Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 802862 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 10 February 2026

Date of Decision: 30 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] person status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm from the [NAME] of the [NAME] [APPELLANT]-[NAME] ([NAME]) because he refused their demands for money and threatened the appellant if payment was not made. [3] The principal issues on appeal are whether the relevant evidence is accepted and whether, on the accepted evidence, there is a risk of the appellant suffering serious harm that reaches the required threshold.

2 [4] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal does not accept that the appellant is at risk of serious harm from members of the [NAME]). His appeal is declined. [5] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [6] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [7] The appellant, a Nepalese citizen in his late 30s, was born in Z town, Y district, W province, [APPELLANT]. His parents and older sister are resident in [APPELLANT]. He is married with two children. [8] After completing secondary school, the appellant set up a small [NAME], in which he and his wife worked. In the early 2010s, the appellant registered his farm as a business with the [NAME]. [9] In September 2021, the appellant obtained a Nepalese passport. Threats made at the [NAME] [10] In the late afternoon of 19 June 2023, the appellant, his wife and their worker were working in a farm shed when three [NAME] arrived, all on the same motorbike. [11] [NAME] said they were from a [COMPANY] and wanted donations for their party. The appellant refused but [NAME] were insistent. They verbally abused the appellant and threatened the safety of both the appellant and his wife. The wife became scared, left the shed and rang the police. [12] The police arrived 10 to 15 minutes later. [NAME] continued to talk about their political party in the interim and, once the police arrived, [NAME] were arrested.

3 [13] The police told the appellant to visit the police station the next day to report the incident. However, when he arrived, the police told him that [NAME] had been released because someone from the [NAME] had rung the police and told them to let [NAME] go. Appellant leaves [APPELLANT] [14] After the appellant arrived home from the police station, a friend told him that [NAME] were very dangerous and that it would be better for him to leave and go somewhere else. The appellant discussed this with his wife, contacted his friend [NAME], who lived in Delhi, India and asked him for help. On 21 June 2023, the appellant left [APPELLANT], travelled to Delhi by bus and stayed with [NAME] for six weeks. [15] In the meantime, the appellant’s wife stayed at home or at her parents’ home which was about 2 kilometres away and both she and the appellant’s family ran the [NAME]. She was not in any danger because the [NAME] would not have targeted women and children. On one occasion, someone came to the farm looking for the appellant. [16] While in Delhi, [NAME] found the appellant employment as a security guard and, during this time assisted the appellant to come to New Zealand. [NAME] completed a visa application for the appellant and loaned him the money for the application. The appellant paid for his flights to New Zealand from his savings. [17] In August 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand holding a visitor visa. His aim in coming to New Zealand was to be safe. Although there were documents that accompanied his visa application that indicated he was travelling to New Zealand for a holiday, he had never seen these documents. [18] Once in New Zealand, the appellant found work in a number of places, including in the [NAME]. [19] On 7 February 2024, the appellant lodged his [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] Person Status (Confirmation of Claim) form. Chickens killed at the appellant’s farm [20] On 10 February 2024, the appellant was rung by his wife in the early hours of the morning because she discovered that 500 to 600 chickens on the farm had been killed. The appellant provided several [NAME] posts about the incident,

4 accompanied by photographs. The appellant believes that the [NAME] carried out the killings. [21] The family then closed the poultry business. The wife is now a homemaker. She receives support from other family farming ventures, being rice and wheat farming. Fear of a return to [APPELLANT] [22] The appellant fears a return to [APPELLANT] because of the problems he encountered before he left. Evidence of [NAME] [23] The appellant’s wife, [NAME], provided evidence via audio-visual link from [APPELLANT]. She also provided a witness brief (25 January 2026). [24] The wife confirmed that three [NAME] arrived at the [NAME] demanding money. They threatened the appellant and the wife became scared, went into the family’s house and rang the police. She understood from the appellant after the incident that [NAME] had guns, but she did not see them. She also understood they were from the [NAME]). [25] The wife confirmed that the appellant had operated the [NAME] and that, prior to [NAME] visiting the property and making threats, the business had been going well. [26] The appellant felt unsafe and left for India the next day. After he left, the wife remained living at home near the farm and continued working there. Although she was scared after the incident, she has not suffered any harm since. She believes she remains unharmed because [NAME] were after the appellant who ran the business rather than her, who assisted him. [27] [NAME] returned to the property once or twice after the initial visit, possibly a few days after the appellant left for India. [NAME] continued asking for money but did not threaten her. The wife did not notice whether [NAME] were carrying guns during their visits. [28] On the morning of 21 February 2024, the wife woke up to feed the chickens and discovered that 500 to 600 of them had been killed. Although the police concluded that stray dogs killed the chickens, the wife believes that the same [NAME]

5 from the [NAME] were responsible, due to the fact that they had previously made threats and demanded money, she could not see any injuries to the chickens (although there were feathers present) and there were screens around the chickens that had not been damaged. Evidence of [NAME] [29] The appellant’s friend, [NAME], provided evidence via audio-visual link from India. He also provided a witness brief (24 January 2026). [30] [NAME] originally met the appellant through [NAME] through a mutual friend. He lives in Delhi and operates an online travel agency and sells mobile phone accessories. The appellant contacted him for assistance due to the threats he had received. [NAME] offered the appellant a place to stay and found work for him. After one month, he suggested the appellant move overseas and someone recommended New Zealand. The appellant then paid [NAME] a sum of money and helped him find for an agent to organise a visa for him. [NAME] owned a travel agency, he did not organise the appellant’s travel. [31] [NAME] considers the appellant is in danger from the [NAME]) in [APPELLANT]. The appellant told him that the group’s criminal activities had significantly increased. [NAME] confirmed that his own family were scared they could be harmed while the appellant stayed with them, although no harm occurred. Evidence of [APPELLANT] [32] The appellant’s friend, [APPELLANT], provided evidence via audio-visual link from [APPELLANT]. He also provided a witness brief (24 January 2026). [33] [NAME] confirmed that some people asked him for directions to the appellant’s farm. [APPELLANT] thought that they might have wanted to buy eggs from the appellant, so he gave the group directions. The next day, he found out from the appellant that the group threatened him and demanded money. He understands the appellant left his farm and lived in India for a number of weeks. He did not believe that the appellant was safe living in [APPELLANT]. Other Evidence and Submissions Received [34] The Tribunal was provided with the [RESPONDENT[NAME] file in relation to the appellant’s claim, including copies of all documents submitted at first instance,

6 Immigration New Zealand’s electronic records setting out his visa history, his 2023 visitor visa application, and the [RESPONDENT[NAME]’s written decision (16 March 2025). [35] On 3 February 2026, counsel filed the following: (a) Opening submissions (3 February 2026). (b) The appellant’s updated written statement (26 January 2026), his business license (untranslated) and registration certificates (2012 and 2016). (c) Written statements from [NAME], [NAME], and [NAME] and their identity information. (d) Information about the attack on the chickens: a police report (22 February 2024), [NAME] posts (dates not shown), and a translation of an article (undated). (e) Two photographs of the appellant with his father and the appellant’s daughter’s student identification card. (f) A bundle of country information. [36] On 17 February 2026, counsel provided a copy of a decision of the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal cited in the hearing, KG (Review of current situation) [APPELLANT] CG [2006] [NAME] 00076. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [37] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning [RESPONDENT] or protection status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and

7 (c) [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [38] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [39] In determining whether the appellant is [RESPONDENT] or [NAME], it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [40] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. See AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [41] The appellant claims that he is at risk of serious harm in [APPELLANT] because: (a) [NAME] who were members of the [NAME]) came to the appellant’s [NAME], making threats and demanding money. (b) The police refused to act on the appellant’s complaint because the [NAME]) told the police to release [NAME]. (c) [NAME] returned to the farm and made threats to the appellant via his workers.

8 (d) In February 2024, 500 to 600 chickens on the farm were killed by members of the [NAME]). [42] While the Tribunal accepts the appellant’s evidence (which included a police report and reports from social media) that 500 to 600 chickens were killed on his farm, other aspects of the appellant’s account lack credence, for the reasons that follow. [NAME]’s visit to the appellant’s farm in June 2023 ― The presence of a gun [43] In his November 2024 statement and the Confirmation of Claim form, the appellant stated that [NAME] pointed a gun at him during the confrontation. However, until the Tribunal raised it with him, the presence of a gun during the incident was not mentioned by the appellant in the hearing. When asked to clarify this omission, the appellant stated that he was answering the Tribunal’s specific questions. The Tribunal invited the appellant to talk about the incident, and when the appellant raised a query about whether the Tribunal wished him to get straight to the point or answer in detail, the Tribunal elected the latter. Therefore, there was every opportunity for the appellant to ensure that all the relevant information about the incident at the farm, including a gun being pointed at him, was provided. Further, the presence of a gun, particularly one being pointed at a [NAME] underscores the great danger that a [NAME] is in. It is implausible that this was not at the front of the appellant’s mind when asked to explain what happened during the visit. [44] The Tribunal also asked the appellant to explain why, when interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME], he had not raised the presence of a gun during the incident at the farm. He responded that the [RESPONDENT[NAME] did not ask him about it and that he forgot to mention it. When asked how he could forget a gun being pointed at him, the appellant’s evidence changed. He said that it had not been pointed at him but instead, one of [NAME] had it “on his side”. When asked to explain the inconsistency of this statement with the evidence in his Confirmation of Claim form, he stated that it could have been because of the translator. [45] The later explanation is not accepted. The Tribunal is satisfied that that the mobile evidence as to the position of the gun was an attempt to downplay the significance of the gun’s presence, thus providing a possible justification for not remembering to mention the gun. However, this does not assist the appellant

9 because, in doing so, it directly contradicts his earlier evidence (in the Confirmation of Claim form and statements) that [NAME] had pointed a gun at him. ― Number of [NAME] who visited [46] While the appellant maintained in his [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview and to the Tribunal that three [NAME] came to the farm, his original claim to the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and his statement of 27 November 2024 recorded a visit by two [NAME]. When asked to explain this, the appellant stated that the translator must have made a mistake because he told the translator that three [NAME] came to the farm. However, his evidence to the [RESPONDENT[NAME] was that he had typed his written statement himself in English, and he confirmed that he reread his statement (which was in English), to ensure it was correct. Given that the group of [NAME] involved was small in number and that they spent at least 10 minutes with the appellant before the police arrived, the appellant could be expected to recall this detail accurately. [47] The Tribunal finds that the above concerns undermine the credibility of the evidence that [NAME] visited the appellant’s farm in June 2023 and threatened him. That part of the account is rejected. [48] Further strengthening this finding, the Tribunal records additional credibility concerns with related parts of the evidence. Police inaction over the appellant’s complaint [49] The appellant says he visited the police station the day after [NAME]’s first visit. He told the police he wanted to make a statement about the incident. The police responded stating that [NAME] had already been released as the [NAME] had rung the police and told them to let [NAME] go, which they did. However, this contradicted the appellant’s claim form in which he stated that the police released [NAME] after taking a bribe from them. When asked about the inconsistency, the appellant told the Tribunal that it was difficult to remember everything. [NAME]’s second visit to the farm [50] In his Confirmation of Claim form, the appellant stated that the day after he had complained to the police, [NAME] (again, with guns) visited the farm for a second time. As the appellant was not there, [NAME] made threats against him to

10 the people working at the farm and it was this second visit that convinced the appellant to leave [APPELLANT]. However, the appellant made no mention of the second visit in the hearing, until it was raised by the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s view, it is implausible that the appellant would fail to mention the second visit if it been the catalyst for him leaving the country. Further, the wife was unclear in her evidence about when and how many times [NAME] visited the farm. In her statement she said that [NAME] visited the farm after about 8 to 10 days, which indicated one visit; however, in the hearing she stated that [NAME] visited once or twice being a “few days” after the appellant left and “two days after then a little bit”. [51] The Tribunal also notes the wife’s evidence that, although the appellant left because he feared for his safety, she remained behind because she had children and her house was close to the farm. When asked why [NAME] would harm the appellant when they had not harmed her, she stated that it was because the appellant was the businessman, that he dealt with the money, and that she was just assisting him. This is particularly because, in his evidence to the Tribunal about [NAME]’s first visit, the appellant stated that after he refused to give [NAME] money, [NAME] responded by indicating that the wife would be in danger. As a result, the wife became scared and left the shed. The Tribunal finds that it stretches credulity that, in the appellant’s absence, the wife, who continued to work on the farm, would not have been vulnerable to harm from [NAME] and that precautions would not have been put in place. [52] The appellant also stated that his wife (and his children) were not threatened or harmed because, in [APPELLANT], it is [NAME], not women, who are targeted. However, various sources of country information record that serious violence, including sexual violence, has been perpetrated against women by [NAME] which included [NAME], see for example, International Commission of [APPELLANT]: Failure to Address the Rights of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Survivors in Transitional Justice Process (31 July 2025). Counsel contended that in accordance with the decision of the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, KG (Review of current situation) [APPELLANT] CG [2006] [NAME] 00076, at para 48, it was “businessmen” in [APPELLANT] who could be targeted by political parties. However, it is not clear to the Tribunal that the court intended that term to refer specifically to [NAME], or whether the decision, being 20 years old, used the term “businessmen” to refer to both businessmen and businesswomen.

11 Visit to Delhi [53] The appellant states that, fearing harm, he left [APPELLANT] and fled to Delhi. Based on the Tribunal’s rejection of the earlier evidence, there was no basis for the appellant to travel to Delhi to avoid harm. Nevertheless, that does not mean that he did not have other reasons to travel to Delhi, as he organised his New Zealand visitor visa through [NAME], his friend in Delhi. Giving the appellant the benefit of the doubt, the Tribunal accepts the evidence of the appellant and [NAME] that the appellant spent some time in Delhi after he left [APPELLANT]. The purpose of the appellant’s travel to New Zealand [54] The purpose for the appellant’s travel to New Zealand was, ostensibly, for tourism purposes. Included in his 2023 visitor visa application was evidence such as an itinerary and return air travel and he confirmed as much in his [RESPONDENT[NAME] interview. However, when questioned in the hearing, the appellant conceded that he did not travel to New Zealand as a tourist and that he had no idea what evidence had been provided to Immigration New Zealand in his visitor visa. Instead, the appellant’s evidence was that he travelled here to avoid harm in [APPELLANT]. The Tribunal finds that the appellant properly conceded that he had not travelled to New Zealand as a tourist; however, given the above concerns, the Tribunal rejects his claim that his travel was prompted by a genuine fear of harm in [APPELLANT]. The February 2024 killing of 500 to 600 chickens on the farm [55] On 21 February 2024, 500 to 600 of the chickens on the appellant’s farm were killed. This is supported by the police report and media accounts of the attack. However, there is nothing to support the appellant’s assertion that the [NAME]) were responsible for the attack. [56] The wife states that because there no injury to the chickens and no damage to the surrounding fence, she therefore thought the chickens could have been attacked by the [NAME]). The appellant thought that the lack of injuries to the chickens could indicate that they were poisoned by people who wished him harm. However, these claims are directly contradicted by the police statement which noted the wire mesh fence was damaged, that many chickens were injured and that the feathers of the chicken were found scattered all over the farm. In light of the other credibility concerns outlined, the bare assertions of the

12 appellant and his wife that the attack could have been carried out by the [NAME]) or any other political party is not accepted. [57] Recent country information indicates a diminishing threat of intimidation to businesses by insurgent groups, including the [NAME]) who, in March 2021, agreed to enter peaceful politics, see United States Department of State 2023 Investment Climate Statements: [APPELLANT] (26 July 2023). Further, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“[NAME]”) [NAME] [APPELLANT] (1 March 2024) (the [NAME] report) notes that following the signing of the peace agreement between the government and [NAME]) in March 2021, terrorist incidents have since “largely ceased” (at para 2.46). The Tribunal finds that, as well as the persuasive nature of the police report, this information reinforces the view that the chicken deaths were not at the hands of the [NAME]). The evidence of the witnesses [58] The wife’s evidence was addressed, as relevant, during the above discussion. As already discussed, the Tribunal had concerns about her evidence about later visits to the farm as well her assertions as to the cause of the chickens being killed at the farm in February 2024. [59] [NAME]’s evidence about the incidents and his assertion that the appellant is not safe in [APPELLANT] is not accepted. He lives in Delhi, and was not a witness to the claimed incidents, but instead was told about them from the appellant. Further, his claim that the activities of the [NAME]) had increased is at odds with the country information discussed at [57]. [60] [NAME] operates a small business near the appellant’s [NAME]. In his statement, [APPELLANT] stated that he had been asked for directions to the appellant’s farm by one person and that “they” were travelling by motorbike. His statement also mentioned three people from the [NAME]) making threats to the appellant. However, he was not a witness to this but, according to his statement “came to know” about the incident the next day. In his evidence to the Tribunal, he confirmed that the appellant was the person who had told him about the visit and the threat. On its own, the Tribunal does not consider that a man asking [NAME] for directions to the farm demonstrates that three [NAME] visited the farm and threatened the appellant, particularly when [NAME]’s understanding of the events at the farm had been relayed to him by the appellant. Therefore, little weight is placed on [NAME]’s evidence.

13 Summary of credibility findings [61] On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the appellant was targeted by members of the [NAME]). The details given by the appellant about the claimed initial visit were mobile and contradictory and there were additional credibility concerns about the claimed complaint to the police and a subsequent visit by the members of the same party. While a large number of chickens were killed at the appellant’s farm in February 2024, the police report made it clear that responsibility for it lay with a group of stray dogs. Therefore, the appellant’s core claim, to have been the [NAME] of threats from members of the [NAME]), is not credible and is rejected. [62] The Tribunal accepts the identity and general biographical details of the appellant and his family. It further accepts that, in the mid-2000s, the appellant set up a [NAME] in Z town, Y district and that in June 2023, he travelled to Delhi where [NAME] helped arrange a New Zealand visitor visa for him and, in August 2023, he arrived in New Zealand. THE [RESPONDENT] [63] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT]. [64] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [65] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60].

14 [66] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [67] The principal issues are, as explained in [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [68] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case. Relevant country information [69] As counsel notes, the United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 August 2025) records, in its executive summary, significant human issues, including credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary detention; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists and unjustified arrests of journalists; and trafficking in persons, including forced labour. It is also reported that the government took credible steps in investigating officials who committed human rights abuses, but did not consistently punish officials convicted of human rights abuses. [70] Counsel produced a series of articles and reports that also address the current state of human rights in [APPELLANT], for example [NAME] [APPELLANT]: Freedom in the World Country Report (2024) and “Amnesty Report Highlights Worsening Human Rights Situation in [APPELLANT]” [NAME] (30 April 2025). These reports highlight similar human rights abuses, inconsistent enforcement of them and a lack of access to justice.

15 [NAME] in [APPELLANT] [71] The [NAME] report addresses recent activities of [NAME]. At para 3.51, it notes that: [NAME] committed numerous human rights abuses during the so-called ‘People’s War’ (1996 to 2006). These were carried out by the [NAME] (the armed wing of the [NAME] [APPELLANT]) and [NAME] ([NAME]). A 2012 report by the [NAME] of the [NAME] found [NAME] had been responsible for the majority of over 2,000 incidents ‘amounting to a serious violation of international law’, including abductions, torture, and unlawful killings, including of civilians. [72] However, following the 2006 peace accords, the [NAME] ceased their armed struggle and entered the political mainstream, see the [NAME] report at para 3.52: [NAME] won the 2017 and 2022 national elections, and the wartime leader of the [NAME] [APPELLANT], [NAME] ([NAME]), is the current Prime Minister (see Political System). In 2023, an alliance called the [NAME] was formed by four of the main leftist political parties: the [NAME] ([COMPANY]), [NAME] (Unified Socialist), the [NAME] [APPELLANT] and the [NAME] [APPELLANT]. [73] After 2008, conflict-related killings in [APPELLANT] have been extremely rare, with [NAME] ceasing to use violence against their opponents (see the [NAME] report at para 3.54). [NAME] assesses that political opponents of [NAME] are generally not at risk of violence from [NAME] (see the [NAME] report at para 3.56). Further, the [NAME] report notes at para 2.45 that the overall security situation in [APPELLANT] has “improved dramatically” since the end of the conflict: Political violence and terrorism are no longer day-to-day threats. Poverty and weak rule of law … continue to contribute to insecurity. Application to the facts [74] Counsel submits that if the appellant returns to [APPELLANT], he will be at risk of serious harm from members of [NAME]). However, the Tribunal finds that there is nothing about his situation in [APPELLANT] that places him at such a risk. [75] The Tribunal has already found that the appellant was not visited and/or threatened by [NAME]) or any other political party. Although a large number of chickens were killed on his farm in 2024, there was nothing to suggest that this was carried out by members of the [NAME]) or any other political party, the most likely culprits being stray dogs. The appellant will be returning to [APPELLANT] after an absence of over two and a half years and will

16 presumably return to live with his wife and children in his home area. There is no credible evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant has experienced serious infringements of internationally recognised human rights in the past. [76] Looking forward, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the risk of the appellant facing serious harm is anything more than remote to the point of being entirely speculative. It finds that objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in [APPELLANT]. [77] The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he returns to [APPELLANT]. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [78] For these reasons, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [79] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in , it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [80] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as [RESPONDENT]. [NAME] [81] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [NAME] in New Zealand under [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. Assessment of the Claim under [NAME] [82] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person

17 has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a [NAME] or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [83] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of their appeal as they do for their claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a [NAME].

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as [NAME] in New Zealand under [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [84] For the above reasons, the appellant is not [NAME] under section 130 of the Act. THE ICCPR [85] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [86] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment.

18 Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [87] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for the claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [88] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the [RESPONDENT] (to which [NAME] person status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035, at [82] and [NAME] v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [89] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under ICCPR [90] For the above reasons already given, the appellant is not [NAME] within the meaning of section 131(1) of the Act.

CONCLUSION [91] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and therefore is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of [NAME] and, therefore, is not [NAME] under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [92] The appeal is dismissed.

19 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [93] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellant. [94] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member