Appellants' Refugee Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Significant Change

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803220–223 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, [NAME]: FD (India)

Respondent: [redacted] Officer

Before: Judge [NAME] (Chair)

Representative for [NAME]: A Bashay

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 20 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION _________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] These are appeals against decisions of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer, declining the second claims for [RESPONDENT] and protected person status by [NAME], citizens of India. [2] [NAME] are husband and wife and their two children. Because the children are under 18 years old, they are minors for the purposes of section 375 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). The husband is the responsible adult to represent their interests. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the second appeals meet the jurisdictional threshold of disclosing a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined; and (b) even if so, whether or not to offer [NAME] an oral hearing on their second appeals; and if not

2 (c) whether the appeals establish a well-founded fear of persecution or sufficient risk of one of the forms of harm which underlie protected person status. [4] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal dismisses the appeals. JURISDICTION [5] Where [RESPONDENT] and protection officer has refused to consider a subsequent claim, section 195(1) of the Act provides that the person may appeal to the Tribunal. [6] Where (as happened here) the decision to refuse to consider the subsequent claim was made under section 140(1) (on the grounds that there is no significant change in circumstances) and the person has then appealed under section 195(1)(a), section 200(1) relevantly provides: “Where an appeal is brought under section 195(1)(a), the Tribunal must first consider— (a) whether there has been a significant change in circumstances material to the appellant’s claim since the previous claim was determined;….” [7] If these requirements are met, then, pursuant to section 200(6), the Tribunal will conduct its orthodox enquiry into whether to recognise the appellant as a [RESPONDENT] or a protected person. [8] If these requirements are not met, then, pursuant to section 200(2), the Tribunal must dismiss the appeal. [9] It is relevant to note that section 226(1) of the Act provides: “It is the responsibility of an [NAME] to establish his or her case or claim, and the [NAME] must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter.” [10] Further, the Tribunal may rely on any finding of credibility or fact by the Tribunal or any appeals body in any previous appeal or matter involving the person and the person may not challenge any finding of credibility or fact so relied upon; see section 231(1) of the Act.

3 Letter to [NAME] [11] In order to address the jurisdictional issue explained above (and other matters), the Tribunal wrote to counsel for [NAME] on 19 March 2026, as follows: “The Tribunal refers to the notices of appeal lodged on 10 October 2025. It notes that [NAME]’ current claims, lodged on 29 October 2024, were determined by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] to be subsequent claims. The claims were declined by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] by combined decision dated 30 September 2025. The first claims [NAME]’ first appeals were dismissed by the Tribunal on 16 September 2024 – see RZ (India) [2024] NZIPT 802371–374. In its decision, the Tribunal found the claims to be credible and that, in relation to their village in Kerala, there were substantial grounds for believing that [the] [NAME] were in danger of cruel treatment, as defined by section 131 of the Immigration Act 2009. It found, however, that they each had an internal protection alternative in that they could live safely away from the village in, for example, Chennai or Bengaluru (also called Bangalore). The second claims In their second claims, lodged on 29 October 2024, [NAME] assert that, since the first claim, the husband’s father has continued to receive threatening phone calls from [NAME], at the rate of three or four calls a month, demanding twice what had been borrowed and threatening to kill [NAME]. In March 2025, two men are said to have visited [NAME]’s house, shouting threats. Jurisdiction Because the [RESPONDENT[NAME] found that the second claims did not disclose a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the second claims. That finding requires the Tribunal to also consider whether there is a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined. The second claims appear to the Tribunal not to disclose a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined because: (a) The new information advanced on the second claims is not a significant change in circumstances because it is merely a continuation of the first claims, not an intensification of either severity of harm or degree of risk. (b) As a separate reason, the finding of the Tribunal on the first appeals was that [NAME] had available to them the internal protection alternative of relocating to either Chennai or Bengalaru. Nothing advanced on the second claims rebuts that finding. It remains the case that [NAME] appear not to be at risk in India of being persecuted or suffering any of the harms referred to in sections 130 and 131 of the Act because there are internal protection alternatives available to them. The Tribunal may rely on previous findings of fact and credibility (see section 231(1) of the Act) and, to the present, the second claims do not appear to even attempt to rebut those findings in the first appeal decision.

