Tribunal Rejects Claim for Refugee Status Due to Lack of Evidence

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803204 [NAME_1], [NAME_32]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: M A Roche (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Hearing: 12 March 2026

Date of Decision: 21 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm of a kind qualifying him for protection from New Zealand because he is a supporter of the [NAME_4] and because he broke off his engagement to his fiancée leading to her brother wishing to harm him for reasons of honour. [3] The principal issues to be determined are whether the evidence is accepted, and whether the risk of the appellant suffering such serious harm reaches the required threshold.

2 [4] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal dismisses the appeal. It notes however that finds that the appellant is the father of a New Zealand-citizen child. It has no jurisdiction to consider the humanitarian circumstances that may arise from this (and any obligations under the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child) as the appellant has no humanitarian appeal before it. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [5] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [6] The appellant from a village near the city of Z in the Punjab. His parents and sister remain in the area although his sister, who is married, lives in a different village with her in-laws. The family have a small farm and the appellant’s father is employed as a police officer based in Z city. For most of his police career the father was a constable. In 2017, he was promoted to the position of assistant sub inspector. [7] From an early age, the appellant has believed in promoting Sikhism and in the idea of a Sikh homeland ([NAME_4]). As a teenager, he worked as a volunteer for a [COMPANY_5] and, with others, went around various villages promoting Sikhism. Their activities included showing religious movies and teaching people how to wear the turban. His parents did not want him to attend political rallies supporting [NAME_4]. When he was under the age of 18, he did so secretly. After he turned 18, he did so more openly. [8] The appellant had a motorbike which he had decorated with a picture of the late Sikh religious leader and activist, [NAME_7]. In late 2016, a group of people, who the appellant believes to be [NAME_9], threw a stick at him while he was riding causing him to fall off his bike. He managed to get back on and escape although he had injuries to his knees from this fall which left him with scars. He believes that if he had not managed to escape, he would have been attacked by the people. Another incident occurred in 2017 when the appellant was driving his family’s car. A group of people threw stones at the car, breaking its windows. He believes that they were [NAME_9] activists and that he was targeted because of his pro-[NAME_4] activities.

3 [9] In November 2017, an arranged marriage was organised for the appellant by one of his father’s relatives. The appellant’s fiancée, [NAME_10], was from this relative’s village which is about 80 or 90 kilometres away from the appellant’s village. [NAME_10]’s father was a retired army officer and the family had a farm. The appellant met [NAME_10] on three occasions. Once in a gurudwara (Sikh temple) in Y city, once at their engagement ceremony, and once before his departure for New Zealand. Many of their family members were present on these occasions and the appellant was never alone with [NAME_10]. However, after they became engaged, the couple began to communicate frequently by phone. [10] In January 2018, the appellant applied for a New Zealand student visa which was granted in February 2018. It was planned that the couple would marry once he had completed his studies. In February 2018, the appellant travelled to New Zealand where he commenced horticulture studies. He obtained a second student visa that expired in March 2020. After that he became unlawfully in New Zealand. [11] The appellant continued communicating with his fiancée from New Zealand although their frequency of communication reduced over time. The appellant was informed by one of his friends in India, [NAME_11], that his fiancée had become involved with another man. The appellant asked [NAME_10] about this and, after that, the situation got worse. At first, she denied it, but later she admitted to the appellant that she had been in contact with another man. [12] The appellant discussed these developments with his parents who were concerned about the reputational damage that would be caused if the engagement was called off. They advised patience. The appellant and his fiancée fought during their phone calls and eventually she acknowledged to him that their engagement should not continue. [13] The engagement was called off and both families returned all the engagement gifts they had given to each other. A mediation was held by the panchayat (village council) in the appellant’s village that was requested by both families to talk through the differences between them arising from the broken engagement. This was attended by [NAME_10]’s uncle. [14] Despite the mediation and the return of gifts, there were difficulties in India arising from the broken engagement. [NAME_10] had a younger brother, [NAME_12]. After the engagement was called off, [NAME_12] made threatening and abusive telephone calls to the appellant in New Zealand after he had been drinking. The appellant blocked

