Second Refugee Status Appeal Rejected: No Significant Change Found

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] [NAME] [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Officer

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 21 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION _________________________________________________________________ [1] This is an appeal under section 195(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”) against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer, to refuse to consider a subsequent claim for [RESPONDENT] status and [NAME] status by the appellant, a citizen of [NAME] [APPELLANT]. INTRODUCTION [2] This is the second time that the appellant has claimed [RESPONDENT] status in New Zealand. [3] The issues to be addressed are: (a) whether the second claim crosses the jurisdictional threshold in section 140(1) of the Act of disclosing a significant change of circumstances material to the second claim since the first claim was determined; and (b) whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing to determine this issue.

2 JURISDICTION [4] Where [RESPONDENT] and protection officer has refused to consider a subsequent claim, section 195(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 provides that the person may appeal to the Tribunal. [5] Where the decision to refuse to consider the subsequent claim was made under section 140(1) (on the grounds that there is no significant change in circumstances) and the person has then appealed under section 195(1)(a), section 200(1) provides: Where an appeal is brought under section 195(1)(a), the Tribunal must first consider— (a) whether there has been a significant change in circumstances material to the appellant’s claim since the previous claim was determined; and (b) if so, whether the change in 1 or more of the circumstances was brought about by the appellant— (i) acting otherwise than in good faith; and (ii) for a purpose of creating grounds for recognition under any of sections 129 to 131. [6] If these requirements are met then, pursuant to section 200(6), the Tribunal will conduct its orthodox enquiry into whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (section 129); and (b) as a [NAME] under the 1984 Convention Against Torture (section 130); and (c) as a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (section 131). [7] If the requirements are not met, then the Tribunal must dismiss the claim. [8] It is relevant to note that section 226 of the Act provides: It is the responsibility of an [NAME] to establish his or her case or claim, and the [NAME] must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [9] Further, the Tribunal may rely on any finding of credibility or fact by the Tribunal or any appeals body in any previous appeal or matter involving the

3 person and the person may not challenge any finding of credibility or fact so relied upon; see section 231 of the Act. [10] Given that it is the appellant’s responsibility to establish the claim and because the Tribunal may rely on past findings of credibility or fact, it is necessary to provide a summary of the first claim and the findings thereon, before turning to the present claim. The appellant's first claim [11] Although not found to be credible by the Tribunal (differently constituted) the account that the appellant gave of his predicament, as recorded in the decision dismissing the appeal ([NAME] ([NAME] [APPELLANT]) [2024] NZIPT 802364), was as follows. [12] The appellant was born in Z town in the early 1970s, as one of a number of children in the family. [13] In 1991, the appellant started work as an electronics technician, primarily mending photocopiers and office equipment. In 1998, he moved to a Gulf state, where he was employed as a photocopier technician. In 2000, he returned to [NAME] [APPELLANT]. [14] Sometime thereafter, the appellant sought employment with better pay and boarded a small ship, with many others, bound for a foreign country. The vessel was intercepted by the [NAME], however, and the appellant spent some months in detention in [NAME] [APPELLANT] on a charge of unlawful travel, before a court dismissed the charge. [15] In the late 2000s, the appellant married. The couple had a child. [16] About three years after his marriage, the appellant found employment as a seaman on ships. He would be given contracts and would be away from home for extended periods. In between voyages, he returned to [NAME] [APPELLANT] and would go around ‘[NAME]’, which offered copying, printing and various electronic services, servicing photocopiers and other electronic machines. One of his customers was a [NAME] named [NAME], who ran a [COMPANY] in another suburb of town. [17] In 2014, [APPELLANT] suggested to the appellant that he should enquire at a [COMPANY] just across the road, run by two [NAME] men, [NAME].

4 The appellant went to see them and, thereafter, would periodically do work on their machines. [18] In mid-2017, the appellant obtained a fresh contract to serve on a sea vessel departing a foreign country, for [NAME] [APPELLANT]. He happened to mention this to [APPELLANT], when telling him that he would be unavailable for servicing for a while. [APPELLANT] then asked the appellant to visit his brother, [APPELLANT], in that country, and to bring back to [NAME] [APPELLANT] an item which [APPELLANT] needed to get to [NAME]. [19] In July 2017, the appellant travelled by air to the country from where the vessel was to depart. A few days later, he met [NAME], who asked him to [NAME] a parcel containing an electronic circuit board back to [NAME] [APPELLANT]. The appellant was well versed in the rules of not carrying anything for other people and told him that he was not permitted to [NAME] “outside equipment” on board a ship. [APPELLANT] offered money but the appellant still refused. They chatted a while longer before parting. [20] About two months later, the appellant was told that the voyage had been cancelled. He was sent back to [NAME] [APPELLANT] by the [COMPANY]. Before leaving, he called [NAME] to tell him that the vessel was not leaving. [NAME] asked him to speak to [NAME] on return because [NAME] was holding a device for him which needed repair. [21] A week after his return to [NAME] [APPELLANT], the appellant went to see [NAME]. They showed him [NAME]’s electronic device. To the appellant, it looked like a form of radar, with a small screen, handles on the sides and knobs and dials for tuning. The appellant found that power was not getting to the unit and determined that the fault lay with its AC/DC converter. He considered that a printed circuit board needed replacing and told [NAME] that he could not repair it on the spot and they needed to get a replacement board. [22] About a week later, the appellant received a telephone call from [NAME], who told him that [NAME] had been arrested at their business by plainclothes Terrorism Investigation Division (“TID”) officers on terrorism charges. Electronic items had been confiscated from their business. As they were being put into a van, the [NAME] had called out loudly that they were looking for someone, using a nickname used by the appellant. [NAME] warned the appellant to be careful. [23] Following this news, the appellant remained at home for a few days, before moving to his parents’ house a kilometre away. Shortly after he did so, his wife

5 telephoned him to tell him that [NAME] had been to the house, looking for him. This was followed by two further visits. [24] A week after he had moved to his parents’ house, the appellant moved to the house of a friend ([NAME]) in a town situated some 20 kilometres away, where he stayed for the next five months. While there, he called his wife and family weekly, using [NAME]’s land line. [25] In early 2018, the appellant secured a position on a small trading vessel in T country. He departed [NAME] [APPELLANT] that month, leaving through Bandaranaike Airport on his own passport. He experienced no difficulties in leaving. [26] In March 2018, the TID visited the appellant’s family home in [NAME] [APPELLANT] twice more. His wife told them that the appellant had gone overseas. [27] The appellant worked on the [NAME] for over 18 months. He then returned to [NAME] [APPELLANT] by air, thinking that it was safe to do so because there had been no further interest shown in him by the TID. He had no difficulty in re-entering [NAME] [APPELLANT]. [28] In late 2019, shortly after the appellant had returned to [NAME] [APPELLANT], [NAME] called at the family house, at a time when the appellant was at his parents. His wife told them that he was still overseas. They did not believe this, however, telling her that he had been seen in [NAME] [APPELLANT]. [29] On hearing this news from his wife, the appellant again went into hiding at [APPELLANT] house. While he was there, the TID made two or three more visits to his family home, looking for him without success. [30] In mid-February 2020, the appellant departed again for the same country, to [NAME] up another contract on the same vessel as before. Again, he had no difficulties in leaving [NAME] [APPELLANT] by air, on his own passport. [31] After he had resumed working on the [NAME], the appellant heard from his wife that [NAME] had visited the family home again. [32] In February 2021, the appellant’s employment was terminated because the [NAME] was laid up over a dispute between the owners. Without an income, the appellant sought support from a [NAME]. [33] In April 2022, the appellant arrived in New Zealand, on a transit visa. Once here, he claimed [RESPONDENT] status at the airport and was granted entry to