4 Discretion whether to offer an oral hearing For these reasons, [NAME]’ second appeals may not cross the jurisdictional threshold of a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined. Further, the Tribunal has an absolute discretion as to whether or not to offer [NAME] an oral hearing on their second appeals – see section 233(4) of the Act. For the reasons explained above in relation to the issue of jurisdiction, the appeals appear to lack merit. In the circumstances, the Tribunal invites [NAME] to file submissions explaining why there is a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined and, even if there is, whether it should afford [NAME] an oral hearing. If the Tribunal determines not to offer an oral hearing, it will proceed without further notice to determine the appeals. For this reason, you are also invited to file any further evidence and submissions which you wish the Tribunal to take into account. Please respond by 5pm, on Friday 26 March 2026, after which the Tribunal will determine the above issues.” Response from [NAME] [12] In response, counsel has filed submissions dated 27 March 2026. In summary, they say: (a) The [RESPONDENT[NAME] did not adequately consider how the risk has evolved over time, especially in relation to the children: (i) The evidence is that individuals connected to [NAME] attended the school of [NAME]. This demonstrates that they have the ability and willingness to locate and approach the children directly, even in environments where they would ordinarily be safe. (ii) The evidence shows that the children were exposed to a violent confrontation in which two associates of [NAME] grabbed, pushed and threatened the husband. Although the children were not physically harmed, they were distressed by the incident. (iii) [NAME] is now entering his teens. As he becomes more independent and mobile, including attending school, travelling and engaging in the community, the likelihood of direct targeting, confrontation or coercion significantly increases. The prior incident at the school must be viewed in

5 this context: what was previously an alarming but isolated incident has evolved into a clear indicator of a risk to the child. (b) In the first decision, it was found that the risk could be mitigated through an internal protection alternative. The present claims demonstrate that the nature, persistence and reach of the threats have evolved, such that the earlier assessment can no longer safely stand. The ability of the perpetrators to locate and intimidate [NAME]’ family members demonstrates that the risk is not confined to a particular locality. The evidence now indicates that they have the means, motivation and network to pursue [NAME] beyond their home area, rendering relocation neither safe nor reasonable. (c) The evidence establishes that the threats from [NAME] have continued over a prolonged period and have intensified in frequency and seriousness, including repeated threatening telephone calls and direct in-person intimidation of family members as recently as March 2025. This reflects an entrenched and escalating pattern of conduct, demonstrating both ongoing intent and capability to carry out harm. (d) Considered cumulatively, [NAME]’ circumstances are materially different from those considered in the first decision.

Accordingly, [NAME] submit that their subsequent claims do disclose a significant change in circumstances material to their claims, and that the Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction to determine the appeals. (e) [NAME] submit that this is an appropriate case in which the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to grant an oral hearing. An oral hearing would allow the Tribunal to properly assess the updated evidence and the current risk faced by [NAME]. [13] At the same time as the above submissions, counsel also filed a brief statement by the husband, stating: “I am writing to urgently request that my family be allowed to remain in New Zealand until the end of this academic year. [NAME] are enrolled in school, actively participating in extracurricular activities, and have built strong friendships. Sudden relocation would severely disrupt their education, social development, and emotional wellbeing.

6 We do not have suitable accommodation to return to, and our family is experiencing significant financial hardship. Immediate removal would place [NAME] in an unstable and unsafe environment. While there have been no changes in our immigration circumstances, my appeal is made solely to protect [NAME]’s rights, education, and welfare during this critical period. I respectfully request compassionate consideration to allow them to complete the current school year. I respectfully request that [NAME] be allowed to remain in New Zealand until the end of this school year . Their education, friendships, and safety are of utmost importance, and I plead for your understanding and compassion in this matter. Thank you for your understanding.” Assessment of jurisdiction [14] The second claims do not to disclose a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined. This is because: (a) The new information advanced on the second claims is not a significant change in circumstances because it is merely a continuation of the first claims, not an intensification of either severity of harm or degree of risk. In this regard, it is helpful to note that, on the first claim, [NAME] claimed that (extracted from of the Tribunal’s decision on the first appeals): “In around 2010, the husband borrowed one million Rupees (approximately NZD20,000.00) from an unofficial [NAME], [[NAME]]…. The husband… has only ever made two or three interest payments…. [[NAME]] began to contact the husband by telephone because of his failure to pay. He was profane and abusive and threatened the husband…. [[NAME]]arly in 2013… [t]wo of [[NAME]’s] men accosted the husband and beat him with an iron rod…. … [[NAME]] continued to threaten the husband by telephone and to demand money…. During the husband’s absence, [[NAME]] harassed the husband’s father…. primarily through abusive telephone calls but sometimes in person…. On one occasion [in about 2021], [[NAME]]… rang the husband and subjected him to abuse and threats. He referred to the assault incident in 2013, implying that this could happen again…. By then, the debt had grown to IRN 2.5 lakh (approximately NZD50,000). [[NAME]]… began to harass the wife and children. [He] arrived at her workplace one afternoon, creating a loud and embarrassing scene,

7 shouting about the debt owed to him.... Not long after, [[NAME]] did something similar at the school [NAME] attended…. [[NAME]] continued to call and threaten [the husband]. If the husband tried to ignore [[NAME]’s] calls, [[NAME]] responded by increasing his harassment of the husband’s father. Although [[NAME]] did not harm the father physically, his abusive calls and threats were upsetting and unsettling…. One evening… [NAME] were… confronted by two of [[NAME]’s] men, riding a motorcycle. The men grabbed the husband by the shirt and, after much pushing and shoving, making abusive and profane threats, the men ran off when another vehicle came into view.” [NAME] claim, on the second appeals, that, since the first claim was determined on 16 September 2024, the husband’s father has continued to receive threatening telephone calls from [NAME], at the rate of three or four calls a month, demanding twice what had been borrowed and threatening to kill [NAME]. In March 2025, two men are said to have visited [NAME]’s house, shouting threats. Clearly, such claims are a continuation of the first claims, not an intensification. The threat to kill is acknowledged but threats of that severity were asserted on the first claim. On the first appeal, the Tribunal noted that the husband’s “predicament engaged the rights articulated in Articles 6, 7 and 9 of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”)], namely the right to life, the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the right to liberty and security of the person". The claims made on the second appeal do not elevate or intensify either the degree of risk or the severity of harm from that previously asserted. (b) There is a further reason why the second appeals do not disclose a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined. That is because, whether or not there is a significant change in circumstances in relation to the risk to [NAME] in their village, the finding of the Tribunal on the first appeals was that they had available to them the internal protection alternative of relocating to either Chennai or Bengalaru. Nothing advanced on the second claims rebuts that finding. It remains the case that [NAME] are not at risk in India of being persecuted or suffering any of the harms referred to in sections 130 and 131 of the Act because there are internal protection alternatives available to

8 them. The Tribunal may rely on previous findings of fact and credibility (see section 231(1) of the Act) and the second claims do not appear to even attempt to rebut those findings in the first appeal decision. The Tribunal finds the reasoning behind the decision of the first appeal panel that there were internal protection alternatives available to [NAME] to be cogent and persuasive. It determines to rely on them. [15] Finally, counsel raises two concerns in relation to the children. First, it is said that associates of [NAME] went to the school of [NAME]. This demonstrates, it is said, that “they have the ability and willingness to locate and approach the children directly”. But this issue was before the Tribunal on the first claim. It cannot be said to amount, of itself, to a changed circumstance. [16] Second, counsel asserts that [NAME] is now entering his teens. As he becomes more independent and mobile, “the likelihood of direct targeting, confrontation or coercion significantly increases”. In reality, however, there is no changed circumstance. [NAME] (and [NAME] for that matter) was always going to become a teenager. This was entirely predictable at the time of the first claim and is not a changed circumstance. The assessment of risk always necessitates a projection into the future, notwithstanding that some far-distant events may become increasingly unpredictable the more they recede into the future (and so become more speculative). But that is hardly the case with the inevitability of aging. The transition of the children into teenagers was entirely foreseeable by [NAME] at the time of their first claims. That they did not raise it as an issue then does not create a changed circumstance now. See, in this regard, the discussion in AJ (Bangladesh) [2014] NZIPT 800458, at [32]. See also the discussion of imminence and foreseeability in [NAME]) v [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer [2024] NZCA 126. [17] Finally, regard must be had to the new statement submitted by the husband. He raises no new evidence relevant to the present appeal. Instead, he asks for compassionate consideration to allow the children to complete the current school year. While the Tribunal understands his concern as a parent, that is not an issue relevant to the present appeal. It will be a factor able to be considered in the humanitarian appeal which was filed at the same time as this appeal, but it is not relevant here.

9 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

Judge [NAME] on Jurisdiction [18] For these above reasons, the Tribunal finds that there is not a significant change in circumstances material to the claims since the previous claims were determined. Pursuant to section 200(2) of the Act, it must dismiss the appeals.

CONCLUSION [19] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that [NAME]: (a) are not refugees within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and, therefore, are not refugees under section 129 of the Act; (b) are not protected persons within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Convention Against Torture and, therefore, are not protected persons under section 130 of the Act; (c) are not protected persons within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, are not protected persons under section 131 of the Act. [20] The appeals are dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [21] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify [NAME]. [22] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to identify [NAME]. “Judge [NAME]” Judge [NAME]