4 his number and has not heard from him since he did this. [NAME_12] also came to the appellant’s family home with a group of friends. The family knew that they were [NAME_12]’s friends because his father recognised a couple of them from photographs of [NAME_12]’s cricket team he had seen. [15] [NAME_12] and his companions vandalised the house by breaking windows in the house and car and smashing decorative items inside the house. They did this once in 2020 and once in 2021. In total, [NAME_12] came to the family’s house approximately five times over a period of two or three years. On one occasion in 2020, he came alone armed with a gun. He also telephoned the family and verbally abused them. [16] The appellant’s father tried to file a police complaint about [NAME_12]. However, he was unable to do so. The police did not want to pursue a complaint against [NAME_12] because [NAME_10]’s family have connections to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) through the famous Indian movie star, [NAME_13], who has a strong association with the BJP. He is from their village and is their cousin. [17] The appellant was very upset by having been the cause of these events in India. His family contacted him a lot and he was stressed and they were stressed. His contact with his family diminished and, for approximately one and a half years around 2020 and 2021, he had no contact with them at all. He resumed contact with them in 2022 and began speaking to them regularly. [18] In July 2025, [NAME_12] came to the appellant’s family home. This was the first time he had been there since 2022 or 2023. He had come to see if the appellant had returned from India and verbally abused the appellant’s parents. [19] The appellant does not know if [NAME_10] remains unmarried or if she married somebody else. He made no enquiries about this with his friend [NAME_11], although he has remained in contact with him. This is because situation gave the appellant stress and, in addition, his New Zealand-citizen partner does not like him making enquiries about another woman. [20] The appellant has continued his support of the [NAME_4] from New Zealand. He voted in the [NAME_4] referendum (a non-binding online referendum organised by the banned group Sikhs For Justice) and when a pro-[NAME_4] activist in India, [NAME_14], formed a party, [NAME_15] ([NAME_15]), the appellant and a friend sent funds to support him. They did this by

5 sending funds to a friend in the Punjab who then donated the same amount to the party. [21] The appellant is active on [NAME_16] which he maintains on a private setting. He estimates that he has around 1,500 friends. He is a member of some pro-[NAME_4] [NAME_16] groups. He does not create posts but from time to time he shares posts he sees on his [NAME_16] feed which relate to [NAME_4]. He is aware that political posts on [NAME_16] can cause risks in India. He has heard of people who have made posts regarding the farmers’ protests being taken into custody. Although it would be possible for him to delete his [NAME_16] page should he return to India, he cannot delete his genuine personal beliefs. [22] If he goes back, the appellant will have to return to his family home in India. He has no resources or support anywhere else. [23] The appellant has been in a relationship with a New Zealand citizen since September 2022. They have a son who was born in [DATE] who is also a New Zealand citizen. The appellant looks after his baby son to the best of his ability. He bathes him, changes him, plays with him and goes shopping with his partner to buy things for him. He is trying his best to be the best father he can be for him. He does not want to be separated from his partner and baby. It would be very difficult for them to visit India. Other Evidence and Submissions Received [24] Prior to the hearing, counsel filed written submissions and a bundle of country information. After the hearing, she filed a document which appears to be a screenshot of the appellant’s “yes” vote in the [NAME_4] referendum. [25] Both the Tribunal and appellant have copies of the appellant’s [NAME_19] file. This file includes a number of photographs depicting the appellant and his fiancée together with other family members at an engagement celebration. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [26] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning refugee or protected person status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as:

6 (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_17] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [27] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [28] In determining whether the appellant is a refugee or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [29] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in [NAME_18]) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. [NAME_18]), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [30] The Tribunal accepts much of the appellant’s evidence. However, there are aspects of it which it finds to be embellishments and gives no weight. In some instances, the problems arise from inconsistencies between the account the appellant gave at his [NAME_19] interview and the account he gave in his

7 evidence to the Tribunal. The [NAME_19] interview was conducted by telephone while the appellant sat in a car. The transcript reflects some technical problems including the loss of audio at one point. In contrast, the Tribunal hearing was conducted in person. However, despite the circumstances of the appellant’s [NAME_19] interview, the Tribunal finds that some of the inconsistencies reflect adversely on his credibility. [NAME_4] [31] The Tribunal turns first to the appellant’s claim to be a supporter of [NAME_4]. The Tribunal accepts that as a teenager in India the appellant supported Sikh causes and performed voluntary work for a [COMPANY_5]. It is accepted that he supported the [NAME_4] and, as a supporter, attended rallies and displayed a picture of [NAME_7] on his motorbike. While the Tribunal has some doubt about his claim to have been attacked in 2016 and 2017 while on his motorbike and driving his family’s car, the appellant is given the benefit of the doubt. It is accepted therefore that stones or sticks were thrown at him while he was driving a motorbike and that stones were thrown at the family car while he was driving causing damage. [32] During his [NAME_19] interview, the appellant made a claim that in 2017, he was detained for a few hours by the police when he went to report receiving threatening telephone calls about his pro-[NAME_4] activities. The police did nothing to assist him and detained him in a police cell for some hours. Neither counsel nor the appellant referred to this detention during the hearing as an element of his claim. For completeness, the Tribunal notes this claim but also notes that at his interview, the appellant did not describe receiving any adverse attention from the police after it occurred. [33] It is accepted that the appellant has continued his interest in and support for the [NAME_4] while in New Zealand. He has expressed his support by occasionally sharing pro-[NAME_4] posts on his private [NAME_16] page and by voting in the [NAME_4] referendum. He also has sent funds to India to support [NAME_14]’s party, [NAME_15] ([NAME_15]). Broken engagement [34] The Tribunal now turns to the appellant’s broken engagement and its claimed consequences. It is accepted that the appellant became engaged to [NAME_10] in India in November 2017 and that it was intended that this engagement would

8 result in an arranged marriage. It is accepted that he saw her on three occasions in the presence of multiple family members and conducted a relationship with her by telephone after they became engaged that continued while he was in New Zealand until approximately 2020. The Tribunal accepts that tensions and difficulties arose between the two families when the engagement was called off and that representatives from both families attended a mediation session convened by the appellant’s village’s panchayat. [35] The Tribunal finds that the appellant’s evidence regarding a series of attacks on his family home carried out by [NAME_10]’s brother [NAME_12] is an embellishment. There were difficulties with this evidence in that the appellant provided inconsistent details concerning these attacks to the [NAME_19] and to the Tribunal. When asked, he was unable to provide a credible explanation for these inconsistencies. [36] At his [NAME_19] interview the appellant claimed that [NAME_12] had visited his family home with hired “goons”. To the Tribunal, he gave evidence that [NAME_12] came to the home with a group of his friends. When asked how he knew they were friends, he claimed that his father had told him that he recognised their faces from cricket team photographs and that his father had carried out an investigation on his own initiative into the incident and found these photographs when he was trying to ascertain the identity of the assailants. When it was put to him that he had told the [NAME_19] that they were hired goons, he changed his evidence and said that a couple of them had been [NAME_12]’s friends, and the rest were goons because not many people would want to get involved and ruin their lives. This inconsistency and the lack of a credible explanation for it leads the Tribunal to reject the claim that [NAME_12] visited the appellant’s family’s home accompanied by goons who vandalised the house. [37] The appellant gave evidence to the Tribunal that on only one occasion [NAME_12] had brought a gun with him to his family’s home. The Tribunal asked him twice to confirm his evidence that they had come only once with a gun, and he did so. However, in his written response to the [NAME_19] interview report he said that his family had “been threatened with guns pointed at them a few times” and that they came “a few times with weapons”. When this inconsistency was put to him, he said that [NAME_12] had brought a gun twice but only once had pointed it at their foreheads. He then added that [NAME_12] would come mostly with any kind of weapon such as a sword or dagger. Again, the Tribunal finds that the appellant’s clarification in response to the inconsistency in his account does not explain it.

9 [38] The appellant gave evidence that in July 2025, after a gap of several years, [NAME_12] turned up at his family’s home again, verbally abusing them and wanting to know if the appellant had returned to India. He had not mentioned this visit in the written response he made to the [NAME_19] interview report in August 2025, despite providing additional details about his claim in that response. No statement of evidence was filed with the Tribunal prior to the hearing. When asked, the appellant stated that he had not informed his lawyers about this visit. While, the Tribunal has some doubt about this late emerging evidence, grants the benefit of the doubt and accepts for the purpose of this decision that [NAME_12] made an enquiry about him in July 2025. [39] When the Tribunal asked the appellant whether [NAME_10] was now married, he gave an evasive and implausible response. He claimed that he did not know, and that he had made no enquiry of anybody in India as to whether [NAME_10] had remarried. He also claimed that his [NAME_20] partner did not want him to make such an enquiry. This is not accepted. Had the broken engagement led to serious difficulties and even ongoing danger for the appellant’s family, it would be expected that he would maintain an interest in developments, including as to whether [NAME_10] had entered a different marriage. There is no plausible reason why the [NAME_20] would not want him to ascertain whether his former fiancée was married, given the risk the broken engagement is claimed to have posed to him and his family. [40] As noted earlier, it is accepted that the appellant had a broken engagement in India. It is accepted that there was unpleasantness and even aggression towards the appellant’s family from [NAME_10]’s family after the engagement was called off. It is not accepted that this unpleasantness extended to violence and vandalism at the appellant’s family home by [NAME_12] accompanied by a gang of friends and hired goons or that [NAME_12] threatened his family with a gun. No weight is placed on the claim that this occurred. [41] The Tribunal has rejected the appellant’s evidence that his family home was attacked by [NAME_12] and hired thugs and has rejected the evidence that [NAME_12] threatened his family with a gun. It follows that the claim that his father tried to file a police report about these incidents is similarly rejected. [42] Subject to the foregoing findings, the Tribunal accepts the balance of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case.

10 THE REFUGEE CONVENTION [43] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. [44] Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention provides that a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [45] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_21] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [46] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [47] The principal issues are, as explained in Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [48] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case and in particular his claim to be at risk of harm as a supporter of the [NAME_4].

11 Relevant country information [49] Country information establishes that, while India is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, there are numerous significant human rights concerns there, as set out in the executive summary of the United States Department of State’s report 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025): Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by Maoist nonstate groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. The government took minimal credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses. Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, northeastern states, and Maoist terrorism- affected areas committed abuses, including killing 20 security personnel and 18 civilians in Jammu and Kashmir as of September 10. There were reports of communal violence. Authorities investigated and prosecuted terrorism-related abuses. [50] The 2011 Indian Census recorded that the Sikh population in India numbered 20.8 million. Sixty per cent of these individuals reside in the Punjab, making it the religious majority in the state. However, because the population is predominantly rural, Sikhs are a minority in urban centres. [51] In 1984, a military operation attacking the Golden Temple, known as Operation Blue Star, led to the killing of a Sikh militant leader and the consequent assassination of then Prime Minister, [NAME_22], by her Sikh bodyguards. The Indian government has estimated that 3,350 Sikhs were killed in different parts of India in unrest that followed, with independent estimates putting the number of Sikh casualties at over 15,000. Operation Blue Star is commemorated annually, and these commemorations are associated with the [NAME_4] which is a political movement seeking full legal recognition of Sikhs and a separate state in India: Council on Minority Rights in India Religious Minorities in India Report (November 2022) (“the Religious Minorities report”) at pp173–183; and “Pro-[NAME_4] on Operation Blue Star Anniversary” The Hindu (6 June 2023).

12 [52] According to the Religious Minorities report, there has been a revival in anti-Sikh feeling in India in recent years corresponding to the larger rise in Hindu nationalism in the country; p174. [53] The latest Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) information report on India states that the separatist movement for the creation of an independent Sikh state called [NAME_4] has mostly been suppressed within India but that low-level tensions remain, and violence occasionally flares up. It also notes that only a small number of Sikhs support the separatist movement and that sources report ordinary residents of the Punjab perceive that the [NAME_4] is something that is discussed in the diaspora abroad more than in the Punjab. Further, it notes that some organisations associated with the [NAME_4] are banned in India: DFAT DFAT Country Information Report: India (29 September 2023) paras 3.94–3.97. [54] A Washington Post article about the revival of the Sikh separatist movement notes the view of some Sikhs that, “[NAME_4] means something short of an independent state” and is “more of a slogan” to coalesce the Sikh community around religious tenets and to support the community’s political demands. The same article states that the Indian government is concerned by signs of a potential revival of the Sikh separatist movement: [NAME_23] “India Sees Signs of Renewed Sikh Separatism and Sound the Alarm” The Washington Post (16 April 2023). [55] A report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (“IRB”) notes the views of a Punjab-based professor that the central government views [NAME_4] supporters with suspicion and notes another source as stating that perceived [NAME_4] supporters are “often implicated in false cases” and that the police “harass” [NAME_4] activists, their families and friends. The report also noted the view of a representative from a [NAME_24] that [NAME_4] activists are tracked through social media and monitored: IRB IND200932.E India: Treatment of Sikhs by Society and Authorities, Particularly the Police; State Protection; Situation and Treatment of Suspected or [NAME_4] in the State of Punjab by Society and the Authorities … (2020–May 2023) (25 May 2023). [56] A report by the United Kingdom Home Office states that Sikhs advocating for [NAME_4] may be monitored, added to police lists, and in some cases charged and detained on terrorist related offences. The same report notes that treatment such as harassment and preventative detention prior to major events is not

13 systemic but occurs at a local level against targeted individuals: United Kingdom Home Office Country Policy and Information Note India: Political Parties and Affiliation (4 December 2023) at paras 3.2.4–3.2.5. [57] Pro-[NAME_4] protests occur from time to time in the Punjab. The Tribunal notes reports of a clash in April 2022 between protesters in favour of and against [NAME_4] separatism in Patiala leading to four people, including two policemen being injured and the imposition of a curfew: N Gopal “Curfew in Patiala, Violence Breaks out Over ‘[NAME_9]’ March” The Indian Express (30 April 2022). Further, in February 2023, it was reported that sword and gun-brandishing supporters of [NAME_14], a prominent [NAME_4] activist and politician, stormed a police station in the Punjab demanding the release of a close aid of [NAME_8]’s. Policemen reportedly were injured, and a police vehicle was damaged, with videos showing a sea of protesters outside the police station with police trying to control them including resorting to lathicharge (a coordinated charge by police using ironbound bamboo sticks). The article states that 600 police were drawn from five districts and deployed: [NAME_25] “Supporters of ‘[NAME_4]’ ([NAME_14]) Clash With 600 Cops in Punjab Town” Times of India (24 February 2023). [58] Other protests appear to be carried out peacefully without significant incidents. For example, the latest anniversary of Operation Blue Star in Amritsar was commemorated on 6 June 2025. Reports noted [NAME_4] activists shouting pro-[NAME_4] slogans and carrying placards bearing portraits of [NAME_7]. However, the anniversary was described as passing peacefully: “41st Anniversary of Operation Passed Off Peacefully Amidst Slogans of [NAME_4]” Tehelka (6 June 2025). Although government security was significantly increased, there was no report that the Tribunal is aware of any violence in association with this commemoration: [NAME_26] “Operation Blue Star Anniversary Amritsar; 2500 Cops Deployed, Paramilitary Forces on Standby” [NAME_26] (1 June 2025). Application to the facts [59] It is accepted that the appellant genuinely supports the [NAME_4] and has done so from a young age. It has been accepted that as a youth in India, he attended rallies, undertook pro-Sikh voluntary work, and displayed an image of a pro-[NAME_4] martyr on his motorbike. He has been given the benefit of the doubt that he was subjected to an attack on his bike and in his family car. These

14 events took place in 2016 and 2017. The appellant described his attackers as “people who were [NAME_9]”. The poster displayed on the appellant’s motorcycle clearly identified him as pro-[NAME_4] and that attack appeared to have been spontaneous and opportunistic. It is less clear why the attack on the car took place but in any case, these appear to have been isolated incidents now remote in time. There was no evidence of any follow-up on the part of the attackers at the time. It is therefore unlikely that the fact that these two incidents occurred, some nine and 10 years ago, give rise to any risk to the appellant in India now. [60] The Tribunal now turns to the appellant’s profile as a supporter of [NAME_4]. It is accepted that if the appellant returns to India, he may join the protest marches and gatherings that are held from time to time to promote aspects of the Sikh cause as he did as a teenager. On some occasions, protesters have been arrested at these protests and there have been incidents of police violence against them. [61] The appellant has no profile with the authorities and is not a member of any political organisation. There is some chance that he may be subjected to police violence or arrest in the course of a protest. However, considering the country information about protests and the various incidents that have occurred, the Tribunal finds that the chance of the appellant being seriously harmed during a protest is remote and does not rise to the level of a real chance. [62] The IRB and United Kingdom Home Office reports referred to above suggest that [NAME_4] activists who participate in activities such as demonstrations are monitored by the police. It is accepted that it is possible that should the appellant regularly involve himself in pro-[NAME_4] protests in the Punjab, he may be subjected to such monitoring. However, as noted above, he currently has no adverse profile as a pro-[NAME_4] supporter or activist and is not a member of any [NAME_24]. The Tribunal considers that the possibility of the appellant being seriously harmed, even assuming he is identified as a participant in such protests due to such monitoring, does not rise to the level of a real chance. [63] There are issues with freedom of expression in India including in relation to the [NAME_4]. It has previously been accepted by the Tribunal that the Indian government monitors social media activity to some extent and that there have been some arrests of people in relation to posts supporting Sikh separatism: [NAME_27] (India) [2020] NZIPT 801754. The appellant gave evidence that he has re-posted some material on his private [NAME_16] page in relation to [NAME_4].

15 [64] Without more, the Tribunal does not consider that the appellant currently has a social media profile that would bring him to the attention of the [NAME_30]. He has no association with or involvement in Sikh organisations in New Zealand or with any internationally based Sikh organisations and is not politically active in any way other than maintaining an interest in Sikh issues and voting in the [NAME_4] referendum. His right to freedom of expression in India is likely to be compromised due to the monitoring of social media by authorities that takes place there. However, the Tribunal does not consider that the harm that would result (his inability to freely express his views regarding [NAME_4] and other Sikh issues on social media) constitutes serious harm that can be described as being persecuted for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Having restrained himself to merely re-posting pro-[NAME_4] posts on a private [NAME_16] page in New Zealand, the Tribunal finds that he would not use social media in an open or public way in India and draw the attention of the authorities by doing so. He is therefore not at risk of being subjected to breaches of other human rights (such as the right to freedom from cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment) due to his expression of his beliefs at the real chance level. Risk from broken engagement [65] The Tribunal does not accept that he and his family are the subject of an ongoing risk of harm by [NAME_10]’s family arising from the broken engagement. Almost six years have passed since the engagement was called off by agreement between the appellant and [NAME_10]. Matters of family “honour” can give rise to serious consequences in India. Here however, the couple saw each other in the presence of many other people on only three occasions more than eight years ago. The appellant has not tried to find out whether [NAME_10] has married somebody else which indicates a lack of continuing concern on his part. [66] It is accepted that there was tension between the families, necessitating a panchayat mediation and that the situation caused considerable stress to the appellant and his family, leading him to lose contact with his family for a time. However, even accepting that there were verbal threats made against the appellant and his family by [NAME_10]’s brother [NAME_12], the Tribunal does not accept that such threats, while unpleasant, indicate any real chance that the appellant currently faces serious physical harm in India as a result. An enquiry made in July 2025 similarly does not indicate that the appellant faces a real chance of serious harm. In any case, it is not accepted that there is any evidence of a lack of state protection for the appellant and his family (the claim that the appellant’s

16 father, tried and failed to file a complaint having been rejected). It is incumbent on the appellant to establish this to be the case. This issue has been recently addressed by the Tribunal in [NAME_28] (India) [2026] NZIPT 802959 at [40]. The Tribunal noted there that: States are generally presumed capable of protecting their citizens. This point has been emphasised in New Zealand’s refugee jurisprudence for over 30 years. [67] It is not overlooked that the appellant has claimed that [NAME_10]’s family have influence over the police because of their familial relationship with an Indian movie star who is associated with the BJP. Even accepting this claimed relationship to be true, this provides no compelling reason for the presumption of state protection not to apply. It does not explain why such protection would not be forthcoming, particularly given that the appellant’s father is a policeman. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [68] For these reasons, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [69] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to Refugee Status [70] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as a refugee. [NAME_17] [71] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME_17] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand.

17 Assessment of the Claim under [NAME_17] [72] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in [NAME_17], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [73] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of their appeal as they do for their claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME_17]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_17] [74] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. THE ICCPR [75] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [76] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards:

18 (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [77] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for the claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [78] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the Refugee Convention (to which protected person status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035, at [82] and Taunoa v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [79] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR.

CONCLUSION [80] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention and therefore is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of [NAME_17] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [81] The appeal is dismissed.

19 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

M A Roche Member Lack of Humanitarian Appeal [82] The appellant was unlawfully in New Zealand when he lodged his refugee and protection claim.

Accordingly, he has no entitlement to appeal to the Tribunal on humanitarian grounds against his liability for deportation. In these circumstances, the Tribunal is unable to weigh the appellant’s identified humanitarian concerns (his relationship with his New Zealand-citizen partner and in particular his role as the involved father of a New Zealand-citizen child) and the obligations New Zealand may have in respect of these concerns under various human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. That will be a matter for Immigration New Zealand to consider through another process. The Tribunal presently lacks jurisdiction to consider these issues further. It is noted however that [NAME_3] (incorrectly) advised the Tribunal at the hearing that the appellant had an outstanding request for a visa pursuant to section 61 of the Act so that his humanitarian concerns could be considered. Records show that such a request was refused in February 2025, and that no further request has been made following the birth of the appellant’s child. It may be that the appellant could be granted a one day temporary visa of a kind which enabled the lodgement of a humanitarian appeal but that is entirely a matter for his counsel to raise with Immigration New Zealand and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to direct Immigration New Zealand in relation to any such matter. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [83] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellants and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others. [84] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “M A Roche” M A Roche Member