6 New Zealand so that his claim could be processed. He was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] in December 2022 and his claim was declined in January 2024, leading to his first appeal. [34] The Tribunal decision dismissing his first appeal was issued on 11 October 2024. The appellant’s second claim [35] On 20 January 2025, the appellant lodged his second claim to [RESPONDENT] and protection status. He has asserted the following as the basis of this claim. [36] In 2000, the appellant became acquainted with [APPELLANT], who owned a [COMPANY]. [37] In August 2003, [APPELLANT] introduced the appellant to an agent named [APPELLANT] who was arranging passengers for a boat trip to Italy. The appellant paid the LKR2.5 million fee to [APPELLANT] by borrowing money from his mother, [NAME] and two friends, and paying LKR500,000 from his own savings. [APPELLANT] told the appellant that the boat would leave in two or three weeks. [38] After a few weeks of waiting, the boat still did not leave as [NAME] was trying to arrange more passengers. To speed up the process, the appellant introduced four men who were customers of [NAME] to [NAME] as they were interested in joining the boat trip. These four men each paid the LKR2.5 million fee. [39] In the third week of September 2003, small motorboats departed from Negombo Beach. [NAME] was present but did not get on the boat. Other sub-agents, like [NAME], brought their own passengers. There were 87 passengers in total, including the appellant and [NAME], none of whom were women or children. The appellant boarded a 45-foot-long fishing trawler. All passengers were then transferred to a bigger boat in the middle of the sea. [40] After about two hours, the boat was intercepted by the [NAME] navy and taken back to Colombo. All 87 passengers were arrested. They were also questioned and photographed by people whom the appellant did not know if they were police officers or otherwise. The passengers were then taken to court in Colombo and subsequently put in jail. The appellant was in remand prison for three months, during which he was taken to court every 14 days.

7 [41] After three months, the appellant and the other passengers were released on bail. The conditions for release were a payment of LKR10,000 and two relatives to guarantee the appellant’s [RESPONDENT] in court. The LKR10,000 was paid by the appellant's father. The appellant initially attended court hearings every three months. When he had to travel abroad, he gave a statement saying that his father would attend the court hearings on his behalf. The appellant was not sure when [NAME] were released. [42] A month after being released, the appellant had a chance encounter with [NAME] at the hostel where they were staying as it was next to the [COMPANY] where he would make repairs. [NAME], as well as the appellant, were looking for [APPELLANT] so they could get their money back. [43] Three months after being released, the appellant met [APPELLANT] at a lodge, at [APPELLANT] advice. [APPELLANT] was hiding from the police as the appellant and the other passengers had given statements claiming that [APPELLANT] had been the one who arranged the boat trip. The appellant asked [APPELLANT] to return the money he had paid as the boat trip was unsuccessful. [NAME] replied he could not return the money but instead could arrange another trip after six months. The appellant was happy with that as he still wanted to escape the country. However, this boat trip did not eventuate, and the appellant could no longer find [APPELLANT]. [44] In 2009, the appellant’s court trial ended. He was not charged as he did not do anything wrong except get on the boat. [45] The appellant asked his father to find [APPELLANT] to no avail. In 2010, the appellant’s father advised him that [APPELLANT] had escaped. [46] In June 2010, on the same day as a religious occasion at his [NAME], the appellant was threatened by [NAME]. They were looking for [NAME] to return their money. They had learned that the boat trip was a scam as it did not have enough fuel to reach Italy. They accused the appellant of being involved in the scam as he had introduced them to [APPELLANT]. The appellant replied that he was also owed money and was looking for [NAME]. However, [NAME] were angry and did not believe him; they demanded that he repay their money. [NAME] left after 10 minutes and warned the appellant that, if he did not return their money, they knew how to get it from him. [47] Following this, [NAME] visited the appellant's home in person every two weeks and called at least once a week. They threatened that they would kill

8 him if he did not return their money. These threats continued for the next 15 years, but the appellant was usually not home and only came face to face with [NAME] on two or three occasions. Starting from 2011, [NAME] started to bring [NAME] with them to intimidate the appellant into repaying them their money. [48] While the appellant was abroad, [NAME] visited his home every month. The appellant’s family consisted of his wife, his daughter, and his elderly mother-in-law. [NAME] threatened the appellant’s wife, demanding payment and stating that the appellant was earning money overseas. [NAME] never physically harmed the appellant's family. [49] In 2013, the appellant's family relocated within the same village, due to issues with their neighbours which were brought about by the [NAME] visiting them. The appellant was overseas at the time, so his wife took care of all the arrangements for the house move. [50] Starting from 2015, [NAME] would visit the appellant's family every three or four months to threaten them and demand repayment. [51] In 2017, the appellant’s family relocated again within the village for the same reasons. As with the first time, he was overseas and his wife took care of the arrangements. The family relocated two more times over the following years for the same reasons. The family never relocated outside the village so that his daughter would not have to change schools, as well as most of his family and friends being based there. It would [NAME] [NAME] three to eight months to learn of the family’s new home address each time. [52] While in New Zealand, the appellant heard from his wife that she had been reprimanded as he was not home when [NAME] had visited. He also heard from his brother, that the TID had confirmed that [NAME] were connected to [NAME] and were still in jail, and that their close contacts had also been arrested. The appellant feared that he would also be arrested as he had many telephone calls with [NAME] and visited their [COMPANY] many times. [53] On 18 and 19 June 2025, the appellant was interviewed by [RESPONDENT] and protection officer. As this was the appellant’s second claim for [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] status, the criteria for considering subsequent claims, contained in section 140 of the Act, was explained. [54] On 10 July 2025, an interview report was sent to the appellant, via counsel. On 26 August 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] received the appellant's response to

9 the interview report. Additional country information was also filed in support of his claim. On 3 September 2025, submissions were made on the issue of jurisdiction. [55] On 31 October 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] declined the appellant’s second claim, on the grounds that it did not disclose a significant change of circumstances material to the second claim since the first claim was determined and there was, therefore, no jurisdiction to consider the second claim. It held that the events narrated by the appellant in support of his second claim did not arise since the determination of his first claim in October 2024. LETTER TO THE APPELLANT [56] On 13 March 2026, the Tribunal wrote to counsel for the appellant. It set out the relevant statutory framework under section 200 of the Act as to its jurisdiction to hear subsequent claims and reminded of the appellant’s statutory responsibilities to establish his claim and put forward all information he wished the Tribunal to [NAME] into account. It then set out why it did not appear that the appellant’s second claim, as he asserted to the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (which was summarised) did not appear to meet the jurisdictional requirements. In particular: (a) The current claim is based on events which began from 2003, well prior to his arrival in New Zealand, and well prior to the determination of his first claim by the Tribunal on 11 October 2024. (b) The fact that the appellant may have not been aware that he could raise this issue as a basis of claim or deliberately refrained from raising it is immaterial. The statutory scheme is clear: see [NAME] (Bangladesh) [2014] NZIPT 800458 at [32]; and [NAME] (Somalia) [2016] NZIPT 800988 at [85]–[86]. (c) As regards the claim that officials with the Terrorism Investigation Department and four men have continued to look for him since the time of the Tribunal's decision, these events appear not to constitute a “significant” change in the circumstances relating to the claimed risk faced by the appellant, but rather appear to be no more than a continuation of events that proceeded the determination of his first claim; see [NAME] (Iran) [2020] NZIPT 801728. [57] The appellant was invited to comment by 20 March 2026. [58] On 20 March 2026, the Tribunal received an undated, handwritten statement from the appellant with an uncertified translation. He states that the TID continue to visit his home and that they do so “even though I changed my place of living few times”. He explains that his friend [NAME] and his wife were too scared to appear as witnesses during his first appeal. He also states that

10 … the four persons who introduced me to [[NAME]] to go to Italy by a boat, are often going to my house with [NAME] and threatening. It’s not possible to make a Police entry against these four persons. [59] Counsel responded by submissions dated 26 March 2026. Those submissions are summarised as follows: (a) The present claim is not merely a repetition of the earlier claim. The identification of these four individuals introduces new factual elements and provides further detail as to the nature and extent of the risk faced by the appellant. The risk to the appellant therefore “persists and has evolved rather than being resolved or diminished”. (b) The four newly identified individuals are capable of being regarded as significant in relation to the assessment of risk. The introduction of these new actors may alter the nature or extent of the risk faced by the appellant and therefore should be considered as potentially material to the determination. (c) There is no evidence to suggest that the appellant has acted in bad faith, nor has this issue been raised by the Tribunal. ASSESSMENT OF JURISDICTION [60] Counsel’s submissions are noted but, with respect, do not address the point outlined in the Tribunal’s letter of 13 March 2026. This was that neither his assertions of continued visits by the TID, nor his introducing of the new information relating to harassment of him by [NAME] who had lost money in a scam by [NAME] relating to their irregular migration to Italy, were capable of satisfying the jurisdictional requirements under the Act. [61] As to these two limbs to the current claim, the assertion relating to the ongoing visits by [NAME] is no more than a continuation of what the appellant had stated to be the case during his first appeal. The assertion does not therefore reference a significant change in circumstances since the determination of the first claim by way of either an intensification of the degree of risk or in its nature; see here the discussion in [NAME] (Iran) [2020] NZIPT 801728 at [51]–[61]. Nor does the bare assertion by the appellant that [NAME] and his wife were too scared to give evidence during his first appeal change the position. Any corroborative evidence by the two witnesses is not material to the jurisdiction assessment, which must

11 measure claim against claim in order to determine whether the necessary changed circumstances are asserted. Evidence which is merely corroborative of what the appellant is asserting does not materially add to the assessment. [62] As to the harassment from [NAME], even if continuing presently, this does not involve a change in circumstances since the determination of the first claim in October 2024 with the decision of the Tribunal in the first appeal. The circumstances giving rise to this limb of the second claim derive from events in 2003 — over 22 years ago — with the failed irregular migration of the appellant and others by boat to Italy and in respect of which the appellant has been threatened by these men since June 2010. By a considerable margin, this limb does not arise since the determination of his first claim. Insofar as there are visits by the men after the date his first claim was finally determined, this is not a change in circumstances, let alone a significant one, but merely a continuation of circumstances which had already existed for approximately 15 years. [63] The fact that the appellant may have not been aware that he could raise this issue as a basis of claim or deliberately refrained from raising it is immaterial. The statutory scheme is clear: see [NAME] (Bangladesh) [2014] NZIPT 800458 at [32]; and [NAME] (Somalia) [2016] NZIPT 800988 at [85] and [86]. WHETHER TO OFFER AN ORAL HEARING [64] The Tribunal has an absolute discretion as to whether to offer a second or subsequent claimant an oral hearing; see section 233(4) of the Act. [65] The Tribunal has considered whether an oral hearing might provide an opportunity for the appellant to provide further relevant evidence as to the question of jurisdiction, but the reality is that he has had ample opportunity to put forward the evidence he wishes to have taken into account. The scheme of the Act, in providing the Tribunal with a discretion as to whether to offer an oral hearing on a second or subsequent appeal, makes it clear that it is not intended that claimants have a never-ending series of opportunities to advance claims incrementally. That is consistent with the section 226(1) responsibility to establish the claim and the reality that, here, the appellant has already had at least 11 opportunities to present information. These were:

12 (a) in the first Confirmation of Claim form; (b) the filing of a written statement; (c) attendance at the first [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview; (d) on filing the first appeal; (e) at the first appeal hearing; (f) the second Confirmation of Claim form; (g) the filing of a further written statement; (h) attendance at the second [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview; (i) responding to the second interview report; (j) on filing the second appeal; and (k) in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 19 March 2026. [66] Nothing is advanced in response to the Tribunal’s letter to suggest that further evidence of any significance is not currently before it, such that an oral hearing is necessary to determine this issue. [67] For the reasons explained above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence presented by the appellant, treating it all as credible, does not establish that he meets the requirements under the Act for the Tribunal to be seized of jurisdiction to hear his second appeal.

CONCLUSION [68] For the reasons explained above, the Tribunal finds that the appellant’s second claim does not establish a significant change in circumstances material to the appellant’s claim since his previous claim was determined. [69] Under section 200(2) of the Act, the Tribunal must dismiss the appeal if it determines that there is no significant change in circumstances material to the claim. That being the finding here, the appeal is dismissed.

13 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [70] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member