined. [27] The agent helped the appellant apply for a New Zealand visitor visa. The agent advised the appellant he needed to demonstrate having sufficient monies to cover his trip, so he had friends temporarily deposit monies into his account, and he presented these bank statements with his visa application. [28] On 10 June 2023, the appellant’s six-month New Zealand visitor visa was approved. [29] On 25 October 2023, the appellant left [APPELLANT] with a group of others and went to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea. He had intended to work in South Korea but was denied entry and was sent back to [APPELLANT] on 6 November 2023. [30] In March 2024, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. He was accompanied by the agent and his wife who returned to [APPELLANT] ten days later. [31] On 26 March 2024, the [NAME] received the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form ("Confirmation of Claim"), dated 25 March 2024. [32] After the appellant’s arrival in New Zealand, [NAME] phoned his wife 40 to 50 times a day to ask when the loans would be repaid. [NAME] also visited the family home and sat outside, stopping the family from working. They also threatened the family and told them they would die there if the debt was not repaid. [33] On 28 April 2025, the appellant was interviewed by [RESPONDENT] and protection officer at [NAME]. On 23 May 2025 an interview report was sent to the appellant and his representative. On 7 July 2025, the appellant responded to the interview report, and on 8 July 2025 the [NAME] received further submissions in support of the appellant’s claim.

11 [34] On 12 September 2025, the [NAME] declined the appellant’s claim. ASSESSMENT [35] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT[NAME]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [36] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a [NAME], section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [37] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the Convention or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. THE [RESPONDENT[NAME] [38] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT[NAME].

12 [39] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [40] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [41] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [42] In terms of [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [43] The appellant has had multiple occasions on which to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [RESPONDENT[NAME], in his interview with [RESPONDENT] and protection officer, in his response to the interview report and in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 26 March 2026. The Tribunal is satisfied that he has had ample opportunity, over an extended period and with the assistance of counsel, to present his claim. See here the discussion in ZB ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802975 at [10]–[27].

13 Country information [44] It is necessary to address the relevant country information. None has been provided by the appellant or counsel, but the Tribunal’s own research establishes the following. [45] [APPELLANT] is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in [APPELLANT] in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by [NAME]; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [46] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [47] As to what constitutes serious harm, not all harm arising from breaches of human rights will qualify. The threshold is that the harm must be serious. In that regard, the purpose of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] is to provide the surrogate protection of another state when the claimant’s own state is unable or unwilling to protect the person. That surrogate protection is not intended to be available where the harm at issue is not serious. [48] In summary, the relevant incidents which have occurred to the appellant in the past are: (a) After defaulting on repayments to [NAME], the appellant was insulted in public and visited at his house by [NAME]. They remained outside and no-one could leave the house. (b) The police were approached but did not take any action.

14 (c) After the appellant’s arrival in New Zealand, [NAME] phoned his wife 40 to 50 times per day regarding repayment. They also visited the family home and sat outside, stopping the family from working. They threatened the family and told them they would die there if the debt was not repaid. [49] While the assessment is forward-looking, past harm can be an indicator of future harm. However, here, the Tribunal is satisfied that the past incidents do not amount to serious harm within the meaning of being persecuted in the sense of requiring the surrogate protection of another country. [50] While in general [NAME] may adopt unorthodox or illegal means of pressuring payment, including at times harming individuals, in this case the appellant has not established that there is a real chance of him suffering serious harm in the sense of being persecuted. Many attempts have been made to seek repayment of the loans, but no escalation into serious harm has occurred. [51] [NAME] have threatened the appellant’s family, saying that they would die if the debt was not repaid, there is no evidence that [NAME] have tried to act on these threats, at any time. The likelihood that they would do so in the future is entirely remote. [NAME] have not sought to contact the appellant directly. [52] The appellant owes money to [NAME] and they are entitled to seek repayment. The appellant could resolve the matter with [NAME] by honouring his obligations. The appellant has been living in New Zealand and able to earn money for over two years. He has not provided any evidence of the actual loans, or amounts repaid and still owing. [53] The appellant sought police protection on one occasion, but was told this was a private matter. The repayment of money owed is a contractual matter. The appellant has not satisfied the Tribunal that the police would not take action so as to reduce the risk of any serious harm below the real chance level. [54] The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in [APPELLANT] is no more than speculative and remote. For this reason, he does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT].

15 Internal Protection Alternative [55] In respect of both the claim for protection as [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. [56] Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [57] It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, pp217–218 and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684 (29 October 1999), at [47] et seq. [58] Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer v [NAME] (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706. [59] An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement.

16 (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] itself. [60] Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in Mumbai (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) it appears that he could access, and reside safely in, Rajasthan where he was born and his family home is. He could also reside in any number of other large cities in [APPELLANT], such as Delhi (with a population of approximately 35 million), or in a different part of Mumbai (with a population of over 20 million), where a significant proportion of Hindu live and he speaks the local language. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. [61] The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of [NAME] harming him or of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [62] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. However, the Tribunal notes that even if it had found in the affirmative, there is no nexus to one of the five [RESPONDENT[NAME] grounds. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [63] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a [RESPONDENT] under the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and section 129 of the Act. The [NAME] [64] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand.

17 [65] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a [NAME] information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a [NAME] has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a [NAME], or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [66] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [67] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the [NAME] categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [68] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in [APPELLANT], to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as [NAME] persons in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [69] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [70] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

18 [71] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [72] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [73] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the [RESPONDENT] context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in [APPELLANT]. [74] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in [APPELLANT]. He is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [75] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act.

CONCLUSION [76] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and therefore is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act;

19 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [77] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [78] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [79] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME]