Refugee Status Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Significant Change

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] [NAME] [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: Judge M [NAME] (Chair)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 28 May 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION _________________________________________________________________ [1] This is an appeal under section 195(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”) against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer to refuse to consider a subsequent claim for [RESPONDENT] status and protected person status by the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. INTRODUCTION [2] This is the second time that the appellant has claimed [RESPONDENT] status in New Zealand. [3] The primary issue to be addressed is whether the second claim crosses the jurisdictional threshold in section 140(1) of the Act, of disclosing a significant change of circumstances material to the second claim since the first claim was determined. If the answer to that question is “no” then Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

2 JURISDICTION [4] Where [RESPONDENT] and protection officer has refused to consider a subsequent claim, section 195(1) of the Act provides that the person may appeal to the Tribunal. [5] Where the decision to refuse to consider the subsequent claim was made under section 140(1) (on the grounds that there is no significant change in circumstances) and the person has then appealed under section 195(1)(a), section 200(1) relevantly provides: “Where an appeal is brought under section 195(1)(a), the Tribunal must first consider— (a) whether there has been a significant change in circumstances material to the appellant’s claim since the previous claim was determined; ...” [6] If the Tribunal finds that there has been no such significant change, it must dismiss the appeal; see section 200(2) of the Act. [7] It is relevant to note that section 226 of the Act provides: “It is the responsibility of an [NAME] to establish his or her case or claim, and the [NAME] must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter.” [8] Given that it is the appellant’s responsibility to establish the claim and because the Tribunal may rely on past findings of credibility or fact, it is necessary to provide a summary of the first claim and the findings thereon, before turning to the present claim.

BACKGROUND [9] The appellant was born into a [NAME] in 1974 in Tamil Nadu. He is married with one daughter. [10] On 6 April 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. The first [RESPONDENT] and protected person claim [11] In the appellant’s first claim, he stated that he feared returning to [APPELLANT]. He identified the source of his fear as [NAME] who had destroyed a statue in his local area. He feared that he would be attacked or killed by [NAME] or members of the

3 [NAME] of [APPELLANT] (“SDPI”) because of his Hindu religion, his online reporting of the destruction of the statue, and protestations he had made against radical Muslim activities in his hometown. [12] The appellant’s first claim was declined by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 7 June 2024. His appeal to the Tribunal (differently constituted) was dismissed on 18 August 2025; see [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802634. [13] The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s evidence of the damage to the religious statue, that he had participated in the protest, and that he received inappropriate or abusive messages on [NAME]. However, it did not accept that he had received death threats or that any threatening phone calls occurred. It noted that his accounts of threats were inconsistent and changed significantly from earlier statements. He provided no corroborating evidence of threats, despite claiming to have phone logs. The Tribunal found the timeline of events implausibly compressed. It rejected the parts of his account concerning serious threats and ongoing interest in harming him. [14] Finding that the appellant had not experienced serious harm in the past the Tribunal found that there was no evidence of any ongoing adverse interest in the appellant from [NAME] or from the SDPI. Communal tensions in [APPELLANT] were acknowledged, but country information did not indicate that [NAME] were being targeted by [NAME] in the manner alleged. More than two years had passed without any further threats, including none having been received through his public [NAME] profile. The appellant claimed that he would not continue in politics if returned to [APPELLANT], but the Tribunal considered that even continued political posting would not expose him to a real chance of serious harm. The Tribunal concluded that he did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT]. The second [RESPONDENT] and protected person claim [15] The appellant’s second claim is that he fears returning to [APPELLANT] due to the election of the [APPELLANT] (“the DMK”). He stated that the DMK has joined with the [NAME] who previously threatened him. He claims that the DMK will file false cases against him as he is Hindu and is connected to the [NAME] (“[NAME]”). He also stated that he is at risk because, during the 2021 elections, he reported illegal voting for the DMK. He states that his fear has increased due to the upcoming election. He further states that he ceased contact with the [NAME] three years ago and does not feel that the [NAME] would support him in tensions against the DMK.

4 [16] The appellant’s second claim was declined by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 22 April 2026 on the grounds that it did not disclose a significant change of circumstances material to the second claim since the first claim was determined and there was, therefore, no jurisdiction to consider the second claim. LETTER TO THE APPELLANT [17] On 5 May 2026, the Tribunal wrote to counsel for the appellant in the following terms: “The Tribunal is in receipt of the appellant’s second appeal for recognition as a [RESPONDENT] or protected person in New Zealand. I am instructed by the Tribunal to write to you as follows. Where the [RESPONDENT[NAME] refused to consider the second claim because it found no significant change in circumstances material to the claim since the previous claim was determined, the appellant is required to establish on appeal such a significant change in circumstances material to the claim since the previous claim was determined. If not, then, the Tribunal may lack jurisdiction to hear the second appeal – see section 195 of the Immigration Act 2009. Further, the Tribunal has an absolute discretion as to whether to offer a second or subsequent claimant an oral hearing – see section 233(4) of the Act. A summary of the claims is as follows: (a) The first claim In the appellant’s first claim, he stated that he feared returning to [APPELLANT]. He identified the source of his fear as [NAME] who had destroyed a statue in his local area. He feared that he would be attacked or killed by [NAME] or members of the [NAME] of [APPELLANT] because of his Hindu religion, his online reporting of the destruction of the statue, and protestations he had made against radical Muslim activities in his hometown. The appellant’s first claim was declined by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 7 June 2024. His appeal to the Tribunal was dismissed on 18 August 2025. (b) The second claim The appellant’s second claim is that he fears returning to [APPELLANT] due to the election of the DMK. He stated that the [NAME] (“the DMK”) have joined with the [NAME] who previously threatened him. He claims that the DMK will file false cases against him as he is Hindu and is connected to the [NAME]. He also stated that he is at risk because, during the 2021 elections, he reported illegal voting for the DMK. He states that his fear has increased due to the upcoming election. He further states that he ceased contact with the [NAME] three years ago and does not feel that the [NAME] would support him in tensions against the DMK. The appellant’s second claim was declined on 22 April 2026. The appellant’s second claim appears to pertain to circumstances and events that predated the determination of the Tribunal’s decision on the first appeal on 18 August 2025. It appears that the current claim does not meet the temporal requirement of Section 140(1) that there be a significant change in circumstances material to the claim, since the previous claim was determined.

5 It is acknowledged that the appellant advised the [RESPONDENT[NAME] that: (a) his second claim is based on “new circumstances and continuing risk factors”; (b) Muslim extremist groups and the DMK in Tamil Nadu remain hostile towards him due to his criticism of the treatment of [NAME] in Tamil Nadu and his role in identifying electoral irregularities; and (c) since the election of the DMK government in 2021, there have been multiple deaths of people in custody. However, the DMK, were elected in 2021 and were governing at the time that the appellant’s first claim was determined in August 2025. Its ongoing governance and view of the appellant is therefore not a change in circumstances that post-dates the determination of the first claim. Nor is it established that the claimed “multiple deaths of people in custody” postdates the first claim, nor why it is material, given that there is nothing on the evidence to indicate that the appellant would be in custody on his return. Applying the risk-oriented assessment in [NAME] (Iran) [2020] NZIPT 801728 and DZ (Bangladesh) [2022] NZIPT 80209, it appears that the circumstances described by the appellant in his second claim are simply a continuation of events which predate the first claim.

Accordingly, there has been no significant change in circumstances material to the claim since his previous claim was determined. You are invited to provide to the Tribunal by 12 May 2026 any response or comment which the appellant wishes to make, together with anything further that he wishes the Tribunal to [NAME] into account in relation to the substantive appeal. After that date, the Tribunal will determine the issue of jurisdiction. If it determines that there is no jurisdiction to consider the appeal that will be determinative of the appeal. If it determines that there is jurisdiction, it will address its discretion whether or not to offer an oral hearing.” [18] Counsel responded by submissions dated 13 May 2026. No discourtesy is intended in summarising them as follows: (a) The second claim concerns a continuing and escalating risk which has developed in a materially different political and security environment since the first appeal was determined on 18 August 2025. (b) It is accepted that the DMK came to power in Tamil Nadu in 2021. However, the issue is whether, since the previous determination, the claimant’s risk has materially changed or intensified due to current political circumstances, continued hostility towards him, his perceived association with the [NAME], his previous reporting of electoral irregularities and the increased risk of false cases, detention, or mistreatment if returned to [APPELLANT]. The consequences of previous events have become more serious because of the current political environment in Tamil Nadu and the increased tensions between the DMK, [NAME] supporters, [NAME] and [NAME]. The

6 claimant’s previous reporting of electoral irregularities and his perceived political opinion continue to identify him as a person adverse to the DMK and its supporters. (c) Recent reporting indicates: (i) continuing political conflict between DMK and [NAME] supporters, including allegations of fake voting and clashes between party workers in Chennai in April 2026. (ii) political and religious rhetoric concerning Hindu beliefs remains highly contentious in Tamil Nadu. Recent reporting records controversy following statements by [NAME[NAME] concerning [NAME], which were strongly criticised by [NAME] leaders as disrespectful of Hindu beliefs. (iii) National Human Rights Commission figures indicate 170 custodial deaths from 1 January to 15 March 2026, with Tamil Nadu among the states recording custodial death cases. (d) The appellant advises that the same persons and political actors remain hostile towards him. His fear is increased because the DMK remains politically powerful in Tamil Nadu and because his previous actions have identified him as a person opposed to their interests. (e) The claimant ceased contact with the [NAME] approximately three years ago. This may increase his vulnerability, because he remains perceived as connected to the [NAME] but does not believe the [NAME] would now support or protect him if he returned. (f) An oral hearing should be offered because the jurisdictional issue is closely connected with the claimant’s credibility, his explanation of the changed circumstances and his current subjective fear. The Tribunal would be assisted by hearing directly from the claimant about why the current circumstances are different from those previously considered, why he believes he remains at risk, and why that risk has increased since the previous appeal.

7 ASSESSMENT OF JURISDICTION [19] Counsel’s submissions do not grapple with the reality that the core of the appellant’s second claim — that he is at risk from members of the DMK — pre-dates his first claim. It is necessary to stress that the appellant’s first claim was determined on 18 August 2025. Any “significant change in circumstances material to the claim” needs to have arisen since that date. [20] In this regard, the appellant points to: (a) his previous reporting of electoral irregularities at the 2021 elections; (b) his perceived association with the [NAME]; (c) the current political circumstances in Tamil Nadu; (d) continued hostility towards him (presumably by the DMK); and (e) the increased risk of false cases, detention, or mistreatment. [21] The reality is that these assertions, which are the core of the second claim, well pre-date the first claim (determined in August 2025). This is because: (a) The claimed reporting of electoral irregularities happened in the aftermath of the 2021 elections. (b) The DMK was elected in 2021 and was governing Tamil Nadu at the time that the first claim was determined. Its claimed governance is not a change in circumstances that post-dates the determination of the first claim. It is also noted (though the Tribunal’s view would not be different otherwise) that the DMK has recently lost the state elections in Tamil Nadu and is no longer in power – see, for example, [NAME] “[NAME] is Indian State Chief Minister after Days of Uncertainty” BBC (10 May 2026). (c) The appellant joined the [NAME] while he was still in [APPELLANT] and any perception of his association with it must logically date to that period. It clearly does not post-date the first claim. (d) The appellant’s departure from the [NAME] similarly occurred before he left [APPELLANT] and must pre-date the first claim. Indeed, he says that he cut ties with the [NAME] “three years” ago, which would locate it in about

8 2023. This was presumably before he left [APPELLANT] in April 2023 but, whether before or after, it clearly pre-dates the first claim. (e) The current political circumstances in Tamil Nadu have not, in fact, changed in any significant or material way since the first claim. Indeed, the DMK is no longer in power, having won only 59 of the 234 seats in the latest elections; see the website of the Electoral Commission of [APPELLANT] “General Election to Assembly Constituencies: Trends & Results May-2026”, at www.eci.gov.in. No country information has been provided to show any intensification of circumstances that heighten any risk for the appellant. (f) Counsel herself describes the hostility of the DMK as “the continued hostility...”, acknowledging that its hostility is not new. (g) Counsel refers to 170 deaths in custody in [APPELLANT] from January– March 2026. In fact, the figures for the last few years, as recorded by the National Human Rights Commission of [APPELLANT], are given by Dr [APPELLANT] and [APPELLANT], in “The Torturous Failure of CCTV Surveillance in Indian Custodial Spaces” [NAME] (9 April 2026) are as follows: “The statical figures shows a persistent surge in custodial death cases: 2023 had reported 2,400 cases increasing to 2,739 cases in 2024. As per the latest report by National Human Right Commission of [APPELLANT], 2,338 cases of custodial deaths were reported in 2025.” (h) Far from increasing, it is clear that the number of custodial deaths in [APPELLANT] was higher in 2023 and 2024 than in 2025. It is simply not a statistic that supports the submission of an intensification of risk. [22] It is not overlooked that the appellant did not raise, on his first claim, the issue of his criticism of the 2021 election results, or the antipathy then shown to him by the DMK, or mention either his membership of the [NAME] or his subsequent disassociation from that party. But he clearly could have done so. He has a duty of candour to the Tribunal and it is not open to him to withhold grounds of claim only to produce them later, when a first claim has been declined. This point was made by both the Tribunal and the High Court in AJ (Bangladesh) [2014] NZIPT 800458, at [32], and AS (Somalia) v [RESPONDENT] Protection Officer [2020] NZHC 833.

9

CONCLUSION ON JURISDICTION [23] While it is accepted that there is different information provided on the second claim, for the reasons outlined above the Tribunal is satisfied that it substantially pre-dates the first claim. To the extent that anything remaining constitutes “changed circumstances”, it is not significant nor material to the second claim. The jurisdictional threshold is not met and the appeal must fail. WHETHER TO OFFER AN ORAL HEARING [24] The Tribunal has an absolute discretion as to whether to offer a second or subsequent claimant an oral hearing; see section 233(4) of the Act. [25] The Tribunal has considered whether an oral hearing might allow the appellant to provide further relevant evidence as to the issue of jurisdiction, but the reality is that he has had ample opportunity to put forward his evidence. The scheme of the Act, in providing the Tribunal with a discretion as to whether to offer an oral hearing on a second or subsequent appeal, makes it clear that it is not intended that claimants have a never-ending series of opportunities to advance claims incrementally. That is consistent with the section 226(1) responsibility to establish the claim and the reality that, here, the appellant has already had at least 11 opportunities to present information. These were: (a) in the first Confirmation of Claim form; (b) the filing of a written statement; (c) on attending the first [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview; (d) on lodging the first appeal; (e) at the first appeal hearing; (f) in the second Confirmation of Claim form; (g) on filing a further written statement; (h) on attending the second [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview; (i) on being invited to make submissions on the applicability of sections 140(1) and 140(3) of the Act;

10 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

Judge M [NAME] (j) on filing the second appeal; and (k) in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 5 May 2026. [26] Nothing is advanced in response to the Tribunal’s letter to suggest that any evidence of significance is not currently before it, such that an oral hearing is necessary to determine this issue. It is not overlooked that counsel asserts that the jurisdictional issue is closely connected with the claimant’s credibility but that is to misunderstand the jurisdictional enquiry, which assesses claim against claim, not the facts as found on either claim. Credibility is simply not in issue. [27] For the reasons explained above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence presented by the appellant does not establish that he meets the requirements under the Act for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction to hear his second appeal.

CONCLUSION [28] For the reasons explained above, the Tribunal finds that the appellant’s second claim does not establish a significant change in circumstances material to the appellant’s claim since his previous claim was determined. That being the finding, the Tribunal must dismiss the appeal. It is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [29] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “Judge M [NAME]” Judge M [NAME]